




Title of dissertation:                              TESTING A DUAL PATH FRAMEWORK OF THE 
BOOMERANG EFFECT: PROATTITUDINAL 
VERSUS COUNTERATTITUDINAL MESSAGES 
 
                                                      Xinyan Zhao, Doctor of Philosophy, 2017 
Dissertation directed by:                       Professor Edward L. Fink 
                      Department of Communication 
 
 
This dissertation aims to differentiate two types of boomerang effects on belief and 
attitude change: a boomerang effect under a proattitudinal message and a boomerang effect 
under a counterattitudinal message. By employing a 2 (Message valence: anti-policy vs. pro-
policy) × 2 (Issues: legal age for drinking vs. legal age of marriage) × 2 (Threat to freedom: low 
threat vs. high threat) × 2 (Argument quality: low quality vs. high quality) plus 2 (Control 
groups: no-message control for the two issues) cross-sectional factorial design (N = 458), 
antecedents and mediators that bring about the two types of boomerang effect were examined. 
Under a counterattitudinal message, both argument quality and prior belief strength predicted a 
boomerang effect: Those receiving a low-quality argument or those with a strong prior belief, as 
compared with the control group, exhibited a boomerang on belief and attitude. The dominant 
mechanism that explained the relationship between argument quality and belief position 
boomerang was counterarguing (vs. anger). Under a proattitudinal message, there was an indirect 
effect of trait reactance on belief boomerang through anger (vs. negative cognitions). But the 
perceived threat to attitudinal freedom did not predict a boomerang effect. These results 
contribute to attitude change research by empirically separating cognitive and affective 
mechanisms for boomerang effects. Furthermore, this study refines the construct of negative 
cognitions and integrates reactance theory and the cognitive response perspective on boomerang 
effects. Both structural equation models and confirmatory factor analysis suggested that 
counterarguments and nonrefutational thoughts were two distinct types of negative cognitions. 
The two constructs were caused by different sets of antecedents and had different outcomes: 
Poor argument quality caused counterarguments, whereas perceived threat and trait reactance 
caused nonrefutational thoughts. Only counterarguments mediated the effects of argument 
quality on the boomerang effects for belief (e.g., the extent to which the legal drinking age 
should be decreased on a magnitude scale) and belief position (e.g., the legal age for drinking), 
which subsequently predicted the boomerang effect on attitude (e.g., the extent to which the legal 
drinking age is liked). This dissertation expands the theoretical scope of belief and attitude 
change research. Future research should explore the persuasive appeals for mitigating the 
cognitive or affective process resulting in a boomerang effect. Among those who are more prone 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the persuasion and attitude change literature, there are many views as to whether there 
is such a thing as a boomerang effect or a backfire effect (J. Brehm, 1966; Cho & Salmon, 2007; 
Hornik, Jacobsohn, Orwin, Piesse, & Kalton, 2008; Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957; Pechmann 
& Slater, 2005; Ringold, 2002; Yzer, Cappella, Fishbein, Hornik, & Ahern, 2003). A boomerang 
effect has been understood to be one type of reduced persuasion (Quinn & Wood, 2004; 
Wegener, Petty, Smoak, & Fabrigar, 2004).  
The reasons for the diverse views regarding the existence of a boomerang effect are that 
there are different measurements and definitions of boomerang effects. In terms of measurement, 
some scholars maintain that a necessary requirement for a boomerang is to have a pretest that 
measures participants’ initial positions (Bettinghaus & Baseheart, 1969; Boster, Turner, & 
Lapinski, 2009; Hovland et al., 1957). Participants’ initial positions are used as a baseline for the 
observation of boomerang effects: If one’s belief moves away from the message-advocated 
position as compared with his or her initial position, then a boomerang effect has occurred. On 
the other hand, some scholars indicate that having a control group (i.e., a group exposed to an 
alternative message or no message) is sufficient to show a boomerang effect (Bessarabova, Fink, 
& Turner, 2013; Byrne & Hart, 2009). In this case, a control group’s position is considered to be 
an alternative type of baseline for determining the occurrence of boomerang effects. Furthermore, 
although some measure a boomerang effect on a relatively continuous unidimensional scale (e.g., 
Fishbein, Jamieson, Zimmer, Haeften, & Nabi, 2002; Fortier, 2011; Hornik et al., 2008; Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Kelley & Volkart, 1952; Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 1958), others have used 
a dichotomous scale (e.g., Snyder & Wicklund, 1976; Werle & Cuny, 2012; Wright, Wadley, 
Danner, & Phillips, 1992) or a multidimensional scale (e.g., Bessarabova et al., 2013).  
Despite these differences, a boomerang effect is typically defined in terms of its effect or 
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outcome. For example, Hovland and his colleagues indicated that a boomerang effect occurs 
when the advocated position in a persuasive message produces an attitudinal shift in the direction 
opposite to the advocated position of the message (Hovland et al., 1953; Kelley & Volkart, 1952; 
Sherif et al., 1958). Hovland et al. (1953) employed a measure of net change in attitude, which is 
the result of subtraction of one’s initial premessage position from one’s postmessage position, to 
evaluate whether a boomerang effect occurs. For example, suppose an undergraduate’s 
premessage position for the appropriate tuition raise is 10%. After receiving a message that 
advocates a 30% tuition increase, the student may believe that there should be no tuition increase 
at all, which represents support for a zero percent tuition increase. This outcome is a boomerang 
effect of – 10% (= 0% – 10%).  
However, scholars have not systematically examined the causes of a boomerang effect 
and whether these causes create a boomerang effect of the same kind. In other words, we still do 
not understand the mechanisms that underlie a boomerang effect. According to Stinchcombe 
(1987), this conceptualization of a variable by common sense is expected at the beginning stage 
of a science. However, “as science advances, it progressively redefines its concepts until they 
accurately represent the phenomena in the world” (Stinchcombe, 1987, p. 40). Therefore, we 
should redefine a boomerang effect not merely in terms of its common sense meaning but also in 
terms of its mechanism. 
Thus, a better definition is necessary for developing knowledge of boomerang effects. 
One way to do so is to define a boomerang effect in terms of its causes and effects. A boomerang 
effect is one of “the natural variables that creates administrative problems” (Stinchcombe, 1987, 
p. 41). But this variable may not have a unique set of causes. For example, a boomerang effect 
may be caused by reactance (J. Brehm, 1966; S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981) or low-quality 
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arguments (Park, Levine, Westerman, Orfgen, & Foregger, 2007). The goal of this dissertation is 
to identify and redefine the boomerang effect based on the set of its causes and effects. Only by 
separating possible different types of boomerang effects caused by different mechanisms will we 
be able to determine whether there is a unitary phenomenon termed a boomerang effect.  
An operational definition of a boomerang effect based on its outcome is employed before 
we are able to separate different mechanisms for a boomerang effect. Cross-sectional 
experimental studies that have found a boomerang effect in terms of its operational definition 
were synthesized in Table 1. Some studies were designed in a way to observe a boomerang effect 
in a laboratory (e.g., Cohen, 1962; Fortier, 2011; Werle & Cuny, 2012; Wicklund & Brehm, 
1968; Wright et al., 1992), whereas some have accidentally found a boomerang effect (e.g., 
Fishbein et al., 2002; Hornik et al., 2008; Park et al., 2007). Specifically, after receiving a 
message, if participants showed belief or attitude change in a direction that was opposite to the 
one advocated in a message, either with a within-subjects or between-subjects design, there is a 
boomerang effect (Byrne & Hart, 2009; Hovland et al., 1957).  
Based on an analysis of these prior studies (see Table 1 for a list of studies in which a 
boomerang effect was observed), two possible types of boomerang effects are examined. The 
first type is a boomerang effect that occurs after people receive a proattitudinal message that 
threatens their attitudinal freedom. In a number of studies, participants showed a boomerang 
effect after they received a message that advocated a position consistent with their own 
(Bessarabova et al., 2013; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Grisevicius, 2007; Silvia, 2006; 
Snyder & Wicklund, 1976, Experiment 1; Wicklund, 1974; Worchel & Brehm, 1970) and had 
high threat to their attitudinal freedom (Bessarabova et al., 2013; Heller, Pallak, & Picek, 1973; 
Sensenig & Brehm, 1968; Silvia, 2006; Snyder & Wicklund, 1976; Worchel & Brehm, 1970). 
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When people process a proattitudinal message, reactance is expected to be a dominant 
explanation for a boomerang effect; reactance is a motivational state that causes a person to 
attempt to restore the eliminated or threatened freedom (J. Brehm, 1966; S. Brehm & Brehm, 
1981).  
The second type of boomerang effects is a boomerang effect that occurs after people 
receive a counterattitudinal message. In several studies, either argument strength (B. Johnson, 
Smith-McLallen, Killeya, & Levin, 2004; Park et al., 2007; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) 
or prior belief strength (Gollust, Lantz, & Ubel, 2009; Hart & Nisbet, 2011; Na, 1999; Nyhan & 
Reifler, 2010) were found to be predictors of a boomerang effect. When people process a 
counterattitudinal message, one’s generation of counterarguments is expected to be a dominant 
explanation for a boomerang effect.  
This dissertation will differentiate these two possible types of boomerang effects by 
examining the dominant mechanism (i.e., negative affect or counterarguments) for each 
boomerang effect and investigate the antecedents that bring about the two types of boomerang 
effect. A dominant mechanism means that compared to another mechanism, the particular 
mechanism is more influential (see the Method chapter for an operational definition of a 
dominant mechanism).  
The idea that there are two types of boomerang effects raises the question of how to 
differentiate them. Without differentiation, we are not able to tell whether each of these 
mechanisms has a set of unique causes and effects. For example, after receiving a 
counterattitudinal message that contains low quality arguments, participants are expected to have 
high levels of counterarguing (i.e., direct rebuttal of arguments in the message; Brock, 1967) and 
low levels of negative affect. In this scenario, if these participants show more negative affect 
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than counterarguing, there is no need to differentiate a boomerang effect under a 
counterattitudinal message and a boomerang effect under a proattitudinal message, because the 
two types of boomerang effects were explained by the same mechanism. Thus, we may conclude 
that a boomerang effect is a unitary concept with a unique set of causes and effects.  
One can measure anger to differentiate a boomerang effect under a proattitudinal message 
from a boomerang effect under a counterattitudinal message. Anger is considered as a mediating 
mechanism of reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005). Dillard and Shen’s (2005) results show that 
high-threat participants experience more anger than low-threat participants. In addition, one can 
measure counterarguing to differentiate the two types of boomerang effects. Counterarguing is 
considered to be one type of negative thoughts (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains & Turner, 
2007). Counterarguing (vs. negative affect) is expected to be a dominant explanation for a 
boomerang effect for a counterattitudinal message. In contrast, counterarguing is not a sufficient 
condition for a boomerang effect for a proattitudinal message. Other types of negative cognitions 
(e.g., nonmessage-originated negative thoughts) may explain the cognitive process of reactance 
that mediates a boomerang effect for a proattitudinal message.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to differentiate the two potential types of boomerang 
effects and to examine the antecedents and mediators that bring about each type. The next 
chapter provides an overview of theories useful for explaining a boomerang effect, including 
reactance theory, the elaboration likelihood model, and biased assimilation. Seven hypotheses 
and two research questions are proposed based on the theoretical framework. The Method 
chapter provides descriptions of the procedures and results for five pilot studies, data collection, 
measurement of variables, and analytical approaches for the main experiment. The Results 
chapter delineates results from statistical analyses in the main experiment. The dissertation 
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Chapter 2: A Dual Path Boomerang Framework: Proattitudinal vs. Counterattitudinal 
Messages 
A Boomerang Effect Under a Proattitudinal Message 
The theory of psychological reactance. According to the theory of psychological 
reactance, when an individual’s exercise of freedom is threatened by “an increase in the 
perceived difficulty of attaining a potential outcome” (S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 3), one 
responds with reactance. Reactance is “the motivational state that is hypothesized to occur when 
a freedom is eliminated or threatened with elimination” (S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 37). 
Applied to the study of persuasion and attitude change, a persuasive message that restricts or 
threatens one’s freedom to take alternative positions is expected to cause reactance (J. Brehm, 
1966). When experiencing reactance, people attempt to re-establish their attitudinal freedom in 
various ways, including by derogating the source (Kohn & Barnes, 1977; Wright, 1986), moving 
away from the position advocated by the communicator (i.e., a boomerang effect; see, e.g., 
Heller et al., 1973; Worchel & Brehm, 1970), or obtaining social support (Bochner & Insko, 
1966).   
The level of reactance an individual has depends on the amount of threat the person 
perceives regarding the freedom that is threatened and the importance of that attitudinal freedom 
(S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). A persuasive message that aims to change an attitude can be one 
source of threat to freedom (e.g., Fishbein et al., 2002; Walster & Festinger, 1962). If one 
perceives that a persuasive message tries to change his or her opinion regarding an issue, one 
may perceive that his or her freedom to take alternative positions is threatened. Thus, the person 
experiences reactance. The amount of threat that one experiences can be influenced by the 
explicitness of the persuasive intent (Bolton, Cohen, & Bloom, 2006; Dean, Austin, & Watts, 
1971; Heller et al., 1973; Sensenig & Brehm, 1968; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kübler, & Wänke, 
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1993; Yzer et al., 2003), language intensity (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Miller, Lane, Deatrick, 
Young, & Potts, 2007; Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), and the power of 
the communicator (J. Brehm, 1966, pp. 113-116; Dean et al., 1971). It is possible that the effect 
of reactance is substantial enough to result in a boomerang effect (J. Brehm, 1966).  
The importance of the attitudinal freedom that is threatened by a communication also 
influences the amount of reactance that one experiences. On the one hand, it is possible that one 
perceives the freedom to take a proattitudinal position as important. For example, if a person 
supports the current legal drinking age, then that person is likely to assign higher importance to 
his or her belief position on drinking (i.e., believing in the legal drinking age of 21) as compared 
with topics toward which the person has no prior belief (e.g., flossing). On the other hand, given 
a proattitudinal message that threatens one’s attitudinal freedom, one may perceive the freedom 
to take alternative positions as equally important or even value the attitudinal freedom to take 
alternative positions more before their exposure to the threat. According to commodity theory, 
the more a commodity (i.e., anything that is relevant to the person possessing it) is perceived to 
be unavailable, the more receivers value or desire the commodity (Brock, 1968). Thus, a belief 
or behavior that cannot be obtained may be judged to be more valuable by message receivers 
(Byrne & Hart, 2009).  
The perceived threat of a proattitudinal message may be particularly strong for those 
whose attitude strength is moderate (S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Smith, 1977, 1978; Snyder & 
Wicklund, 1976, Experiment 1; Worchel & Brehm, 1970). Smith (1977) indicated that she did 
not find a boomerang effect because subjects in her experiment were strongly committed to the 
position advocated in the message and might have perceived the attitudinal freedom to take other 
positions to be less important. Therefore, when receiving a proattitudinal message, people may 
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experience reactance because their freedom to adopt other positions, which may be equally (or 
even more) important to them, is threatened.  
Boomerang given a proattitudinal communication. A proattitudinal message is defined 
as a message with which a person initially agrees prior to exposure to the message. When there is 
a proattitudinal communication that contains a threat to attitudinal freedom, those who initially 
agreed with the position advocated in a message will exhibit a boomerang effect because they 
need to establish their freedom not to take the position advocated in the message, according to 
the notion of the prior exercise of freedom (Wicklund, 1974). Thus, a communication that 
threatens one’s attitudinal freedom only causes a boomerang effect among those who initially 
agreed with the advocated position in the message (Bessarabova et al., 2013; Schultz et al., 2007; 
Silvia, 2006; Snyder & Wicklund, 1976, Experiment 1; Werle & Cuny, 2012; Wicklund, 1974; 
Worchel & Brehm, 1970). For example, Schultz et al. (2007) found that among households that 
were already saving energy, there was a boomerang effect in their behaviors (i.e., increased 
energy consumption) after their exposure to a proattitudinal message that advocated saving 
energy. Worchel and Brehm (1970) found that only subjects who initially agreed with the 
communicator (i.e., that were presented with a proattitudinal message) showed attitude change in 
a direction that was opposite to the message position. Worchel and Brehm (1970) argued that “a 
subject who disagrees with the communicator is already exercising the freedom ‘threatened,’ 
while the subject who agrees with the communicator is not exercising the freedom threatened” 
(Worchel & Brehm, 1970, p. 21).  
In this study, a boomerang is considered as one possible route to restoring the threatened 
or eliminated attitudinal freedom, by moving away from the advocated message position as 
compared to a control group.  For example, regarding the legal drinking age policy, one may 
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accept 18 as the legal age. A proattitudinal message that advocates lowering the legal age from 
21 to 18 threatens the person’s freedom to take the alternative positions not advocated by the 
message. As a result, the person may show a boomerang effect by moving away from the 
message’s advocated position as compared with his or her initial belief (i.e., the postmessage 
belief could be 22 or 17). Because beliefs and attitudes are interrelated and can affect each other 
(Woelfel & Fink, 1980), the person may also show a boomerang effect on the attitudinal level, 
by having a more favorable attitude toward the current drinking policy or by indicating less 
agreement with advocated message position (i.e., lowering the legal age).  
Our conceptualization of a boomerang effect is consistent with the original work on 
psychological reactance (S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Worchel & Brehm, 1970; Wicklund, 1974) 
but different from that of other studies (Quick & Stephenson, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Quick and 
his colleagues considered a boomerang an unintended effect of a persuasive message not desired 
by message producers, particularly in the health domain. In addition, Quick and his colleagues 
adopted a broader definition of a boomerang by considering the boomerang effect on both the 
individual and group levels. For example, given a message that promotes exercising, a message 
recipient is considered to have a boomerang effect if the person (1) is less motivated to exercise, 
(2) is more motivated to imagine being around others who do not exercise, and (3) is more 
motivated to do other unhealthful behaviors such as smoking.  
Antecedent: Perceived threat to attitudinal freedom. For a proattitudinal 
communication, the amount of reactance one experiences can be manipulated by the amount of 
perceived threat to the person’s attitudinal freedom (S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Previous studies 
suggest that a manipulation combining intent to persuade and language intensity was effective in 
inducing reactance (Bessarabova et al., 2013; Dillard & Shen, 2005; Miller, Lane, Deatrick, 
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Young, & Potts, 2007). Intent to persuade can cause reactance because respondents may perceive 
a message as being manipulative (Bessarabova et al., 2013). And the use of an intense and 
explicit message can cause reactance (Miller et al., 2007; Silvia, 2006). Explicit language 
“conveys a single meaning and leaves little doubt as to the source’s intentions”  (Miller et al., 
2007) and can be conveyed by the use of imperatives (e.g., should). But explicit language does 
not create a low quality message, which is defined by its validity of reasoning and organization 
of arguments.  
Based on the discussion above, when a proattitudinal message with a clear persuasive 
intent and intense language is present, individuals are expected to perceive high threat to their 
attitudinal freedom for not adopting the position advocated in the message, which may cause 
reactance and subsequently a boomerang effect. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 predicts that among 
those who receive a proattitudinal message, those who perceive high threat to their attitudinal 
freedom (vs. the control participants) have a boomerang effect; those who perceive low threat to 
their attitudinal freedom (vs. the control participants) do not have a boomerang effect.  
H1: Those who receive a proattitudinal message that has a high threat to their attitudinal 
freedom (vs. the control participants), but not those who receive a proattitudinal message that 
has a low threat to their attitudinal freedom (vs. the control participants), exhibit a boomerang 
effect.  
Mediator: Reactance. The theory of psychological reactance suggests that reactance 
mediates the relationship between perceived threat to attitudinal freedom and a boomerang effect. 
To test this idea of mediation, a clarification of the conceptualization and measurement of 
reactance is needed. Although S. Brehm and Brehm (1981, p. 37) claimed that reactance cannot 
be measured directly and can only be studied by its outcome, several scholars have proposed that 
 
 12 
reactance is a combination of affect (i.e., anger) and cognition (i.e., negative thoughts; Dillard & 
Shen, 2005; Kim, Levine, & Allen, 2013; Quick & Bates, 2010; Quick & Kim, 2009; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2007b; Rains & Turner, 2007). Specifically, participants who received a high 
freedom-threatening message had more reactance in terms of having more anger and more 
negative thoughts as compared to those who received a low freedom-threatening message.  
When people feel that their freedom of choice is threatened, they show reactance by 
displaying negative affect, such as discomfort or aggressive feelings (J. Brehm, 1966). 
According to Miron and Brehm (2006), whether the discomfort is perceived as anger or other 
emotions depends on the characteristics of the threat (e.g., the legitimacy of the threat). Anger 
has consistently been found to represent this discomfort (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains & 
Turner, 2007), particularly when the message has both a personal insult and high attitudinal 
threat (Abelson & Miller, 1967; Kim et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, when people receive a message that threatens their attitudinal freedom, they 
also show reactance by generating negative thoughts toward the persuasive communication 
(Bessarabova et al., 2013; Brock, 1967; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979a; Rains & Turner, 2007). 
Following the reactance literature, negative thoughts are defined in a broad sense: They are 
thoughts that (1) express disagreement with any component of a message (e.g., message source 
or evidence) or (2) suggest alternatives to the advocated position in the message. Negative 
thoughts do not necessarily include counterarguing and there can be other types of negative 
thoughts. (This will be explained below; Brehm, 1966, pp. 106-108.) 
 In addition, trait reactance, one’s personal propensity to experience reactance (Dillard & 
Shen, 2005; Hong & Faedda, 1996; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), may also affect the degree of 
reactance aroused if a proattitudinal message contains a threat to one’s attitudinal freedom. In 
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Dillard and Shen’s (2005) study, both threat to attitudinal freedom and trait reactance predicted 
attitudes toward binge drinking and flossing through the mediator of reactance. Thus, Hypothesis 
2 predicts that given a proattitudinal message, reactance (i.e., negative affect and negative 
cognitions) mediates the effect of perceived threat and trait reactance on a boomerang effect.  
H2a: Given proattitudinal communication, there are indirect effects of perceived 
attitudinal threat on the boomerang effect through anger and negative cognitions, such that the 
higher perceived attitudinal threat, the more anger and negative cognitions, which result in a 
larger boomerang effect.   
H2b: Given proattitudinal communication, there are indirect effects of trait reactance on 
the boomerang effect through anger and negative cognitions, such that the higher trait 
reactance, the more anger and negative cognitions, which result in a larger boomerang effect.   
 Given a proattitudinal message that threatens one’s attitudinal freedom, anger and 
negative cognitions as mediators may vary in their relative dominance or importance. It is of 
interest whether anger or negative thoughts is the dominant mediator for the reactance process, 
because the dual path boomerang framework hypothesizes different sets of antecedents and 
mediators for differentiating the two types of boomerang effects. If one has more negative 
thoughts (vs. anger) given a proattitudinal message with attitudinal threat, there is less evidence 
for differentiating a boomerang effect under a counterattitudinal message and a boomerang effect 
under a proattitudinal message, because the two types are explained by a similar mediator (i.e., 
counterarguing is one type of negative thought). In some of the previous studies, anger (vs. 
negative thoughts) contributed more to reactance, as the factor loading of reactance on anger (vs. 
negative thoughts) was larger in magnitude (Quick & Kim, 2009; Rains & Tuner, 2007, 
Experiment 1). Other studies found that both negative thoughts and anger were equally important 
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mediators as both had significant indirect effects that were similar in magnitude (Dillard & Shen, 
2005; Quick & Stephenson, 2007b). Thus, to understand the relative dominance of anger, as 
compared to negative cognitions, Research Question 1 is proposed: 
RQ1: Is anger (vs. negative cognitions) the dominant process of a boomerang effect given 
a proattitudinal message?  
A Boomerang Effect Under a Counterattitudinal Message 
Considering a counterattitudinal message. According to the theory of reactance (J. 
Brehm, 1966) and the prior exercise of freedom (Wicklund, 1974), those who initially disagree 
with the position advocated in a message may experience low levels of reactance. This is because 
by having message-inconsistent positions, those who initially disagree with the message position 
have already exercised their freedom for not accepting the advocated position in the message. 
Snyder and Wicklund (1976) argued that those who were in initial disagreement with a message 
position are more secure about having the freedom not to take the position advocated in the 
persuasive message, because they have exercised that freedom by showing disagreement. S. 
Brehm and Brehm (1982) suggested that a counterattitudinal issue might not create enough 
reactance to cause a boomerang effect: 
If a person believes X and the freedom to believe this is threatened by someone else 
telling the person to believe Y, subsequent endorsement of any position on the X side 
immediately reestablishes the freedom to believe X. Confronted with a motive to comply 
as well as a motive to resist, the person can satisfy both motives simultaneously. He or 
she can comply by moving toward the counterattitudinal position but can resist by staying 
on his or her initial side. Given this state of affairs, it may be difficult to create strong 




Thus, confronted with a counterattitudinal message, people can easily re-establish their 
freedom to adopt their prior view by staying at the initial position rather than by having a 
boomerang effect. Therefore, a counterattitudinal message should not result in a boomerang 
effect through reactance.  
However, a counterattitudinal persuasive message that is unconvincing may cause a 
boomerang effect that is mediated by a different mechanism, that is, by counterarguing. A 
counterattitudinal message should elicit greater elaboration, more counterarguments (Brock, 
1967; Fink & Cai, 2013, p. 92), and possibly a boomerang (B. Johnson et al., 2004). This type of 
boomerang effect mediated by counterarguing has been examined in studies of cognitive 
response and cognitive elaboration.  
Antecedent: Argument quality. According to the cognitive response perspective (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1979b, 1984), how a message is evaluated by the receiver determines the outcome 
of the communication. People who are motivated to process a message are more likely to 
determine their attitudes by scrutinizing the quality of arguments in a message (i.e., the central 
route, as compared to the peripheral route, to persuasion; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b). When 
individuals receive a counterattitudinal communication, they tend to elaborate on the message, 
that is to say, they are more likely to think about the quality of the message, assuming that they 
are involved with the message. If the quality of the message is perceived to be low, they tend to 
counterargue the message, which might give rise to a boomerang effect. That is, argument 
quality may be an antecedent of a boomerang effect given counterattitudinal communication. 
Park et al. (2007) proposed that low-quality arguments (as compared to high-quality arguments) 
are sufficient to yield a boomerang effect regardless of the level of ego-involvement, message 
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involvement, or the type of the advocated position in the message (pro vs. con). However, 
Neimeyer, MacNair, Metzler, and Courchaine (1991) found that weak arguments are associated 
with reduced persuasion rather than with a boomerang effect.  
This inconsistency may be explained by the different definitions of argument quality. 
Neimeyer et al. (1991) used the effect-based definition of argument quality: Strong arguments 
are those that induce favorable thoughts in message recipients, whereas weak arguments are 
those that induce unfavorable thoughts in message recipients (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 
1981). However, Park et al. (2007) defined argument quality as a pre-existing feature of a 
message: Strong arguments are characterized by sound logic, valid reasons, logical persuasion, 
and statistical statements, whereas weak messages rely on personal opinions, assertions without 
support, and circular arguments (O’Keefe, 2003). Thus, the arguments that induce unfavorable 
thoughts may be logical and valid (e.g., a woman who strongly disagrees with abortion may have 
unfavorable thoughts toward a message that advocates the right to have an abortion, even if the 
message has sound logic and valid reasons). As a result, message recipients may find it difficult 
to argue with logical arguments that induce unfavorable thoughts. And it should be much easier 
to attack an illogical message that relies on circular arguments or anecdotal information, even 
though the message may induce favorable thoughts. Thus, it may be easier to create a boomerang 
effect when argument quality is defined in terms of its characteristics rather than its effect.  
Some scholars have argued that argument quality is not a sufficient antecedent of a 
boomerang effect, and only the interaction between message involvement and argument quality 
predicts a boomerang effect (e.g., B. Johnson et al., 2004; Petty et al., 1981). B. Johnson et al. 
(2004) found that low argument quality (vs. high argument quality) was associated with a 
boomerang effect among those message-involved people who receive a counterattitudinal 
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message. Message involvement refers to the extent to which a message topic has personal 
meaning and important personal consequences (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b, 1984). Indeed, those 
who are more involved with a message may exhibit more attitude change that is opposite to that 
advocated in the message after their exposure to a low-quality message (i.e., there is an 
interaction between argument quality and message involvement). However, given that message 
involvement is one factor that causes message receivers’ elaboration of arguments in the 
message, alternative factors that motivate people to scrutinize a message, such as perceived 
importance of the message or ego involvement with the message (Johnson & Eagly, 1989), may 
also interact with argument quality in creating a boomerang effect.  
Few of the studies that have examined the influence of argument quality on attitude 
change have reported a boomerang effect. One reason for the lack of evidence for the existence 
of a boomerang effect may be a lack of theoretical explication. Except for reactance theory (J. 
Brehm, 1962) and the competitive processing hypothesis (Byrne & Hart, 2009), there is rarely 
any theory or model that explicates the relationship between a boomerang effect and its 
antecedents. Another reason for the few findings of a boomerang effect given counterattitudinal 
communication with low argument quality may be that the designs in previous studies did not 
facilitate the finding of a boomerang effect, because neither a control group was used nor were 
participants’ initial attitudes measured (e.g., Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 2002). Park et al. (2007) 
observed a boomerang effect caused by weak arguments; they did measure participants’ initial 
attitudes. But because Park et al. (2007) did not measure participants’ generation of 
counterarguments, we do not know whether counterarguing mediated the boomerang effect 
observed in their study.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 predicts that among those who receive a counterattitudinal 
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message, those who receive low-quality arguments (vs. the control participants) will have a 
boomerang effect, but those who receive high-quality arguments (vs. the control participants) 
will not show a boomerang effect.  
H3: Those who receive a counterattitudinal message that has low quality arguments (vs. 
the control participants), but not those who receive a counterattitudinal message that has high 
quality arguments (vs. the control participants), exhibit a boomerang effect.  
Antecedent: Prior belief strength. According to motivated reasoning theory (Hart & 
Nisbet, 2011; Redlawsk, 2006; Strickland, Taber, & Lodge, 2011) or the biased assimilation 
hypothesis (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), people who hold strong beliefs or attitudes on a social 
issue are likely to interpret and process a message in a biased manner that reinforces their 
predisposition. Because of biased assimilation, those with a strong belief may perceive low 
argument quality in a counterattitudinal message, because these people may be more skeptical of 
the attitude-inconsistent information (vs. the attitude-consistent ones; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; 
Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Consequently, based on the effect of argument quality on a boomerang 
effect, those with a strong belief are expected to generate counterarguments and have a 
boomerang (Redlawsk, 2006). That is to say, after receiving a counterattitudinal message, a 
person who holds a strong attitude toward a message may have a boomerang effect. Similarly, 
according to Cohen’s  (1962) extension of cognitive dissonance theory, if people hold a strong 
belief on a social issue and their prior cognitions are “highly resistant to change” (Cohen, 1962, 
p. 77), they may bolster their initial belief (i.e., reduce dissonance) by adding consonant 
cognitions, such as by responding with a boomerang effect or by enhancing the strength of their 
beliefs (see also Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956).  
Several studies support the influence of prior belief or attitude strength on a boomerang 
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effect (Gollust et al., 2009; Hart & Nisbet, 2011; Na, 1999; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Hart and 
Nisbet (2011) found that after exposure to a message that discussed the possible harms to health 
due to global climate change, Republicans had a boomerang effect by showing significantly 
decreased support for climate change mitigation policies compared to a control group. Gollust et 
al. (2009) found that Republicans reported a lower level of support for public health polices 
compared to control participants after these Republicans read a counterattitudinal message that 
attributed Type 2 diabetes to social determinants. Na (1999) showed that those with a strong 
attitude who received a counterattitudinal message had a boomerang effect. Furthermore, Na 
(1999) found that participants’ generation of counterarguments mediated the effect of attitude 
strength on a boomerang effect. According to Na (1999), those with a strongly held attitude can 
“easily and willingly generate counterarguments from their already elaborated cognitive structure 
for that strongly held attitude” (Na, 1999, p. 591).  
Some nonexperimental studies show that attitude strength is associated with a boomerang 
effect. Hovland et al. (1957) examined attitudes toward a controversial message (support for 
prohibition vs. repeal of prohibition in a dry state). Prior to the communication, people were 
purposely selected from several “dry” or “wet” groups. These people had established and 
publicly had committed themselves to dry or wet views, which probably indicated high attitude 
strength. After those who held the extreme “dry” position were exposed to a highly 
counterattitudinal “wet” communication, they showed a boomerang effect. Similarly, Kelley and 
Volkart (1952) conducted a study in which Boy Scouts were exposed to a message that 
challenged group-anchored attitudes. Students who placed a high value on their membership in 
the Boy Scouts (i.e., those who were presumed to be strong attitude holders) had attitude change 
away from the advocated message position. And N. Miller (1965) found that those who had 
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highly dogmatic and extreme initial attitudes and were involved with the message also showed 
attitude change away from the advocated position.  
Hypothesis 4 predicts that among those who receive a counterattitudinal message, those 
whose prior belief is strong (vs. the control participants) will have a boomerang effect. Among 
those who receive a counterattitudinal message, those whose prior belief is weak (vs. the control 
participants) will not show a boomerang effect.  
H4: Those who receive a counterattitudinal message and have a strong prior belief (vs. 
the control participants) exhibit a boomerang effect. Those who receive a counterattitudinal 
message and have a weak prior belief (vs. the control participants) do not exhibit a boomerang 
effect.  
Mediator: Counterarguing. The dominant mechanism that mediates a boomerang effect 
under a counterattitudinal message should be the generation of counterarguments. 
Counterarguments are defined as arguments with reasoning that directly refute or attack one or 
more arguments in the message (Jacks & Cameron, 2003). This definition is consistent with 
Brock’s (1967) definition that counterarguments are “declarative statements directed against the 
advocated position” and contain “a specific unfavorable or undesirable consequence that was not 
simply a restatement or paraphrase of the advocated position” (p. 301).  
Counterarguing should mediate the relationship between argument quality and the 
boomerang effect under a counterattitudinal message. Many studies have shown that argument 
quality predicts the generation of counterarguments, which affects persuasion. Counterarguing 
should be differentiated from reactance-based anger. Rains and Turner (2007) found that 
manipulated argument quality in a message about banning alcohol did not have any significant 
influence on reactance, a combination of anger and negative cognitions, in the first experiment. 
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Rains and Turner (2007) explained that participants may neglect the manipulation of argument 
quality that was placed after the manipulation of perceived threat to attitudinal freedom, because 
“once they perceived a threat to their freedom, the actual arguments supporting the threat may be 
unimportant” (p. 262). Although their explanation may be easily tested by changing the 
placement of the two manipulations, there is a more plausible explanation based on cognitive 
elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b, 1984): The influence of argument quality on an attitude is 
mediated by counterarguing rather than by reactance; the two mechanisms are different.  
This dissertation examines whether counterarguing mediates the relationship between 
argument quality and the boomerang effect across issues with different advocated positions. 
Thought listing may be used to measure counterarguing (Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, & 
Brock, 1981). With this approach, both one’s attitude and thoughts after message exposure are 
assessed. Differences in message elaboration are reflected in the differences in the number and 
types of thoughts listed. Thus, Hypothesis 5 predicts that in the counterattitudinal message 
condition, counterarguing mediates the effect of argument quality on a boomerang effect. 
H5: In the counterattitudinal message condition, there is an indirect effect of argument 
quality on a boomerang effect through counterarguing, such that the lower argument quality, the 
more counterarguing, which results in a larger boomerang effect.   
In addition, to establish the dual path to boomerang effects, we need to test whether 
counterarguing, anger, or their combination mediates the relationship between argument quality 
and a boomerang effect (by examining the significance of the indirect effects through the 
mediators). If both counterarguing and anger mediate the relationship between argument quality 
and a boomerang effect, it is highly likely that the actual mechanism underlying this process is 
reactance. If that is the case, there is no need to differentiate the two types of boomerang effects. 
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Kim et al. (2013) found that argument quality predicted reactance, which subsequently led to 
reduced persuasion for the issue of banning cellphones in class. But Kim et al. (2013) only 
employed one issue with a single advocated position, which largely constrains the 
generalizability of their results. Therefore, Research Question 2 asks whether counterarguing (vs. 
anger) is a dominant process in a boomerang effect given a counterattitudinal issue. 
RQ2: Is counterarguing (vs. anger) the dominant process of a boomerang effect given a 
counterattitudinal communication? 
An Integrated Dual Path Framework: Differentiating Negative Cognitions and 
Counterarguing 
Based on the dual path boomerang framework, negative cognitions were hypothesized to 
mediate the relationship (1) between perceived threat and a boomerang effect and (2) between 
trait reactance and a boomerang effect given proattitudinal communication; and counterarguing 
was hypothesized to mediate the relationship between argument quality and a boomerang effect 
given counterattitudinal communication. However, the definitions of negative cognitions and 
counterarguing have been used inconsistently in previous studies. The two concepts were used 
interchangeably in some studies (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Festinger & Maccoby, 1964; Kim et al., 
2013) but were treated as distinct constructs in other studies (Brock, 1967; Cameron, Jacks, & 
O’Brien, 2002; Jacks & Cameron, 2003). To refine the research on reactance and cognitive 
response, we differentiate the two concepts by considering counterarguing as one type of 
negative thoughts. Negative thoughts can be categorized into two types: Counterarguing that 
comprises negative thoughts with direct rebuttal of arguments in the message (Brock, 1967), and 
nonrefutational thoughts, which do not refute the arguments in the message (Jacks & Cameron, 
2003). Typical nonrefutational thoughts found in the literature include self-attitude bolstering, 
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which involves generation of thoughts that are favorable toward one’s prior attitude without 
directly refuting message arguments (Cameron et al., 2002, p. 206); communication derogation, 
which involves insulting the message without providing arguments (Wright, 1986); and 
suggestion of alternatives to the advocated position or to the problem discussed in the message 
(Osterhouse & Brock, 1970).  
Previous studies have not examined the type of negative thoughts that are caused by 
perceived threat and trait reactance in the reactance process. It is possible that nonrefutational 
negative thoughts, rather than counterarguments, are the type of negative thoughts generated 
given a message that threatens one’s attitudinal freedom. Perceived threat to attitudinal freedom 
may play the role of a heuristic cue during message processing (Rains & Turner, 2007), which 
results in less elaboration and fewer counterarguments targeting the message. This heuristic cue 
may also give rise to more nonrefutational thoughts such as communication derogation. Silvia 
(2006) found that communication derogation, one type of nonrefutational negative thought, 
mediated the influence of perceived attitudinal threat on respondents’ attitude. It is also unknown 
whether counterarguing, nonrefutational thoughts, or both are caused by low quality messages. It 
is reasonable that people may exhibit more message or source derogation (i.e., one type of 
nonrefutational negative thoughts) given low quality arguments. To differentiate 
counterarguments and nonrefutational thoughts and to examine the antecedents and outcomes of 
the two, several hypotheses are proposed:  
H6a: There is an indirect effect of perceived threat on a boomerang effect through 
nonrefutational thoughts, such that the higher perceived threat, the more nonrefutational 
thoughts, which result in a larger boomerang effect.   
H6b: There is an indirect effect of trait reactance on a boomerang effect through 
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nonrefutational thoughts, such that the higher trait reactance, the more nonrefutational thoughts, 
which result in a larger boomerang effect.   
H7a: There is an indirect effect of argument quality on a boomerang effect through 
counterarguing, such that the lower argument quality, the more counterarguing, which results in 
a larger boomerang effect.   
H7b: There is an indirect effect of argument quality on a boomerang effect through 
nonrefutational thoughts, such that the lower argument quality, the more nonrefutational 
thoughts, which results in a larger boomerang effect.   
Measuring a Boomerang Effect 
As previously stated, a boomerang effect has been evaluated inconsistently. Some 
scholars maintain that a necessary requirement for a boomerang is to have a pretest that measures 
participants’ initial positions (Bettinghaus & Baseheart, 1969; Boster et al., 2009; Hovland et al., 
1957), whereas some scholars indicate that having a control group (i.e., a group exposed to an 
alternative message or no message) is sufficient to show a boomerang effect (Bessarabova et al., 
2013; Byrne & Hart, 2009). In this study, a control group’s belief and attitude were used as the 
baseline for measuring a boomerang effect. This is because if subjects are asked to indicate their 
belief and attitude prior to the message, they may be sensitized and be aware of their 
postmessage belief or attitude change. Sensitization could cause bias from the interaction 
between pretest and message. 
In addition, some scholars have used a dichotomous scale to determine the existence of a 
boomerang effect (e.g., J. Brehm, 1966, pp. 109-112; Snyder & Wicklund, 1976; Worchel & 
Brehm, 1970; Wright et al., 1992). For example, in Wright et al.’s (1992) experiment, female 
students were exposed to a message that had three levels (i.e., high, low, and control) of threat to 
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their freedom and were asked to evaluate the relative attractiveness of two males. Before the 
manipulation messages, all these women received some basic information about the two males. 
In the high-threat condition, these women were told that there was not any choice but to choose 
candidate A, who was superior to candidate B on several dimensions, such as appearance. In the 
low-threat condition, the women received a suggestion to choose A. In the control condition, 
there was no message. If fewer women in the high-threat condition (vs. the control condition) 
selected candidate A, these women in the high threat condition had a boomerang effect. Wright 
et al. (1992) found that only 14% participants in the high threat condition chose A (i.e., the 
candidate who was praised by the message); in contrast, 56% participants in the control 
condition chose A. Thus, Wright et al. (1992) concluded that there was a boomerang effect. 
However, Wright et al. (1992) used a dichotomous scale where a subject had to go with either 
the “choose A” or the “do not choose A” option. It can be easier to find a boomerang effect with 
a dichotomous rather than a nondichotomous scale such as a continuous measure (Bessarabova et 
al., 2013). With the dichotomous scale, an individual is forced to select one of the two options 
and there is a 50% chance that the person has a boomerang effect without considering other 
factors. However, with the continuous scale, one can move to any position and the likelihood of 
a boomerang effect should be much lower.  
A number of scholars have used Likert-type scales in studies regarding reactance (e.g., 
Silvia, 2006; Smith, 1977). Variables measured by Likert-type scales are not continuous and may 
have many cases at the floor or ceiling because Likert-type scales are bound at the top and the 
bottom (Fink, 2009). For example, Smith (1977) used the gain score of participants’ responses 
from pretest to posttest on a Likert-type scale to measure attitude change. A negative gain score 
in the high-threat condition that was significantly different from the gain score in the low-threat 
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condition or in the control condition would indicate that threat to freedom caused a boomerang 
effect. Using this scale, Smith (1977) did not observe a boomerang effect.  
In addition, a boomerang effect has been measured on different variables, including 
beliefs (e.g., Qucik & Considine, 2008; Snyder & Wicklund, 1976; Wicklund & Brehm, 1968; 
Wright et al., 1992), attitudes (e.g., Dean et al., 1971; Silvia, 2006; Smith, 1977, 1978; Worchel 
& Brehm, 1970; Wright, 1986), and behavioral intention or actual behavior (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 
2005; Rains & Turner, 2007, Study 2; Schultz et al., 2007).  
In the current study, boomerang effects were measured by continuous scales (e.g., 
magnitude scales) on belief and attitude. The continuous scale provides the following benefits: 
First, a continuous scale measures both whether there is a boomerang effect as well as the 
magnitude of the boomerang effect; second, a continuous scale is not bound at the top, thus it 
does not have potential ceiling effects. For example, let’s assume that a person’s attitude toward 
an issue prior to a communication is 5 on a 5-point Likert-type scale. After receiving a low-
quality counterattitudinal message, the individual may generate counterarguments toward the 
message and source and have a boomerang effect. However, if there is a boomerang effect, it 
may not be captured by the 5-point Likert-type scale, because the individual cannot move further 
than 5 on this scale. The person may show no attitude change (i.e., score 5) or change toward the 
message (i.e., score lower than 5). Therefore, continuous scales will be employed to measure 
belief and attitude, which will then be used to compute a difference score that represents a 
boomerang effect.  
Belief and Attitude Boomerang  
The dual path boomerang framework considers the boomerang effects on beliefs and 
attitudes. To be precise, a belief can be nonevaluative or evaluative (e.g., “X is Y,” where Y can 
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be either nonevaluative or evaluative, whereas an attitude means “I like [or dislike] X.”) 
According to theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and 
the summative model of attitude (Fishbein, 1967), one’s attitude toward an issue is a function of 
one’s salient beliefs about the issue. Thus, a message that advocates a belief position on a social 
issue may elicit a respondent’s salient beliefs on the issue (O’Keefe, 2002). And the likelihood 
and evaluation of the salient beliefs affects one’s attitude toward the issue (Fishbein, 1967). 
Similarly, according to media priming theory, a message related to a specific belief increases the 
salience of that belief, which could strength the correlation between that belief and an attitude 
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Therefore, a low-quality counterattitudinal message that advocates 
decreasing the legal drinking age may cause the boomerang effects on belief (e.g., the extent to 
which the legal drinking age should be decreased on a magnitude scale) and belief position (e.g., 
the legal age for drinking), which subsequently causes a boomerang effect on attitude (e.g., to 
extent to which subjects like the legal drinking age).  
Summary 
The dual path framework hypothesizes that the two types of messages (i.e., a 
proattitudinal message and a counterattitudinal message) may bring about boomerang effects 
with a different set of antecedents and dominant mediators. On the one hand, after people receive 
a proattitudinal message, it is expected that a persuasive communication that threatens attitudinal 
freedom can create a boomerang effect that is mediated by reactance, which is a combination of 
anger and negative thoughts. Anger, compared to counterarguing, is expected to be dominant. On 
the other hand, after people receive a counterattitudinal message, it is expected that a low-quality 
persuasive communication will create a boomerang effect that is predominantly mediated by the 
generation of counterarguments. There has been one study that supports the dual paths to 
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boomerang effects: Smith (1978) found that those who were in moderate agreement with a 
message and those who were in extreme disagreement with a message both had boomerang 
effects. But Smith did not measure reactance or counterarguing and had no way to differentiate 
these two types of boomerang effects.  
Furthermore, for integrating the dual paths to boomerang effects in one model, this 
dissertation categorizes negative cognitions into counterarguments and nonrefutational negative 
cognitions. It is predicted that nonrefutational negative cognitions mediate the effect of perceived 
threat on the boomerang effect; both counterarguments and nonrefutational negative cognitions 
are expected to mediate the effect of argument quality on the boomerang effect.   
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Chapter 3: Method 
In this chapter, first, the approaches to data collection and analysis are discussed, 
including data winsorizing, data transformation, and index formation. Then, five pilot studies 
conducted prior to the main experiment are presented and their results are discussed. Finally, the 
method of the main experiment is described, including the participants, study design, procedures, 
instrumentation, and the analytical strategy to determine the significance of the boomerang 
effects across experimental conditions. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Before collecting the data for the proposed experiment, five pilot studies were conducted. 
The purpose of the first and second pilot studies was to select two topics for the main 
experiment. In the third pilot study, participants were asked to generate arguments regarding the 
two topics. Based on the results of the third pilot study and additional issue-related information 
from newspapers and the Internet, eight sets of arguments that vary on issue type, message 
valence, and argument quality were generated for stimuli in the main experiment. In the fourth 
pilot study, these messages were tested for the success of the manipulation of argument quality. 
In the fifth pilot study, arguments that failed the manipulation check in the fourth pilot were 
revised and tested again. With the arguments that passed the manipulation check in the fourth 
and fifth pilot studies, eight stimuli with variations on issue type (i.e., legal age for drinking vs. 
legal age of marriage), message valence (i.e., propolicy vs. antipolicy), and argument quality 
(i.e., high vs. low) were generated for the main experiment.  
The purpose of the main experiment was to examine the boomerang effect under 
proattitudinal and counterattitudinal persuasive communication and to model the mechanisms for 
different types of boomerang effects. Data collection for this dissertation was approved by the 
University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (date of approval: February 23, 2015). All of 
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the pilot tests and the final experiment were conducted online using Qualtrics (Snow & Mann, 
2013). All pilot tests and the main experiment are described below. 
Data winsorizing and transformation. To control for outliers, winsorization was 
conducted for the variables measured by the magnitude scales: The values that were above the 
ninety-fifth percentile value were recoded to be equal to the ninety-fifth percentile value. If a 
variable appeared relatively nonnormal (i.e., the skewness or kurtosis was higher than 2.50 or 
lower than -2.50), it was transformed through exponentiation (e.g., a score raised to the power of 
a value between 0 and 1). The data winsorizing and transformation strategy was consistently 
applied to all data in the pilot studies and the main experiment. The winsorized and transformed 
scores of variables are reported in the measurement sections. 
Pilot Study 1: Topic Generation 
The purpose of the first pilot study was to select several candidate topics for the study. 
Participants were instructed to complete a survey in which they were asked to list five issues that 
they hear about from parents, the media, their friends, or other sources (see Appendix A). The 
topics that are most frequently mentioned are assumed to be perceived as important, realistic, and 
ego-involving by a majority of participants. A personally involving, important, and realistic issue 
should make an individual value the threatened or eliminated freedom more and motivate one to 
process the message and generate thoughts about the message.  Participants also indicated their 
view or position on these issues. An ideal issue is expected to have both opponents and 
supporters, such that arguments about an issue can be framed as either proattitudinal or 
counterattitudinal in the main study.  
Participants. A sample of 60 students was recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. Seventy percent (n = 42) of respondents were female; the 
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mean age was 19.73 (Mdn = 19, SD = 2.27), with ages ranging from 18 to 32 years of age.  
Forty-five percent (n = 27) of our participants were Caucasian, thirteen percent (n = 8) 
were Black or African-American, twelve percent (n = 7) were Hispanic or Latino American, 
twenty-two percent (n = 13) were Asian or Asian American, two percent (n = 1) were Middle 
Eastern, and six percent (n = 4) did not fit into the provided categories. Participants were 
restricted to select only one option.   
Procedures. Participants were directed to an online survey on Qualtrics once they signed 
up for the study on the Department of Communication participants pool (SONA) at the 
University of Maryland. Participants were instructed to list five issues that they hear about from 
parents, the media, their friends, or other sources. They were also asked to indicate their opinions 
for each issue listed. The data were coded by the author. 
 Results and discussion. The results indicates that out of 60 respondents, 18 mentioned 
the Ferguson unrest (i.e., protests and riots that began after the fatal shooting of a Black man by a 
White police officer in Ferguson, Missouri), 16 mentioned the issue of gender equality and the 
rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people (LGBT), 14 mentioned sexual assault on 
campus, 14 mentioned tuition, 10 mentioned underage drinking, and 9 mentioned raping or 
bullying in fraternities and sororities. The remaining issues were mentioned by fewer than nine 
people and were not considered. 
 Respondents’ opinions on the issue were coded into three categories: protopic, antitopic, 
or NP (no identified position). An ideal issue should be both protopic and antitopic for different 
people. For the Ferguson unrest, 14 out of 18 people were antitopic and 4 were coded as NP; for 
gender equality, 12 out of 16 people were protopic and 4 were NP; for sexual assault, 8 out of 14 
were antitopic and 6 were NP; for tuition raise, 10 out of 14 were antitopic, 1 was protopic, and 3 
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were NP; for underage drinking, 6 out of 10 were protopic, 2 were antitopic, and 3 were NP; for 
raping or bullying in fraternities and sororities, 6 out of 9 were antitopic and 3 were NP. In 
summary, an overwhelming number of people had a one-sided opinion for the Ferguson unrest, 
gender equality, and sexual assault and therefore these issues were not considered for our study. 
Two issues, underage drinking and tuition, were further tested in Pilot Study 2.  
Pilot Study 2: Topic Selection 
In the second pilot study, underage drinking, tuition raise, and three additional topics (i.e., 
the legal age for marriage, the amount of sleep one needs each day, and undergraduate career 
training courses) were tested. The three additional issues were not mentioned by undergraduates 
and were thus expected to be less involving as compared with issues that were mentioned by the 
undergraduates. The main experiment ideally should include two topics with variation on issue 
involvement for higher generalizability, so the inclusion of additional topics in the second pilot 
study offered some flexibility in topic selection.  
  In the second pilot study, participants were instructed to indicate their beliefs and 
attitudes (e.g., How much do you like the current legal drinking age?; see Appendix B for the 
questionnaire) for five topics on 11-point scales where 1 indicates “Not at all,” 6 indicates 
“Moderate,” and 11 indicates “Extremely.” Although 11-point scales are less precise than 
magnitude scales (Fink, 2009), variable scores on 11-point scales usually need no transformation 
and can be used for data description. Because the main purpose of this pilot study was to choose 
an issue by observing the histograms for participants’ positions, the use of 11-point scales was 
desirable. For an ideal issue, (1) responses on belief position should show some variation; (2) 
respondents should not possess extreme beliefs or attitudes: on the attitudinal continuum (from 
not agree at all to completely agree) for a topic, a majority of responses do not reside at the two 
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ends of the continuum, such that respondents’ attitude are free to move in either direction to 
exhibit persuasion or boomerang. For example, assuming that many respondents indicate 1 “Not 
At All” when they are asked whether they like the current legal drinking age, then it would be 
highly unlikely to observe any boomerang effect given a propolicy message. This is because 
responses lumped at the lower bound of the scale cannot move below 0.  
Furthermore, the two issues to be selected are expected to vary on respondents’ prior 
belief strength. The relationship between prior belief strength and a boomerang effect is not clear 
in the literature. On the one hand, people with a strong prior belief may discount the influence of 
a counterattitudinal message by showing a boomerang effect (Smith, 1978). On the other hand, 
people with a weak prior belief (vs. those with a strong prior belief) may show less inertia or 
resistance to change (Saltiel & Woelfel, 1975) and thus may be more likely to move their 
position on the belief continuum for an issue given a persuasive message. In this case, whether 
those with a strong prior belief move closer or away from the message-advocated position may 
be determined by message characteristics such as argument quality.   
Participants. A sample of 41 students was recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. Sixty-six percent (n = 27) of respondents were female; the 
mean age was 19.12 (Mdn = 19; SD = 1.42), with ages ranging from 18 to 25 years of age.  
Fifty-one percent (n = 21) of our participants were Caucasian, seventeen percent (n = 7) 
were Black or African-American, five percent (n = 2) were Hispanic or Latino American, 
twenty-five percent (n = 10) were Asian or Asian American, and two percent (n = 1) did not fit 
into the provided categories. Participants were restricted to select only one option.   
Procedures. Participants were directed to an online survey on Qualtrics once they signed 
up for the study on the Department of Communication participants pool (SONA) at the 
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University of Maryland. Participants were instructed to indicate their belief positions and 
attitudes (see Appendix B for the items) for five topics. The data were analyzed using summary 
statistics and the data’s frequency distributions. 
 Results and discussion. The variation of the belief positions for each issue was 
examined first. Outliers were identified through an examination of histograms, and they were 
removed. However, there were only outliers for the belief position on amount of tuition. For the 
legal drinking age, respondents believed in an average age of 19.15 (Mdn = 18, SD = 1.73) years, 
with a range of from 17 to 24. For current tuition, respondents believed in an average tuition of 
$4,135.27 (Mdn = $4,000, SD = $1,507.42) for full-time resident undergraduates at the 
University of Maryland for the Spring 2015 semester. For legal marriage age, respondents 
believed in an average age of 17.98 (Mdn = 18, SD = 1.29) years, with a range from 16 to 21. For 
amount of sleep, respondents believed in an average time of 7.97 hours sleep (Mdn = 8, SD = 
0.86) each day, with a range from 7 to 10. For undergraduate career training courses, respondents 
believed in an average number of 3.65 courses (Mdn = 4, SD = 2.08), with a range from 0 to 10. 
Comparatively speaking, respondents’ belief position has a large variation for current tuition; 
medium variation for legal drinking age, marriage age, and the required number of career 
training courses; and small variation for amount of sleep one needs each day. Thus, the hours of 
sleep each day was not considered.   
 The histograms for all the belief and attitude variables for the five issues are provided in 
Figures 1-5. From the distribution of responses, we can see that there is an overwhelming 
percentage of opposers (vs. supporters) for tuition raise (Figure 2) and for having less than 7-8 
hours of sleep each day (Figure 4). Thus, it is not feasible to frame the two issues as either 
proattitudinal or counterattitudinal, and therefore the two issues were not considered further.   
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 Two issues, the legal age for drinking and the legal age for marriage, were selected as the 
two issues for the main study. The two issues are comparable to some extent. More important, 
when one specific position (e.g., lower the legal drinking age) is advocated in a message 
regarding these two issues, the message can be either proattitudinal or counterattitudinal for 
different participants. This ensures that a boomerang effect can be tested for both proattitudinal 
and counterattitudinal communication. It seems that people have more established and 
potentially strong attitudes on the legal age for drinking but not on the legal age for marriage, as 
indicated by the finding that more people chose to take the stance do not like the policy at all on 
the drinking age issue (M = 4.56, SD = 2.85) but not on the marriage issue (M = 6.20, SD = 2.03). 
This variation on attitude strength for the two issues increases the generalizability of any 
potential findings of a boomerang effect.  
Pilot Study 3: Argument Generation  
In the third pilot study, respondents were asked to indicate their position on the legal age 
for drinking and legal age for marriage and to generate four arguments that support their position 
and four arguments opposed to their position for both issues (see Appendix C for the 
questionnaire). Then these arguments were further edited to form four sets of arguments for two 
issues: strong propolicy arguments; weak propolicy arguments; strong antipolicy argument; weak 
antipolicy arguments. High-quality and low-quality messages were generated for an argument by 
manipulating the type of evidence. Strong arguments were produced by adding logical, statistical, 
and credible evidence that supports the advocated position in the message; weak arguments were 
produced by adding anecdotes or illogical arguments (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1979a). Both 
student-generated content and news report from the Internet were used for evidence. The 
readability level of the arguments was examined to make sure that respondents were able to 
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comprehend the arguments in the main study and that the strong and weak versions of an 
argument were comparable on readability. These sets of arguments were also examined to make 
sure that they matched on the perceived threat of attitudinal freedom. 
Participants. A sample of 37 students was recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. Sixty-five percent (n = 23) of respondents were female; 
the mean age was 18.91 (Mdn = 19; SD = 1.27), with ages ranging from 18 to 24 years of age.  
Sixty-nine percent (n = 24) of our participants were Caucasian, nine percent (n = 3) were 
Black or African-American, three percent (n = 1) were Hispanic or Latino American, fourteen 
percent (n = 5) were Asian or Asian American, and five percent (n = 2) did not fit into the 
provided categories. Participants were restricted to select only one option.   
Procedures. Participants were directed to an online survey on Qualtrics once they signed 
up for the study on the Department of Communication participants pool (SONA) at the 
University of Maryland. Participants were instructed to generate arguments that supported and 
opposed their positions for two issues (i.e., the legal age for drinking; the legal age for marriage). 
The data were compiled to form a pool of arguments.  
 Results and discussion. The complete compiled pool of arguments is provided in 
Appendix D. For legal drinking age, example antipolicy arguments included “The current legal 
drinking age has pushed underage drinking into private and less controlled environments, where 
young adults may be more prone to binge drinking and other unsafe behaviors” and 
“Government should regulate the consumption of alcohol based on the difference of age rather 
than set 21 as a legal age for drinking.” Example propolicy arguments included “A legal drinking 
age of 21 reduces traffic accidents and fatalities” and “Beginning to drink during high school 




For the legal marriage age, example antipolicy arguments included “At 16, one lacks the 
relational skills and emotional maturity required to sustain the marriage” and “It will put an 
unnecessary burden and unnecessary debt on these young people who get married at 16.” 
Example propolicy arguments included “Marrying at a young age may help teenagers mature” 
and “Parental consent helps those youth who decide to marry at an early age make a right 
choice.” 
Based on the pool of arguments, four sets of arguments for these two issues that varied on 
valence (i.e., propolicy vs. antipolicy) and quality (i.e., high vs. low) were generated. In each set, 
there were four to six arguments. For each argument, there was an average of 78 words (SD = 
14). These arguments were proofread by the author as well as two native English speakers to 
make sure the material was free of grammatical or other types of errors. Readability of each 
argument was examined using the Flesch-Kincaid grade level (Kincaid, Agard, O’Hara, & 
Cottrell, 1981) through an online readability calculator. The Flesch-Kincaid grade level score 
represents the U.S. grade level needed to understand a reading passage in English (Kincaid et al., 
1981). A score of 9 means that an individual with at least a ninth-grade readability level should 
be able to understand the content. The readability of all four sets of arguments was good (M = 
10.88, SD = 1.71) and ranged from 9 to 14. Thus, undergraduates in our main study should be 
able to comprehend these arguments. In addition, the weak and strong set of arguments did not 
have significant difference on the Flesch-Kincaid grade level, t(14) = 0.28, p = .78, or the 
number of words, t(14) = -0.88, p = .39.  
Pilot Studies 4 and 5: The Manipulation of Argument Quality  
In Pilot Studies 4 and 5, participants were randomly assigned to either a strong or weak 
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block of arguments (typically four to six arguments in each block) for each of the four argument 
sets (propolicy arguments for drinking age; antipolicy arguments for drinking age; propolicy 
arguments for marriage age; antipolicy arguments for marriage age). A participant had to 
evaluate a total of nineteen arguments. Participants were asked to rate the strength of the 
arguments that they just read on magnitude scales (see Appendix D for the questionnaire). The 
sequence of arguments in each set was counterbalanced. 
Participants. Fifty-nine subjects participated in the fourth pilot study. However, the 
results of the fourth study were not good: In each of the four argument sets, more than half of the 
arguments did not work as expected because there was no significant difference on the perceived 
strength of a weak and strong version of the argument. To improve the manipulation, Pilot Study 
5 was conducted with revised arguments from the fourth pilot study. A total of 65 subjects 
participated in the fifth pilot study. As the content of the questionnaires for the fourth and fifth 
studies was similar, only the questionnaire for the fifth pilot study is provided in Appendix D, 
and only results from the fifth pilot study are included.  
Procedures. Participants were recruited from undergraduate classes in communication at 
the University of Maryland. They signed up for the study through SONA, the Department of 
Communication participants pool at the University of Maryland. Participants were first asked to 
familiarize themselves with magnitude scales (0 indicates not at all, 100 indicates a moderate 
amount, and the scale has no upper bound) by reading instructions for magnitude scales and by 
completing four practice questions. Participants were not directed to the questionnaire until they 
provided correct answers to the four practice questions.  
 Results and discussion. The original scores on the magnitude scales were highly skewed 
and thus were transformed by winsorization and exponentiation (see the instrumentation section 
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of the main experiment for details). Transformed scores were reported. Several independent-
sample t tests were conducted to test whether the high-quality version of an argument was 
stronger than the low-quality version. These results provided support for the effectiveness of the 
argument quality manipulation. Generally speaking, respondents rated the high-quality 
arguments stronger than the low-quality arguments for each of the four argument sets with 
variations on the issue (drinking age vs. marriage age) and message valence (propolicy vs. 
antipolicy). For example, in the propolicy drinking age argument set that contains five pairs of 
high-quality versus low-quality of arguments, the high-quality version of an argument (M = 2.82, 
SD = 1.86, n = 33) was rated stronger than its low quality version (M = 1.57, SD = 1.32, n = 32), 
t(63) = 3.12, p < .01. Of the nineteen pairs of arguments, three pairs did not work as expected 
and were thus removed.  
The Main Experiment 
 The purpose of the main experiment was to identify a boomerang effect under different 
conditions of perceived message type (i.e., proattitudinal vs. counterattitudinal), threat to 
attitudinal freedom (i.e., high vs. low), and argument quality (i.e., high vs. low) on two issues 
(the legal age for drinking and of marriage) and to examine the cognitive and affective 
mechanisms that account for different boomerang processes. 
 Data collection and participants. Data collection occurred in December 2015 and 
March 2016. A total of 458 undergraduates were recruited for the main experiment. Among these 
undergraduates, 238 students participated in the first study, on the legal age for drinking in 
Maryland, and 220 students participated in the second study, on the legal age of marriage in 
Maryland. Although messages in the two studies were different in content, the design and 
protocol of the two studies were the same except for some minor changes in wording. Data were 
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collected through the Department of Communication Participants Pool (SONA) at the University 
of Maryland. All students received extra-credit in a communication course for their participation.  
In the main experiment (N = 458), fifty percent of participants (n = 231) were male. The 
mean age was 19.38 years (Mdn = 19.00, SD = 1.81), with ages ranging from 18 to 30 years of 
age. Of participants who provided their ethnicity or race information (N = 450), fifty-nine 
percent (n = 267) were White, twelve percent (n = 54) were Black or African-American, six 
percent (n = 26) were Latino or Hispanic American, one percent (n  = 5) were American Indian, 
Alaska Native, or Pacific Islander, eighteen percent (n = 79) were Asian or Asian American, one 
percent (n = 6) were Middle Eastern, and two percent (n = 13) did not fit into the provided 
categories. Participants were restricted to select only one option.   
Design and procedures. A 2 (Message valence: antipolicy vs. propolicy) × 2 (Threat to 
freedom: low threat vs. high threat) × 2 (Argument quality: low quality vs. high quality) × 2 
(Issue: legal age for drinking vs. legal age of marriage) plus 2 (Control groups: no-message 
control for each issue) design (18 conditions total) was employed (see Appendix E for the 
complete questionnaire). The manipulations of message valence and argument quality were 
identical to those used in the last (fifth) pilot study. To create a condition in which participants 
perceive threat to their attitudinal freedom, participants read the following paragraph that forced 
them to agree with the advocated position: So those are my reasons for the position I advocated. 
They are good reasons, so I know you have no choice but to agree with them. Because when you 
think about it you are really forced to agree (Silvia, 2006). These manipulations were given on 
Qualtrics. This paragraph was placed at the end of the message to make sure the manipulation of 
perceived threat did not interfere with argument quality. As observed by Silvia (2006), when the 
perceived threat was placed at the beginning of message, respondents may have an unfavorable 
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attitude toward the message and thus generate counterarguments, regardless of argument quality. 
Approval (December, 2015) was obtained from the University of Maryland IRB. After 
participants signed up for the study, they were directed to the study on Qualtrics, through the link 
provided by the Department of Communication Participants Pool (SONA). First, participants 
completed a consent form. Then participants were told that they would use three types of scales 
in this study: 11-point or 4-point Likert-type scales, count scales, and magnitude scales. 
Participants read instructions regarding how to respond to these scales and completed a practice 
exercise for the magnitude scales. Respondents were not able to proceed to the next section until 
they successfully completed the exercise by answering five questions in the exercise correctly. 
After respondents finished the magnitude scale practice exercise, they were asked to 
indicate their premessage position and belief strength and were then randomly assigned to a 
condition. After respondents read the stimulus, they answered survey questions measuring their 
belief (e.g., the extent to which the legal age for drinking should be decreased) and attitude (e.g., 
the extent to which they liked the current legal drinking age) toward the issue discussed in the 
stimulus. In addition, respondents answered questions gauging their traits (e.g., trait reactance) 
and demographic variables. At the end of the study, all participants were debriefed about the 
purpose of the experiment and were welcome to print the debriefing form. To control for the 
potential order effect on questionnaire, the postmessage survey questions were divided into three 
blocks: outcome variables, mediators (anger and thought listing), and manipulation checks and 
trait variables. The sequence of the question blocks was counterbalanced. Respondents in the 
control conditions did not read any stimulus and thus were not debriefed. The control 




 Instrumentation. Participants’ postmessage belief and attitude and premessage belief 
strength were measured on continuous scales. The manipulation checks, mediators, and trait 
variables were measured on 11-point or 4-point scales. And the premessage belief was measured 
by a single binary item for mitigating sensitization (see discussion in the following section). 
Scores of variables measured by continuous scales were examined for outliers and skewness 
before investigating the descriptive statistics as well as the histograms of the variables 
(Anscombe, 1973; Fink, 2009). To control for outliers and skewness, the values that were above 
the ninety-fifth percentile value were recoded to be equal to the ninety-fifth percentile value. 
After winsorization, if the distribution of scores still appeared relatively nonnormal (i.e., the 
skewness or kurtosis was higher than 2.50 or lower than -2.50), the scores of these variables 
were transformed by exponentiation (e.g., these scores raised to a power of a value between 0 
and 1 if positively skewed). If the distribution of the variable values was relatively normal after 
transformation (i.e., the skewness and kurtosis were in the range between -2.50 and 2.50), then 
the transformation was considered successful. Table 2 provides the transformation strategies for 
the outcome variables on magnitude scales and their summary statistics after transformations. 
For variables on magnitude scales, the transformed scores (if a transformation was necessary) are 
reported below. All the statistical analyses were conducted on the transformed predictor and 
outcome variables. Variables not on magnitude scales were relatively normal and not 
transformed. 
For the variables that have unidimensional structures based on previous studies (e.g., 
anger; Dillard & Shen, 2005), all the items were averaged to calculate a composite score. For the 
variables that have multidimensional structures based on previous studies (e.g., trait reactance; 
Hong, 1992), a principal components analysis was used to form the indexes using the first 
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unrotated principal component (Afifi, Clark, & May, 2004). A principal component score (i.e., a 
standardized weighted sum of all the items based on their contribution to the principal 
component) was calculated for trait reactance.  
Premessage belief and belief strength. First, participants indicated their premessage 
belief on the issue by choosing one of the following options: “Oppose the policy” (Drinking: 
61.5%; Marriage: 50.2%) versus “support the policy” (Drinking: 38.5%; Marriage: 49.8%). The 
pretest of respondents’ belief and attitude could lead to sensitization (see discussion in the 
Introduction chapter). Thus, a single binary measure of belief was employed to (1) determine 
whether the message is proattitudinal or counterattitudinal for the individual, and (2) to mitigate 
the potential biases from sensitization. Second, people’s belief strength was measured on a 
magnitude scale by one question: “How strongly do you believe in your position?” (Drinking: M 
= 149.91, SD = 114.85; Marriage: M = 71.67, SD = 29.89). Transformed scores of premessage 
belief strength are reported.  
Postmessage beliefs and attitudes. Transformed scores of beliefs and attitudes are 
reported below. First, two questions captured participants’ issue-relevant beliefs on magnitude 
scales. Participants indicated their beliefs toward changing the current policy on one of these two 
issues. Namely, they indicated the extent to which they agreed that the legal age for drinking 
should be decreased (M = 10.38, SD = 0.47) or that the legal age of marriage should be increased 
(M = 94.57, SD = 7.11). And participants’ belief positions on the issue were measured by one 
question: “What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking [marriage] age should be?” For drinking 
age, the average belief position was 19.41 (SD = 0.37); for marriage age, the average belief 
position was 18.16 (SD = 0.12). Then, participants were asked to indicate their attitudes on the 
given issue by indicating the extent to which they liked the current legal age for drinking (M = 
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20.62, SD = 1.08) or for marriage (M = 69.07, SD = 3.64). As expected, subjects’ beliefs and 
attitude were correlated. For the drinking age, subjects’ belief toward decreasing the drinking age 
was significantly correlated with their attitude toward the policy (r = - .66, p < .001, n = 260) and 
their belief position for the drinking age (r = - .53, p < .001, n = 260); for the marriage age, 
subjects’ belief toward increasing the marriage age was significantly correlated with their 
attitude toward the policy (r = - .37, p < .001, n = 240) and their belief position for the marriage 
age (r = .37, p < .001, n = 240).  
Boomerang effect. A boomerang effect was assessed by comparing the postmessage 
belief and attitude scores of participants in the experimental and the control condition for the 
specific issue. If participants in the experimental condition had belief or attitude scores further 
away from the position advocated in the message, as compared with those in the control 
condition, a boomerang effect was observed. For example, suppose that participants receive a 
message that advocates lowering the current legal drinking age. There is a boomerang effect if 
these participants express less agreement with lowering the drinking age, a more favorable 
attitude toward the current drinking age, or a higher belief position on the legal drinking age, as 
compared with those in the control group. Therefore, participants’ responses on beliefs and 
attitudes were coded on both the group and individual levels for testing boomerang effects given 
different hypotheses. The coding strategies for the statistical analyses are discussed in detail in 
the Results chapter.  
Message and message source disparagement. Scales of communication and message 
source disparagement were adapted from Bochner and Insko’s (1966) study. Both 
communication and message source disparagement were measured on 11-point scales from 1 
strongly disagree to 11 strongly agree. Communication disparagement was measured by eight 
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questions regarding the extent to which the communication “made sense,” “covered all relevant 
aspects necessary for evaluating the topic,” “was easy to understand,” “was reasonable,” “was 
well-written,” “was convincing,” “was interesting,” and whether participants “like the message.” 
Scores from the eight items were reverse coded and averaged to represent message 
disparagement (Drinking: M = 4.72, SD = 2.12, Cronbach’s alpha = .92; Marriage: M = 5.06, SD 
= 2.19, Cronbach’s alpha = .93). Disparagement of the message source was reversed coded and 
measured by six questions regarding the extent to which the communicator was “sincere,” 
“competent,” “trustworthy,” “intelligent,” “credible,” and “knowledgeable” (Drinking: M = 5.00, 
SD = 1.91, Cronbach’s alpha = .91; Marriage: M = 5.02, SD = 2.22, Cronbach’s alpha = .94).  
Trait reactance. Hong’s (1992; Hong & Faedda, 1996; Hong & Page, 1989) reactance 
scale was used to measure trait reactance. Previous studies have shown that Hong’s reactance 
scale has a four-factor structure (Hong, 1992; Hong & Page, 1989). The 11-item scale from 1 
strongly disagree to 11 strongly agree consists of three items relating to participant’s emotional 
response to restricted choice (e.g., “I become angry when my freedom of choice is restricted”), 
three items regarding reactance to compliance (e.g., “Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in 
me”), three items about resisting influence from others (e.g., “I resist the attempts of others to 
influence me”), and two items on reactance towards advice and recommendations (e.g., “I 
consider advice from others to be an intrusion”; see Appendix E for the complete scale). The 
focus of the current study is not the factorial structure of trait reactance. So trait reactance was 
measured by the standardized principal component score that explains the largest variance in the 
correlation matrix of all 11 items. 
 Control variables. Participants’ competence to exercise their belief or attitudinal 
freedom was measured on a magnitude scale and the transformed scores are reported below. 
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Previous studies have shown that people who feel more competent to exercise their belief or 
attitudinal freedom tend to have a boomerang effect after exposure to a high-threat 
communication (Wicklund & Brehm, 1968). Based on Smith’s (1977) measure, participants were 
asked the extent to which they feel that “they currently possess sufficient information and 
knowledge about the issue to make an intelligent decision regarding their position” on a 
magnitude scale (Drinking: M = 150.23, SD = 130.43; Marriage: M = 81.36, SD = 55.28). 
Participants reported their demographic information including age, gender, ethnicity and race, 
and year in college.   
Manipulation check: Argument quality. Argument quality was measured by seven items 
(Rains & Turner, 2007). On 11-point scales from 1 extremely disagree to 11 extremely agree, 
participants rated the degree to which the message was smart, well supported, compelling, 
effective, informative, detailed, and weak. After reverse coding and averaging, the mean of 
argument quality was 5.23 (SD = 2.17, Cronbach’s alpha = .77) for drinking age and was 5.06 
(SD = 2.19, Cronbach’s alpha = .81) for marriage age.  
Manipulation check: Perceived threat. Based on Dillard and Shen’s (2005) study, 
perceived threat was measured by four items: “The message threatened my freedom to choose,” 
“The message tried to make a decision for me,” “The message tried to manipulate me,” and “The 
message tried to pressure me.” Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with the 
four items on 11-point scales from 1 extremely disagree to 11 extremely agree. After averaging, 
the mean of perceived threat was 4.75 (SD = 2.93, Cronbach’s alpha = .92) for drinking age and 
was 4.93 (SD = 2.82, Cronbach’s alpha = .92) for marriage age.  
Mediator: Anger. Anger was measured by four items that gauge the extent to which 
participants feel irritated, angry, annoyed, and aggravated (Dillard & Shen, 2005). Participants 
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indicated the extent to which they agreed with the four items on 4-point scales from 1 definitely 
do not feel to 4 definitely feel. After averaging, the mean of anger was 1.76 (SD = 0.83, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .88) for drinking age and was 1.84 (SD = 0.81, Cronbach’s alpha = .87) for 
marriage age.  
Mediators: Negative thoughts and counterarguments. Thought listing was employed to 
measure both negative thoughts and counterarguments (Brock, 1967; Petty et al., 1981). After 
the persuasive message, participants were asked to list all the thoughts they had while reading the 
message by entering text consecutively in five blank boxes provided by Qualtrics.  
Participants’ cognitive responses were coded on two variables by two independent 
coders: Negative thoughts and counterarguments (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on the 
difference between negative thoughts and counterarguments). In this dissertation, 
counterarguments were defined as message-related arguments that attack the message (Petty et 
al., 1981) and were not “simply a restatement or paraphrase” of the message (Brock, 1967, p. 
301). For a thought to be considered a counterargument, the cognition should be a negative 
thought and explicitly refute one or more arguments of the persuasive communication (Jacks & 
Cameron, 2003) with reasoning (in order to be arguments at the first place). Negative thoughts 
are cognitive responses that show disagreement with message position, arguments, or source in a 
variety of ways. Negative thoughts include both counterarguments that directly refute the 
arguments in the message and nonrefutational negative thoughts (Cameron et al., 2002), which 
include the suggestion of alternatives to the issue or position in the message (Osterhouse & 
Brock, 1970), attitude bolstering (Cameron et al., 2002), and insulting the message or message 
source without providing arguments (Wright, 1986). Mere affective (e.g., unhappy) or physical 
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(e.g., I am tired) responses were not considered to be negative thoughts or counterarguments 
(Rains & Turner, 2007; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987).  
Negative thoughts and counterarguments were measured by counting the number of 
negative thoughts and counterarguments for each participant. Nonrefutational thoughts were 
calculated by subtracting the number of counterarguments from the number of negative thoughts. 
Because we were only interested in the cognitive responses of participants who received 
persuasive communication, only thoughts of those in the experimental conditions (but not control 
conditions) were coded (n = 346). The coding scheme was explained to the two independent 
coders who are doctoral candidates in communication. After two rounds of training, both coders 
coded 10% responses to establish intercoder reliability. Krippendorff’s alpha reliability scores 
were calculated through the kalpha macro in SPSS (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). Coders’ 
Krippendorff’s alpha was .86 on negative thoughts and .88 on counterarguments, suggesting 
acceptable intercoder reliability (Krippendorff, 2012). The two coders proceeded to code the 
remaining responses. In our final dataset, the average number of negative thoughts was 1.32 (SD 
= 1.37) for the legal drinking age and was 0.93 (SD = 1.28) for the legal marriage age; the 
average number of counterarguments was 0.74 (SD = 1.06) for the drinking age and was 0.50 
(SD = 0.97) for the marriage age. The number of nonrefutational thoughts was computed by 
subtracting the number of counterarguments from the number of negative thoughts. The average 
number of nonrefutational thoughts was 0.59 (SD = 0.84) for the legal drinking age and was 0.43 
(SD = 0.74) for the legal marriage age. The original nontransformed scores were reported. The 
discriminant validity of anger, negative thoughts, counterarguments, and nonrefutational 
thoughts was examined by correlations and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and are discussed 
in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter starts with a description of the manipulation checks for perceptions of threat 
to freedom and argument quality. Second, the results from correlations and CFAs for the 
discriminant validity of mediators are presented. Third, the analytical approach for ANOVAs and 
the results of a series of ANOVAs with polynomial contrast are presented for H1, H3, and H4. 
Last, the analytical schemes and results of three structural equation models are detailed for the 
remaining hypotheses (H2, H5, H6, and H7) and research questions (RQ1 and RQ2).  
Manipulation Checks 
 Manipulation check: Perceived threat. Our model predicts that threat to attitudinal 
freedom (i.e. high vs. low), argument quality (i.e. high vs. low), and perceived message valence 
(i.e., whether a message is perceived as proattitudinal or counterattitudinal) predict a boomerang 
effect. Two analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed to determine the effect of threat 
manipulation on perceived threat to freedom on the two issues: the legal age for drinking and the 
legal age of marriage. Threat, argument quality, and message valence were the independent 
variables, and perceived threat to freedom was the dependent variable. Regarding the legal age 
for drinking issue, the 𝑅2 for the entire model was 13.3% (adjusted 𝑅2 = 9.5%). The results 
indicated that the effect of the threat induction was significant, F(1, 174) = 13.06, p < .001: The 
individuals in the low-threat condition perceived significantly less threat to freedom (M = 4.12; 
SD = 0.30; n = 88) than those in the high-threat condition (M = 5.66; SD = 0.30; n = 86). The 
effect of the argument quality manipulation was not significant, F(1, 174) = 0.39, p = .53. The 
effect of the message valence manipulation was significant, F(1, 174) = 6.65, p < .05: The 
individuals in the antipolicy-message valence condition perceived significantly less threat to 
freedom (M = 4.34; SD = 0.30; n = 86) than those in the propolicy-message condition (M = 5.44; 
SD = 0.30; n = 88). There were no significant interactions between the independent variables. 
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 Regarding the legal age for marriage, the 𝑅2 for the entire model was 9.1% (adjusted 𝑅2 
= 5.1%). The results indicated that the effect of the threat induction was significant, F(1, 168) = 
8.65, p < .01: The individuals in the low-threat condition perceived significantly less threat to 
freedom (M = 4.48; SD = 0.30; n = 84) than those in the high-threat condition (M = 5.73; SD = 
0.30; n = 84). The effect of the message valence manipulation was not significant, F(1, 168) = 
0.05, p = .82. The effect of the argument quality manipulation was significant, F(1, 168) = 4.90, 
p < .05: The individuals in the high argument-quality condition perceived significantly less threat 
to freedom (M = 4.64; SD = 0.30; n = 85) than those in the low argument-quality condition (M = 
5.58; SD = 0.30; n = 83). There were no significant interactions between the independent 
variables. 
Based on these results, it was concluded that the effect of the threat manipulation on 
perceived threat to freedom was successful. But given the same threat manipulation, individuals 
who received the propolicy message (vs. the antipolicy message) perceived more threat to 
freedom regarding the legal age for drinking; individuals who received the low-quality message 
(vs. the high-quality message) perceived more threat to freedom regarding the legal age for 
marriage. Thus, results should be interpreted with caution.  
 Manipulation check: Argument quality. Two ANOVAs were performed to determine 
the effect of the argument quality manipulation on perceived argument quality on the two issues: 
the legal age for drinking and the legal age for marriage. Threat, argument quality, and message 
valence were used as independent variables, and perceived argument quality was used as the 
dependent variable. The 𝑅2 for the model on the legal age for drinking was 9.2% (adjusted 𝑅2 = 
5.4%), and the 𝑅2 for the model on the legal age of marriage was 16.9% (adjusted 𝑅2 = 13.3%). 
The results indicated that the effect of the argument quality induction was significant, F(1, 174) 
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= 13.47, p < .001, for the legal age for drinking, and F(1, 168) = 21.74, p < .001, for the legal age 
for marriage. On both issues, the individuals in the low argument quality condition perceived 
significantly lower argument quality (drinking: M = 4.59, SD = 0.23, n = 86; marriage: M = 4.21, 
SD = 0.30, n = 83) than those in the high argument quality condition (drinking: M = 5.79, SD = 
0.23, n = 88; marriage: M = 5.71, SD = 0.23, n = 85). The effect of the threat manipulation was 
not significant on the two issues, F(1, 174) = 1.34, p = .25, for the legal age for drinking; F(1, 
168) = 0.23, p = .63, for the legal age for marriage. The effect of the message valence 
manipulation was not significant for the legal age for drinking, F(1, 174) = 1.34, p = .25; 
however, the effect of the message valence manipulation was significant for the legal age of 
marriage, F(1, 174) = 4.55, p < .05. Furthermore, there were no significant interactions between 
the independent variables.  
Based on these results it was concluded that the effect of the argument quality 
manipulation on perceived argument quality was successful. However, on the legal age for 
marriage, individuals who received the antipolicy message (versus the propolicy message) 
perceived higher argument quality. Thus, results should be interpreted with caution.  
Discriminant Validity of Mediators 
Correlations. For the discriminant validity of anger, negative thoughts, 
counterarguments, and nonrefutational thoughts, their correlations were examined among those 
who were asked to indicate their postmessage thoughts (i.e., those in the experimental conditions, 
N = 349). Results showed that anger was slightly correlated with nonrefutational thoughts (r 
= .13, p <  .05), counterarguments (r = .21, p <  .001), and negative thoughts (r = .25, p <  .001). 
The correlation between counterarguments and nonrefutational thoughts was not significant (r 
= .07, p = .18), whereas the correlation between counterarguments and negative thoughts was 
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moderate (r = .65, p <  .001). These results provided some initial evidence for the discriminant 
validity of these mediators.   
Confirmatory factor analysis. For a further examination of the discriminant validity of 
mediators, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted with R “psych” package 
(Revelle, 2014). The two-factor model is shown in Figure 6. The two latent constructs were 
anger and negative cognitions and their error terms were allowed to covary. The four 
measurement items of anger were predicted to load on anger, whereas counterarguments and 
nonrefutational thoughts were predicted to load on negative cognitions. The error terms of 
observed variables were not allowed to covary. The maximum likelihood (ML) method was 
employed for parameter estimation.  
Overall, the specified CFA (Figure 6) fit the data well, 𝜒2(8, N = 349) = 53.86, 𝑝 <  .01, 
SRMR = 0.03, RMSEA = 0.13, and CFI = 0.94. SRMR was smaller than .09 and CFI was close 
to 0.95, as recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999). The model fit indices suggested that (1) the 
overall discrepancy between the observed and model-implied covariance matrix was not 
significant, and (2) the proposed model fit the data better than a baseline null model. But the 
RMSEA was larger than 0.06, suggesting that the overall discrepancy between the observed and 
model-implied covariance matrix was not good taking into account the model’s simplicity.  
Modification indices were computed for improving the model-data fit. Based on the 
indices, the error variances of anger item 2 and anger item 4 were allowed to covary (see Figure 
7). After respecifying the structure, the model parameters were estimated again with ML. The 
modified model fitted the data very well, 𝜒2(7, N = 349) = 13.50, 𝑝 > .05, SRMR = 0.02, 
RMSEA =  .05, and CFI = 0.99. The 𝑝 value for 𝜒2 was larger than the critical value of  .05, 
which implied that the model-implied covariance matrix was not significantly different from the 
 
 54 
observed covariance matrix. And all model fit indices were desirable considering the 
recommendations from Hu and Bentler (1999). Because the initial model was nested within the 
modified model, the 𝜒2 differences between the two models were computed, ∆𝜒2 = 40.36, df = 1, 
𝑝 < .001. Thus, the modified model was significantly better than the initial model.   
As shown in Figure 7, all freely estimated factor loadings on the construct of anger were 
significant, p < .001. Nonrefutational negative cognitions significantly loaded on the construct of 
negative cognitions, beta = .20, p < .05 (the factor loading for counterarguments was fixed). The 
correlation between two latent constructs was .65, p < .01. Because anger, negative cognitions, 
counterarguments, and nonrefutational negative thoughts demonstrated good discriminant 
validity in confirmatory factor analysis, these constructs can be treated as distinct mediators in 
subsequent statistical analyses. 
Coding Proattitudinal versus Counterattitudinal Subgroups 
 The hypotheses and research questions predicted different boomerang effects for the 
proattitudinal versus counterattitudinal subgroups. Because participants’ prior belief on the 
policy issues were not manipulated but measured prior to the message exposure, the 
proattitudinal (n = 196) versus counterattitudinal (n = 149) subgroups were coded from the 
experimental conditions. In the proattitudinal communication conditions, participants’ prior 
attitude and manipulated message valence were consistent: (1) Those who opposed the policy 
received an antipolicy message; (2) those who supported the policy received a propolicy 
message. But in the counterattitudinal communication conditions, participants’ prior attitude and 
manipulated message valence were inconsistent: (1) Those who opposed the policy received a 
propolicy message; (2) those who supported the policy received an antipolicy message (see 
Table 3). This treatment encourages us to observe the boomerang effect on both sides of the 
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attitudinal continuum for a topic and increases the generalizability of our results.  
 There were several reasons for the nonrandom assignment treatment of prior belief. First, 
two real policy issues were employed to increase the external validity of the experiment. As a 
result, participants had well-established prior beliefs on the issues, especially for the legal age for 
drinking. It is difficult to manipulate participants’ well-established prior beliefs. Second, 
previous studies measured rather than manipulated prior belief or attitude (Hovland et al., 1957; 
Kelley & Volkart, 1952; N. Miller, 1965). Last but not least, according to the hypothesized dual 
path model of boomerang effects, belief strength was related to counterarguing, which might 
subsequently predict a boomerang effect (see discussion in Chapter 2). Thus, using policy issues 
that the participants may feel strongly about serves the purpose of the study better than using 
fake issues. However, using made-up issues for manipulating prior belief allows for random 
assignment, a significant criterion for inferring causality between prior belief and boomerang 
effects. More discussion on the advantages and limitations of the nonrandom assignment 
treatment of prior belief is included in the Discussion chapter.  
Hypothesis Testing: Subgroup ANOVAs 
 H1 predicts that among those who receive a proattitudinal message, those who perceive 
high threat to their attitudinal freedom, but not those who perceive low threat to their attitudinal 
freedom (vs. the control participants), would have a boomerang effect. H3 predicted that among 
those who receive a counterattitudinal message, those who receive low-quality arguments, but 
not those who receive high-quality arguments (vs. the control participants), would show a 
boomerang effect. H4 predicted that among those who receive a counterattitudinal message, 
those whose prior belief is strong, but not those whose prior belief is weak (vs. the control 
participants), would show a boomerang effect. 
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 Analytical approach. Among those who received a proattitudinal message (n = 196), 
ANOVAs were conducted for testing H1. Among those who received a counterattitudinal 
message (n = 149), ANOVAs were conducted for testing H3 and H4. Subjects’ responses in each 
experimental condition were coded into different groups for testing boomerang effects in the 
ANOVAs. The coded group variable can be modeled as a fixed factor predicting the dependent 
variables and used for examining the polynomial contrasts (i.e., the trend of the outcome variable 
across the ordered levels of the factor variable) in a linear model.  
Coding boomerang and nonboomerang groups. The rules and procedures for coding are 
delineated here: First, with the predictions of boomerang effects from these hypotheses and the 
operationalization of the boomerang effect, cells where a boomerang was expected were coded 
into group 1, 2, and 3, and cells where no boomerang was expected were coded into group 4, 5, 
and 6 (for detecting unexpected boomerang effects). The coded groups 2 and 5 represented the 
same control cell (2 and 5 were used only for differentiating the recoded boomerang and 
nonboomerang groups). Second, those in coded group 1 were expected to show a boomerang 
effect by scoring lower than the control group, and those in coded group 3 were expected to 
show a boomerang effect by scoring higher than the control group. For example, given a 
proattitudinal antipolicy message, those in a high attitudinal threat cell would show boomerang 
effects by liking the current policy more (vs. the control participants), believing in a higher legal 
drinking age, and having a less favorable attitude toward changing the policy. So these subjects’ 
responses were coded into group 3, 3, and 1, respectively, for the three dependent variables. 
Applying this rule, all 18 conditions were coded into the six groups for each dependent variable 
on an issue (see Table 3 and Table 4). Last, the coded group entered the univariate linear model 
as a fixed factor for comparing the difference of group means, inspecting the direction of 
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difference, and exploring the linearity of the effects. Because of our directional hypotheses, an 
ANOVA was judged to be statistically significant when the p value of the test was at least .05 
one tailed.   
H1: Perceived threat and boomerang. Based on H1, among those who received a 
proattitudinal message, those who perceived a high threat to their attitudinal freedom (H1a), but 
not those who perceived a low threat to their attitudinal freedom (H1b), as compared with the 
control participants for the specific issue, were predicted to exhibit a boomerang effect. With the 
proattitudinal subgroup (n = 196), the coded boomerang groups (1-3) were the fixed factor in the 
univariate model for testing H1a and the coded nonboomerang groups (4-6) were the fixed factor 
in the univariate model for testing H1b. The first group represented those who received high-
threat arguments and were predicted to have a boomerang effect by scoring lower than the 
control group; the third group represented those who received high-threat arguments and were 
predicted to have a boomerang effect by scoring higher than the control group; and the second 
group was the control group. The fourth group represented those who received low-threat 
arguments and were predicted to not show a boomerang effect by scoring lower than the control 
group; the sixth group represented those who received low-threat arguments and were predicted 
not to have a boomerang effect by scoring higher than the control group; and the fifth and the 
second group were the same control group (named differently for distinguishing the coded 
boomerang and nonboomerang groups).  
Among those who received the proattitudinal message (n = 196), several ANOVAs 
revealed significant effects of the recoded boomerang factor on five outcome variables (see 
Table 5), including respondents’ belief toward changing the legal age for drinking, F(2, 116) = 
17.58, p < .001, 𝑅2 = .24, adjusted 𝑅2 = .22; respondents’ belief toward changing the legal age 
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of marriage, F(2, 87) = 11.27, p < .001, 𝑅2 = .20, adjusted 𝑅2 = .18; the extent to which 
respondents liked the current legal age for drinking, F(2, 116) = 21.22, p < .001, 𝑅2 = .27, 
adjusted 𝑅2 = .26; the extent to which respondents liked the current legal age of marriage, F(2, 
87) = 16.15, p < .001, 𝑅2 = .26, adjusted 𝑅2 = .24; and the belief position on the legal age of 
marriage, F(2, 85) = 21.02, p < .001, 𝑅2 = .32, adjusted 𝑅2 = .31. But the effect of the recoded 
boomerang groups on the belief position for the drinking age was not significant, F(2, 116) = 
0.86, p = .43. However, the comparisons of recoded group means suggest persuasion, not 
boomerang (Table 5). The persuasion effect was stronger for the issue of marriage age (vs. the 
drinking age). For both issues across three outcome variables, the means of boomerang groups 
(1-3) were inconsistent with our predictions. For example, on the extent to which the legal 
drinking age was liked, those who received the antipolicy high-threat message (group 1) showed 
a boomerang effect (M = 38.77, SD = 12.15) by scoring higher than the mean of the control 
group (M = 19.89, SD = 16.99). Similarly, those who received the propolicy high-threat message 
(group 3) showed a boomerang effect (M = 12.05, SD = 9.62) by scoring lower than the mean of 
the control group (M = 19.89, SD = 16.99). In summary, H1a was not supported.  
Another six ANOVAs revealed significant effects of the recoded nonboomerang factor 
on three outcome variables across two topics (see Table 6). Again, comparisons of recoded 
nonbommerang group means suggested persuasion. For both issues across three outcome 
variables, the group means were consistent with our predictions (Table 6). Thus, H1b was 
supported.  
H3: Argument quality and boomerang. Based on H3, those who received a 
counterattitudinal message with low-quality arguments (H3a), but not those who received a 
counterattitudinal message with high-quality arguments (H3b), as compared with the control 
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participants for the specific issue, were expected to exhibit a boomerang effect. With the 
subgroup of respondents who received the counterattitudinal message (n = 149), the coded 
boomerang groups (1-3) were the fixed factor in the univariate model for testing H3a and the 
recoded nonboomerang groups (4-6) were the fixed factor in the univariate model for testing H3b. 
The first group represented those who received low-quality arguments and were predicted to 
have a boomerang effect by scoring lower than the control group (for the specific issue); the third 
group represented those who received low-quality arguments and were predicted to have a 
boomerang effect by scoring higher than the control group; and the second group was the control 
group. The nonboomerang groups were recoded with a similar rule.   
The boomerang groups (H3a). Among those who received the counterattitudinal 
message (n = 149), several ANOVAs were conducted for H3a (see Table 7). For the legal 
drinking age, among those who received a counterattitudinal low quality message, there were 
significant boomerang effects on all three dependent variables, including their belief toward 
lowering the drinking age, F(2, 97) = 6.94, p < .01, 𝑅2 = .13, adjusted 𝑅2 = .11; the extent to 
which they liked the current legal drinking age, F(2, 97) = 6.20,  p < .01, 𝑅2 = .12, adjusted 𝑅2 = 
.10; and the belief position on the legal age for drinking, F(2, 97) = 3.71,  p < .05, 𝑅2 = .07, 
adjusted 𝑅2 = .05. The means of the coded boomerang groups (1-3) were consistent with our 
predictions on the three outcome variables for drinking age. For example, on attitude (i.e., the 
extent to which the legal drinking age was liked; see Table 7), those who received propolicy low-
quality arguments (group 1) showed a boomerang effect (M = 13.23, SD = 11.61) by scoring 
lower than the mean of the control group (M = 19.89, SD = 16.99). Similarly, those who received 
antipolicy low-quality arguments (group 3) showed a boomerang effect (M = 33.01, SD = 12.97) 
by scoring higher than the mean of the control group (M = 19.89, SD = 16.99). Results from 
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polynomial contrasts suggested an overall linear trend (p < .01), but not a quadratic trend (p > 
.05) on all three dependent variables.  
For the legal marriage age, among those who received a counterattitudinal low-quality 
message, there were significant boomerang effects on all three dependent variables, including 
respondents’ belief toward raising the marriage age, F(2, 87) = 2.40, p < .05, one tailed, 𝑅2 = 
.05, adjusted 𝑅2  = .03; the extent to which the current legal marriage age was liked, F(2, 87) = 
3.43,  p < .05, 𝑅2 = .07, adjusted 𝑅2 = .05; and the belief position on the legal age of marriage, 
F(2, 85) = 5.03,  p < .01, 𝑅2 = .11, adjusted 𝑅2 = .09. The means of recoded boomerang groups 
(1-3) were consistent with the predictions on the three outcome variables (see Table 7). The 
results from polynomial contrasts suggested an overall linear trend (p < .05, one tailed) rather 
than a quadratic trend (p > .05) on belief and attitude. But a quadratic trend (p < .01), rather than 
a linear trend (p > .05), was found for belief position. Overall, the results on belief and attitude 
for both issues supported H3a. 
The nonboomerang groups (H3b). Among those who received the counterattitudinal 
message (n = 149), several ANOVAs were conducted for H3b (see Table 8). Among those who 
received a counterattitudinal high-quality message, there were significant effects of recoded 
nonboomerang groups on the extent to which respondents liked the current legal age for drinking, 
F(2, 102) = 4.99, p < .01, 𝑅2 = .09, adjusted 𝑅2 = .07; the extent to which respondents liked the 
current legal age of marriage, F(2, 89) = 3.93, p < .05, 𝑅2 = .08, adjusted 𝑅2 = .06; and the belief 
position on the legal age of marriage, F(2, 87) = 5.38, p < .01, 𝑅2 = .11, adjusted 𝑅2 = .09 (see 
Table 8). The comparisons of recoded nonboomerang group means suggested unexpected 
boomerang effects. Results from the polynomial contrasts suggested linear trends for the extent 




H4: Belief strength and boomerang. Based on H4, among those who received a 
counterattitudinal message, those whose prior belief was strong (H4a), but not those whose prior 
belief was weak (H4b), as compared with the mean of control participants for the specific issue, 
were expected to exhibit a boomerang effect. As belief strength was measured rather than 
manipulated, we categorized the subjects’ response on premessage belief strength into high 
(strong prior belief) and low (weak prior belief) based on a median split. The medians were 100 
for legal drinking age and 80 for legal marriage age. With the subgroup of respondents who 
received the counterattitudinal message (n = 149), we recoded the three boomerang groups (1-3) 
and the three nonboomerang groups (4-6). The first group represented those with a strong prior 
belief and were predicted to have a boomerang effect by scoring lower than the control group; 
the third group represented those with a strong prior belief and were predicted to have a 
boomerang effect by scoring higher than the control group; and the second group was the control 
group. The nonboomerang groups were recoded with a similar rule.   
Among those who received the counterattitudinal message (n = 149), six ANOVAs were 
conducted for H4a (see Table 9). For the legal drinking age, there were significant linear effects 
of the boomerang groups on respondents’ belief toward lowering the drinking age, F(2, 91) = 
12.63, p < .01, 𝑅2 = .22, adjusted 𝑅2 = .21, the extent to which respondents liked the current 
legal drinking age, F(2, 91) = 15.40,  p < .01, 𝑅2 = .26, adjusted 𝑅2 = .24, and the belief position 
on the legal age for drinking, F(2, 91) = 2.58,  p < .05, one tailed, 𝑅2 = .06, adjusted 𝑅2 = .03. 
Similarly, for the legal marriage age, there were significant linear effects of recoded boomerang 
groups on the extent to which respondents liked the current legal marriage age, F(2, 87) = 5.38, p 
< .01, 𝑅2 = .11, adjusted 𝑅2 = .09, and the belief position on the legal marriage age, F(2, 85) = 
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7.59, p < .01, 𝑅2 = .16, adjusted 𝑅2 = .14. But the effect of the recoded boomerang groups on 
respondents’ belief toward raising the marriage age was not significant, F(2, 87) = 0.63, p = .54. 
As expected, the means of recoded boomerang group on the outcome variables were consistent 
with the predicted group means. For example, on attitude (i.e., the extent to which the legal 
drinking age was liked; see Table 9), those with a strong prior belief who received a propolicy 
message (group 1) showed a boomerang effect (M = 10.47, SD = 13.47) by scoring lower than 
the mean of the control group (M = 19.89, SD = 16.99). Similarly, those with strong prior belief 
who received an antipolicy message (group 3) showed a boomerang effect (M = 44.13, SD = 
11.12) by scoring higher than the mean of the control group (M = 19.89, SD = 16.99). Results 
from polynomial contrasts suggested an overall linear trend (p < .05) on all three dependent 
variables. Therefore, H4a was supported.  
Several ANOVAs with the nonboomerang groups as the fixed factor were conducted for 
testing H4b (see Table 10). Overall, there was no significant effect of the recoded nonboomerang 
groups on the dependent variables for the two issues, as predicted by H4b. Results from 
polynomial contrasts did not suggest any linear or quadratic trend. H4b was supported. 
Auxiliary interaction tests. Several interactions in the linear models were conducted as 
auxiliary tests for the effects of perceived threat and argument quality on the boomerang effects 
in the proattitudinal and counterattitudinal subgroups, respectively. In these models, the fixed 
factors were the predicted interaction effects and the dependent variables were belief and attitude 
boomerang, which were computed from the difference between the mean of control subjects and 
an individual score on belief and attitude (see the section on computing individual boomerang 
scores). Overall, the results (see Table I1 in Appendix I) supported the interactions between 
subgroup and argument quality on drinking age for belief boomerang, F(1, 174) = 7.60, p < .01, 
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𝑅2 = .41 , adjusted 𝑅2 = .40, and for belief position boomerang, F(1, 174) = 6.17,  p < .05, 𝑅2 
= .40 , adjusted 𝑅2 = .38. For example, Figure I1 showed that for subjects in the 
counterattitudinal subgroup, those receiving low-quality arguments had larger belief boomerang 
(M = 4.54, SE = 0.94) than those receiving high-quality arguments (M = 2.23, SE = 0.88). These 
results were consistent with the previous subgroup ANOVAs.  
Exploratory post hoc tests. To explore a boomerang effect in a specific experimental 
condition, a series of post hoc t tests were conducted for comparing the difference of the mean of 
an experimental condition and the mean of the control participants for the specific issue (see 
Tables G1-G6 in Appendix G). Overall, the results solidified the analysis of variance results: 
Boomerang effects were observed across topics and across outcome variables. And in the 
experimental condition of low argument quality, there was consistently a boomerang effect 
regardless of any other condition. Tables H1-H3 in Appendix H show the number of subjects 
who had a boomerang effect in each message condition.  
Summary. Overall, the results supported H3 and H4. Given the counterattitudinal 
message, those who received low-quality arguments or had a strong prior belief, as compared 
with the control participants, exhibited boomerang effects. But those who received high-quality 
arguments or had weak prior belief, as compared with the control participants, did not exhibit 
any boomerang effect. But H1 was only partially supported. Given the proattitudinal message, 
those who received either the high-threat message or the low-threat message did not show any 
boomerang effect. In the following section, several structural equation models were tested to 
examine the mediators for the two types of boomerang effects. 
Hypothesis Testing: Subgroup Structural Equation Modeling  
 H2 predicted that given proattitudinal communication, there were indirect effects of both 
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perceived attitudinal threat and trait reactance on the boomerang effect through anger and 
negative cognitions. H5 predicted that given the counterattitudinal communication, there was an 
indirect effect of argument quality on a boomerang effect through counterarguing. In addition, 
RQ1 asked whether anger (vs. negative cognitions) was the dominant process of a boomerang 
effect given proattitudinal communication. RQ2 asked whether counterarguing (vs. anger) was 
the dominant process of a boomerang effect given counterattitudinal communication.  
 A boomerang effect was coded at the individual level for the structural equation models. 
The three boomerang variables were created to measure the boomerang effects on respondents’ 
(1) belief on changing the policy (i.e., the extent to which the policy should be changed), (2) 
belief position on the policy, and (3) attitude toward the current policy (i.e., how much they liked 
the policy).  
 Computing individual boomerang scores. Boomerang effects were indirectly determined 
by the advocated message position and the control group mean. A set of decision rules was 
established for coding the boomerang variables. Consider the example of coding belief 
boomerang for drinking age. For an antipolicy message on drinking age, an individual’s 
boomerang score was computed by subtracting the mean of control participants on drinking age 
from the person’s score on belief toward changing the current policy. For a propolicy message on 
drinking age, an individual’s boomerang score was computed by subtracting the person’s score 
on belief toward changing the current policy from the mean of control participants on drinking 
age. A positive boomerang score indicates that the individual had a boomerang effect, and the 
value of the score indicates the magnitude of the boomerang effect. Similar coding rules were 
applied to code belief position and attitude boomerang. For coding efficiency, several for-loops 
were programmed on R to apply the decision rules and generate the three boomerang variables 
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(see Appendix F for the R code).    
 Examining the indirect effects. Based on the hypotheses and research questions, two 
separate structural equation models were constructed for the proattitudinal (Table 8) and 
counterattitudinal (Table 9) subgroups. The significance of the hypothesized indirect effects in 
H2 (see Table 8) and H5 (see Table 9) were tested through the R “Lavaan” package (Rosseel, 
2011). For example, in Table 8, the indirect effect of perceived threat on the belief boomerang 
through anger in H2 can be examined by testing the significance of the product of the path 
coefficient linking perceived threat and anger (a1) and the path coefficient linking anger and 
belief boomerang (b1). Because attitude is a summative function of salient beliefs (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980), attitude boomerang is modeled as an outcome of belief boomerang and belief 
position boomerang. Similarly, the indirect effect of perceived threat on belief position 
boomerang through anger can be examined by testing the significance of the product of the path 
coefficient linking perceived threat and anger (a1) and the path coefficient linking anger and 
belief position boomerang (b3). A similar technique was employed for testing indirect effects in 
H2 and H5 (see Table 9). Because these hypotheses were directional, the significance of the 
estimated predictor and indirect effects was judged to be statistically significant when the p value 
was less than .05 one tailed. 
H2: Mediators given a proattitudinal message. H2a predicted an indirect effect of 
perceived threat on a boomerang effect through anger and negative cognitions given a 
proattitudinal message. H2b predicted an indirect effect of trait reactance on a boomerang effect 
through anger and negative cognitions given a proattitudinal message.  
Among those who received a proattitudinal message, a structural equation model (SEM) 
was constructed for testing H2. Table 8 provides the model of the hypothesized indirect effects. 
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The summary statistics and correlation matrix of the variables in the proattitudinal SEM are 
included in Table 11. Specifically, the endogenous variables were belief boomerang, belief 
position boomerang, and attitude boomerang. Attitude boomerang was modeled as an outcome of 
belief and belief position boomerang (see Figure 8). The mediators were anger and negative 
cognitions. The error terms of two mediators and two belief boomerang variables were set to 
covary, respectively. In addition, the exogenous variables were (1) perceived threat to attitudinal 
freedom and trait reactance, and (2) control variables, including issue type, prior belief strength, 
and perceived competence to exercise belief freedom. Control variables were used for predicting 
both the mediators and endogenous variables but were not shown in Figure 8 for simplicity.  
In the specified structural equation model, the variables measured by a single item were 
specified as observed variables. Only anger was assessed by multiple items (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.92). To adjust for the measurement error of anger, anger was treated as a latent variable with one 
indicator (i.e., the averaged composite) and the error term of the indicator fixed at (1- α) times 
the indicator’s variance (Bollen, 1989). With an inspection of the missing data (6 data entries), 
the values appeared to be missing at random (MAR). Thus, the missing data were treated with 
the full information maximum likelihood (FIML, Enders & Bandalos, 2001).  
The sample size (N = 196) was sufficient for the specified SEM. Bentler and Chou (1987) 
suggested a ratio of at least 5 participants to each free parameter estimated within the model. The 
proattitudinal SEM had 39 parameters to be estimated, suggesting a minimum sample size of 195. 
Nunnally (1967) suggested a minimum of 10 cases per variable. The proattitudinal SEM had 10 
variables, suggesting a minimum sample size of 100. And a sample size of 150 for SEM has 
been recommended by SEM analysts, including Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Holbert and 
Stephenson (2002). Parameters were estimated by maximum likelihood.  
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 The overall model-data fit was good, χ2(6, N = 196) = 5.13, 𝑝 > .05, SRMR = 0.017, 
RMSEA =  .00, and CFI = 1.00. The p value for χ2 was larger than the critical value of  .05, 
which implied that the model-implied covariance matrix was not significantly different from the 
observed covariance matrix. The SRMR was less than .09 and RMSEA was less than .06, 
consistent with recommendations by Hu and Bentler (1999). This suggests that the overall 
discrepancy between the observed and model-implied covariance matrix was not significant, 
with or without considerations of simplicity. The incremental fit index, CFI, was larger than .96. 
This suggested that the proposed model fit the data better compared to the baseline null model.  
In the model, the variance explained by the exogenous variables was .196, .060, and .243, 
respectively, for belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude boomerang; the 
variance explained by the exogenous variables was .132 and .079 for anger and negative 
cognitions, respectively.  
In Table 14, the solid lines indicate significant path coefficients whereas dashed lines 
indicate nonsignificant path coefficients. From Table 14, we can see that there were no 
significant indirect effects of perceived threat on the boomerang variables through anger or 
negative cognitions. The results did not support H2a. However, there was a significant indirect 
effect of trait reactance on the belief boomerang through anger, standardized indirect effect = .04, 
SE = 1.88, z = 1.60, p < .05, one-tailed test. As shown in Figure 11, trait reactance caused anger 
(beta = .36, SE = 0.05, z = 5.00, p < .001), which subsequently predicted a boomerang on 
respondents’ belief regarding changing the current policy (beta = .11, SE = 6.54, z = 1.69, p < .05, 
one-tailed test). Thus, H2b was partially supported: Anger, but not negative cognitions, mediated 
the effect of trait reactance on the boomerang effect. 
H5: Mediators given a counterattitudinal message. H5 predicted an indirect effect of 
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argument quality on a boomerang effect through the number of counterarguments given a 
counterattitudinal message. Among those who received a counterattitudinal message, an SEM 
(Figure 9) tested H5. Figure 9 models the hypothesized indirect effects. The summary statistics 
and correlation matrix for the variables in the model are reported in Table 12. Specifically, the 
endogenous variables were belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude 
boomerang. Attitude boomerang was an outcome of belief and belief position boomerang (see 
Figure 9). The mediators were counterarguments and anger. The error terms of two mediators 
and two belief boomerang variables were set to covary, respectively. The exogenous variables 
were (1) argument quality, and (2) control variables, including issue type and prior belief 
strength. All the variables except for anger were specified as observed variables in the model. 
The control variables were used for predicting both the mediators and the endogenous 
boomerang variables but were not shown in Figure 9 for simplicity. The sample size (N = 149) 
was sufficient for the model specified (Figure 9). Bentler and Chou (1987) suggested a ratio of at 
least 5 participants to each free parameter estimated within the model. The counterattitudinal 
SEM had 28 parameters to be estimated, suggesting a minimum sample size of 140.  
The overall model-data fit was good, χ2(7, N = 149) = 8.47, 𝑝 >  .05, SRMR = 0.03, 
RMSEA =  .04, and CFI = 0.97. Overall, the model fit indices suggested that the overall 
discrepancy between the observed and model-implied covariance matrix was not significant, 
recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999). The SRMR was less than .09 and RMSEA was less 
than .06, consistent with recommendations by Hu and Bentler (1999). This suggests that the 
overall discrepancy between the observed and model-implied covariance matrix was not 
significant, with or without considerations of simplicity. The CFI was close to but smaller than 
0.96, suggesting that the model did not fit the data better than the null model. In the model, the 
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variance explained by the exogenous variables was .032, .125, and .074 for belief boomerang, 
belief position boomerang, and attitude boomerang, respectively; and variance explained by the 
exogenous variables was .164 and .015 for counterarguments and anger, respectively.  
 In Figure 12, the solid lines indicate significant path coefficients whereas dashed lines 
indicate nonsignificant path coefficients. As shown in Table 15, counterarguments were a 
significant mediator for the indirect effect from argument quality to the belief position 
boomerang (standardized indirect effect = - .09, SE = 0.10, z = -2.62, p < .01). Specifically, 
argument quality caused generation of counterarguments (beta = - .31, SE = 0.180, z = -4.14, p 
< .001), which subsequently predicted belief position boomerang (beta = .27, SE = 0.11, z = 3.39, 
p < .001; see Figure 12). But the indirect effect from argument quality to belief boomerang 
through counterarguments was not significant, standardized indirect effect = - .01, SE = 3.49, z = 
-0.36, p = .72. Only the belief position boomerang (beta = .13, SE = 1.92, z = 1.61, p < .05, one-
tailed test), but not belief boomerang (beta = .09, SE = 0.05, z = 1.08, p = .28), predicted attitude 
boomerang. Therefore, H5 was partially supported.  
 Relative dominance of mediators (RQ1 & RQ2). RQ1 asked whether anger (vs. 
negative cognitions) was the dominant mediator of a boomerang effect given a proattitudinal 
message. RQ2 asked whether counterarguing (vs. anger) was the dominant mediator of a 
boomerang effect given a counterattitudinal communication. A dominant mediator was 
operationalized to carry a significant and larger indirect effect (i.e., all the indirect effects 
traveling through the mediator from the exogenous variables to the endogenous variables in the 
path model), as compared with the alternative mediator(s). The magnitude of indirect effects in 
H2 (Figure 8) and H5 (Figure 9) were examined to answer RQ1 and RQ2, respectively.  
  The aforementioned results on the structural equation models answered both research 
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questions. Regarding RQ1, given a proattitudinal message (Table 14), the indirect effect between 
trait reactance and belief boomerang through anger (standardized indirect effect = .04, SE = 1.88, 
z = 1.60, p < .05, one-tailed test) was larger than through negative cognitions (standardized 
indirect effect = - .01, SE = 0.67, z = -1.00, p = .32). But the difference was not statistically 
significant. Thus, anger (vs. negative cognitions) was the dominant mediator for the influence of 
trait reactance on belief boomerang given a proattitudinal message. Regarding RQ2, given a 
counterattitudinal message (Table 15), the indirect effect of argument quality on belief position 
boomerang through counterarguments (standardized indirect effect = - .09, SE = 0.10, z = -2.62, 
p < .01) was larger than through anger (standardized indirect effect = - .01, SE = 0.04, z = -1.00, 
p = .32). But the difference was not statistically significant. In conclusion, counterarguments (vs. 
anger) were the dominant mediator for the influence of argument quality on the boomerang 
effect given a counterattitudinal message.  
Hypothesis Testing: SEM Integrating Proattitudinal and Counterattitudinal Subgroups 
H6 predicted that there were indirect effects of both perceived threat (H6a) and trait 
reactance (H6b) on the boomerang effect through nonrefutational thoughts, and H7 predicted that 
there were indirect effects of argument quality on the boomerang effect through both 
counterarguing (H7a) and nonrefutational thoughts (H7b).  
Analytical strategy. With all the subjects who received a message (N = 345), an SEM 
integrating the proattitudinal and counterattitudinal subgroups was examined. Those in the two 
control conditions were not included because they did not receive a message and were not asked 
to list any message-related thoughts. The integrated model tested the predicted indirect effects in 
H6 and H7 and provided additional tests for H2 and H5. For example, anger was included as a 
mediator for further validating the indirect effect of trait reactance on the boomerang effect 
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through anger in H2. Figure 10 provides a representation of the hypothesized indirect effects.  
In the model, the endogenous variables are belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, 
and attitude boomerang. Attitude boomerang was an outcome of belief and belief position 
boomerang. The mediators were counterarguments, nonrefutational thoughts, and anger. The 
error terms of three mediators and two belief boomerang variables were allowed to covary, 
respectively. In addition, the exogenous variables were (1) argument quality, perceived threat, 
and trait reactance, and (2) control variables, including issue type, subgroup (i.e., proattitudinal 
versus counterattitudinal message), belief strength, and perceived competence to exercise belief 
freedom. Control variables were used for predicting both the mediators and endogenous 
variables but were not shown in Figure 10 for simplicity. All the variables except for anger were 
specified as observed variables in the model. The summary statistics and correlation matrix of all 
variables are reported in Table 13. With an inspection of the missing data (6 data entries), the 
values appeared to be missing at random (MAR). Thus, the missing data were treated with FIML.  
H6 and H7: Differentiating counterarguments and nonrefutational thoughts. As 
shown in Figure 13, the overall model-data fit was good, χ2(17, N = 345) = 17.64, 𝑝 > .05, 
SRMR = 0.02, RMSEA =  .01, and CFI = 1.00. The variance explained by the exogenous 
variables was .113, .384, and .180 for the belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and 
attitude boomerang, respectively; and the variance explained were .093, .074, and .158 for 
counterarguments, nonrefutational thoughts, and anger, respectively.  
Nonrefutational thoughts were not a significant mediator for the indirect effects of 
perceived threat on belief boomerang (standardized indirect effect = .01, SE = 1.04, z = 1.38, p 
= .17) or belief position boomerang (standardized indirect effect = .01, SE = 0.02, z = 1.10, p 
= .27). Similarly, nonrefutational thoughts were not a significant mediator for the indirect effects 
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of trait reactance on belief boomerang (standardized indirect effect = .01, SE = 0.51, z = 1.44, p 
= .15) or belief position boomerang (standardized indirect effect = .01, SE = 0.01, z = 1.01, p 
= .31). Thus, H6a and H6b were rejected. 
In Table 16, the indirect effect of argument quality on belief boomerang through 
counterarguments were significant, standardized indirect effect = - .03, SE = 1.84, z = -2.44, p 
< .05. Similarly, the indirect effect of argument quality on belief position boomerang through 
counterarguments were also significant, standardized indirect effect = - .02, SE = 0.03, z = -2.17, 
p < .05. In Figure 13, the solid lines indicate significant path coefficients whereas dashed lines 
indicate nonsignificant path coefficients. As shown in Figure 13, we can see that argument 
quality predicted counterarguments (beta = -.18, SE = 0.11, z = -3.42, p < .001), which 
subsequently predicted belief boomerang (beta = 0.17, SE = 3.61, z = 3.41, p < .001) and belief 
position boomerang (beta = 0.11, SE = 0.08, z = 2.57, p < .01). And both belief boomerang (beta 
= 0.29, SE = 0.04, z = 4.47, p < .001) and belief position boomerang (beta = 0.25, SE = 1.41, z = 
3.84, p < .001) significantly predicted attitude boomerang. But there were no significant indirect 
effects of argument quality on belief boomerang (standardized indirect effect = -.02, SE = 1.93, z 
= -1.51, p = .13) or belief position boomerang (standardized indirect effect = -.01, SE = 0.03, z = 
-1.19, p = .24) through nonrefutational thoughts. Thus, H7 was partially supported: Only 
counterarguments (H7a), rather than nonrefutational thoughts (H7b), mediated the indirect effect 
between argument quality and the boomerang effect.  
Furthermore, as shown in Table 16, there were significant indirect effects of trait 
reactance on the belief boomerang (standardized indirect effect = 0.04, SE = 1.29, z = 2.15, p 
< .05) and belief position boomerang (standardized indirect effect = 0.03, SE = 0.03, z = 2.07, p 




Overall, the results from SEMs provided support for H2, H5, and H7, but not H6. Given a 
proattitudinal message, anger mediated the indirect effect between trait reactance and the 
boomerang effect on belief and belief position; given a counterattitudinal message, 
counterarguments mediated the indirect effect between argument quality and the boomerang 
effect on belief and belief position. Nonrefutational thoughts did not explain any mechanism of a 
boomerang effect. Additionally, these results provided predictive validity for counterarguments, 
nonrefutational thoughts, and anger. Counterarguments and nonrefutational thoughts appear to be 




Chapter 5: Discussion 
This dissertation examined and differentiated two types of boomerang effects: a 
boomerang effect under a proattitudinal message and a boomerang effect under a 
counterattitudinal message. By employing a 2 (Message valence: antipolicy vs. propolicy) × 2 
(Issues: legal age for drinking vs. legal age of marriage) × 2 (Threat to freedom: low threat vs. 
high threat) × 2 (Argument quality: low quality vs. high quality) plus 2 (Control groups: no-
message control for the two issues) factorial design (18 conditions total), antecedents and 
mediators that bring about the two types of boomerang effect were examined. The dissertation is 
among the first studies to systematically examine the mechanisms underlying boomerang effects 
given different types of messages.  
First, a boomerang effect was observed on belief and attitude given either a proattitudinal 
or counterattitudinal message with distinct message characteristics. Under a counterattitudinal 
message, both argument quality and prior belief strength predicted a boomerang effect: Those 
receiving a low-quality argument or those who had a stronger prior belief, as compared with the 
control group for the specific issue, exhibited a boomerang effect. Under a proattitudinal 
message, perceived threat to attitudinal freedom unexpectedly did not predict a boomerang 
effect. The findings were consistent regardless of issue (i.e., the drinking age vs. the marriage 
age) and the message advocated position (i.e., propolicy vs. antipolicy), suggesting some 
generalizability of the results. There has been controversy on the existence and measurement of a 
boomerang effect (e.g., Cho & Salomon, 2007; Pechmann & Slater, 2005), and there have been 
few efforts theorizing or examining the mechanism of a boomerang effect (Byrne & Hart, 2009). 
This dissertation contributes to persuasion research by showing that a boomerang effect occurs in 
a predictable manner and can be measured. The results expand the theoretical scope of 
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persuasion research emphasizing message effectiveness and reveal new research opportunities. 
For example, given the direct effect of prior belief strength on the boomerang effect, more 
research should be conducted on persuasive appeals that mitigate the cognitive or affective 
process resulting in the boomerang effect among those with a strong belief for a specific issue 
(e.g., social norm appeal; see Schultz et al., 2007).  
Second, the results support the idea that there are two types of boomerang effects with 
different mediators and antecedents. Specifically, counterarguments (vs. anger) were found to be 
the dominant mediator for the effect of argument quality on a boomerang effect given a 
counterattitudinal message, whereas anger (vs. negative cognitions) was the dominant mediator 
for the effect of trait reactance on a boomerang effect given a proattitudinal message. These 
findings provide evidence for the dual path boomerang framework and advance research on 
persuasion and attitude change by separating the cognitive and affective mechanisms for the 
boomerang effects: There was predominantly a cognitive process for a boomerang effect given a 
counterattitudinal message and predominantly an affective process for a boomerang effect given 
a proattitudinal message.  
Last, this dissertation refines the construct of negative cognitions and integrates the two 
long-standing lines of research on the theory of reactance (e.g., S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981) and 
the cognitive response perspective (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). The results support two types 
of negative cognitions: Counterarguments and nonrefutational thoughts. Counterarguments and 
nonrefutational thoughts were caused by different sets of antecedents and had different 
boomerang outcomes. It was found that counterarguments (vs. nonrefutational thoughts) 
mediated the relationship between argument quality and the boomerang effect. But perceived 
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threat and trait reactance caused only nonrefutational thoughts, which did not predict the 
boomerang effect. These results are discussed below.  
H1 tested the prediction of a boomerang effect given a proattitudinal message based on 
psychological reactance theory (e.g., S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). The result did not confirm a 
boomerang effect caused by a high threat to attitudinal freedom for both the issues, which is 
inconsistent with previous reactance studies that observed a boomerang effect caused by a high 
threat induction (Bessarabova et al., 2013; Wicklund, 1974; Worchel & Brehm, 1970). Instead of 
questioning the theoretical association between perceived threat and a boomerang effect, our 
unexpected result is more likely to be explained by the multiple manipulations in the experiment. 
In previous studies on reactance, only perceived threat, rather than other message features, was 
manipulated. In this study, the manipulation of perceived threat to attitudinal freedom was placed 
at the end of an essay in a single paragraph and conveyed by more general (vs. issue-specific) 
arguments (i.e., you have no choice but to agree with the reasons). The purpose of the 
manipulation was to ensure that the manipulation of perceived threat did not interfere with that 
of argument quality. This procedure was recommended by Silvia (2006), who found that 
respondents generated counterarguments toward a message (regardless of the argument quality) 
when the perceived threat manipulation was placed at the beginning of the message. Thus, it is 
possible that respondents only perceived threat to their general attitudinal freedom (as supported 
by the successful manipulation check on perceived threat) but not to their issue-specific 
attitudinal freedom. Respondents may fail to link their issue-specific belief and attitude with the 
attitudinal freedom threat and subsequently do not experience any boomerang effect on an issue-
related belief and attitude.  
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Another possible explanation for the nonsignificant relationship between perceived threat 
and a boomerang effect is the relative length of the two manipulations. The manipulation of 
argument quality used three to four paragraphs, but the manipulation of perceived threat to 
attitudinal freedom only had one paragraph. Although the manipulation checks for both 
perceived threat and argument quality were significant, the effect of argument quality might 
cause a discounting of the effect of perceived threat, because respondents may have paid greater 
attention to the argument quality induction. Furthermore, the finding for H2 that trait reactance 
had a significant effect on a boomerang through anger supports the role of reactance in the 
boomerang process under proattitudinal communication, because anger constitutes the dominant 
indicator of reactance (Bessarabova et al., 2013; Quick & Kim, 2009; Rains & Tuner, 2007). 
Therefore, the nonsignificant relationship between perceived threat and the boomerang effect 
may be attributed to our treatment of multiple manipulations rather than to the lack of the 
theoretical link between reactance and a boomerang effect.  
H3 predicted a boomerang effect given a counterattitudinal message, based on the 
cognitive response perspective (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Argument quality was found to 
predict the boomerang effect on belief and attitude across issue types, message valence, and 
perceived threat, given a counterattitudinal message. This finding provides little support for the 
cognitive response perspective, which suggests that argument quality should interact with issue 
involvement to influence message receivers’ attitude (e.g., B. Johnson et al., 2004; Petty et al., 
1981). For the two issues employed in the main experiment, participants apparently perceived 
the legal age for drinking (vs. the legal age of marriage) more important and involving, as 
suggested by summary statistics in multiple pilot studies and the main experiment. But a 
boomerang occurred for both issues. This was consistent with Park and her colleagues’ (2007) 
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finding that low-quality arguments (as compared to high-quality arguments) are sufficient to 
yield a boomerang effect regardless of the level of ego-involvement, message involvement, or 
message type. Furthermore, previous studies (e.g., Neimeyer et al., 1991) found that low-quality 
arguments were associated with reduced persuasion (i.e., low-quality arguments are less 
persuasive than strong arguments) but not with a boomerang effect (i.e., those who receive low-
quality arguments have a boomerang effect as compared with their prior belief or a control 
group). One reason for such a finding may be the lack of a measure of the boomerang effect in 
previous studies. Our finding that a low-quality argument was associated with a boomerang 
effect emphasized the detrimental effect of weak arguments in persuasion.  
H4 predicted a boomerang effect caused by prior belief strength given a 
counterattitudinal message. Consistent with predictions based on motivated reasoning theory 
(Hart & Nisbet, 2011; Redlawsk, 2006), biased assimilation theory (Lord et al., 1979), and 
cognitive dissonance theory (Cohen, 1962), prior belief strength was also found to predict a 
boomerang effect given a counterattitudinal message under all experimental conditions (i.e., for 
both issue types, both advocated positions, and both levels of argument quality). This finding 
was consistent with previous studies that indirectly observed the potential effect of belief and 
attitude strength on a boomerang effect (Hovland et al., 1957; Kelley & Volkart, 1952; N. Miller, 
1965). One argument based on biased assimilation theory and motivated reasoning theory is that 
given a counterattitudinal message, strong belief or attitude holders may perceive argument 
quality in a biased manner. Therefore, those with strong prior belief may perceive lower 
argument quality, generate more counterarguments, and have a boomerang effect. The finding 
that prior belief strength was a significant and positive predictor of a boomerang effect 
strengthened support for this line of reasoning.   
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H2 and H5 tested the mediators for the two types of boomerang effects; RQ1 and RQ2 
tried to separate the two processes by assessing the relative dominance of the mediators. It was 
expected that reactance, a combination of anger and negative thoughts, could explain the 
boomerang effect given a proattitudinal message (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains & Turner, 2007) 
and anger was expected to be the dominant mediator (Bessarabova et al., 2013; Quick & Kim, 
2009; Rains & Tuner, 2007). On the other hand, counterarguments, as compared with anger, 
could explain the boomerang effect given a counterattitudinal message (B. Johnson, et al., 2004). 
The results from three SEMs confirmed our hypotheses. Among the proattitudinal message 
subjects, anger (vs. negative cognitions) mediated the influence of trait reactance on belief 
boomerang, a boomerang on the belief toward changing the current policy, for both issues. 
However, among the counterattitudinal message subjects, counterarguments (vs. anger) mediated 
the influence of argument quality on belief position boomerang for both issues. In addition, 
results from the SEM integrating the proattitudinal and counterattitudinal subgroups provided 
additional evidence for the dual path boomerang framework. Among those who received a 
message, anger mediated the effect of trait reactance on the belief boomerang and the belief 
position boomerang, whereas counterarguments mediated the effect of argument quality on the 
belief boomerang and the belief position boomerang. And respondents’ attitude boomerang was 
predicted by their belief and belief position boomerang.  
These findings support the dual path framework by empirically differentiating the 
antecedents and mediators for the two mechanisms underlying boomerang effects. The 
boomerang effect under a proattitudinal message is predominantly an affective process driven by 
psychological reactance; the boomerang effect under a counterattitudinal message is 
predominantly a cognitive process driven by the generation of counterarguments. Thus, this 
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study advances the research on both reactance and cognitive responses by integrating the two 
mechanisms in a dual-path framework. In addition, this study advances the research on attitude 
change by redefining the boomerang effect (originally defined by its outcome) into a reactance 
boomerang and a counterarguing boomerang (defined by its processes). Last, the results that 
subjects’ attitude boomerang was predicted by their belief or belief position boomerang extended 
the scope of theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and summative model of 
attitude (Fishbein, 1967).  
Last, H6 and H7 were proposed to differentiate two types of negative thoughts by 
examining their antecedents and outcomes. Synthesizing the literature on cognition and attitude 
change (Brock, 1967; Jacks & Cameron, 2003; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970; Wright, 1986), 
negative thoughts were categorized into two types: counterarguments and nonrefutational 
thoughts. By counterarguing, one directly refutes or attacks one or more arguments in a message 
(Brock, 1967); by generating nonrefutational thoughts, one does not directly refute the 
communication (Cameron et al., 2002). Instead, one may generate thoughts favorable toward 
one’s prior attitude (attitude bolstering) or insult the communication or communicator 
(derogation). By identifying the specific type of negative thoughts underlying reactance, this 
study furthers reactance research. Among those who received a message, both perceived threat to 
attitudinal freedom and trait reactance were found to predict the generation of nonrefutational 
thoughts (vs. counterarguments). But nonrefutational thoughts did not mediate the effect of trait 
reactance on belief or belief position boomerang. On the other hand, argument quality predicted 
the generation of counterarguments (vs. nonrefutational thoughts), which subsequently predicted 
the belief boomerang and the belief position boomerang. Therefore, this study advances 
cognitive response research by demonstrating counterarguing as the direct cause of one type of a 
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boomerang effect. But it is doubtful whether nonrefutational thoughts may cause a boomerang. 
In the main experiment, there was no relationship between perceived threat and a boomerang 
effect, perhaps because perceived threat was manipulated and placed at the end of the message. 
If the relationship between perceived threat and a boomerang effect was observed in our 
experiment as was found in previous studies (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains & Turner, 2007), 
nonrefutational thoughts may be the mediator between  the effect of perceived threat and a 
boomerang effect.  
In summary, this dissertation provided evidence that a boomerang effect can be predicted 
by manipulating message features and measuring individual traits. Based on the results 
supportive of differentiating the antecedents and mediators of the boomerang effect, the concept 
of the boomerang effect needs to be redefined. There is a reactance boomerang effect (given a 
proattitudinal message) and counterarguing boomerang effect (given a counterattitudinal 
message). Most research efforts in attitude change center on message effectiveness and 
persuasive appeals. And most research on a boomerang effect do so from a reactance standpoint. 
This dissertation redefines the phenomenon of a boomerang, establishes a theoretical framework 
for the boomerang, and empirically examined the antecedents and mediators for the two types of 
boomerang effects. This study is a starting point for research on the two types of boomerang 
effect. For example, more research should be conducted on the persuasive appeals for mitigating 
the cognitive or affective process resulting in the boomerang effect. In addition, among those 
who are more prone to boomerang on certain issues, the boomerang can be employed as an 




Theoretical implications. This dissertation has several theoretical implications for future 
directions. First, given the two types of boomerang effects observed in this study, future studies 
should explore additional antecedents that bring about boomerang effects. The variance of the 
boomerang effect explained by the antecedents in the main experiment was not large, suggesting 
that there may be other important predictors. For example, misperceived norms may be a 
predictor of the boomerang effect, particularly in health promotion campaigns among teenagers 
(Fortier, 2011; Hornik et al., 2008). The relationship between misperceived norms and the 
boomerang effect is still unclear. Future studies should examine whether an affective or a 
cognitive mechanism accounts for a boomerang effect caused by misperceived norms.  
Additionally, it is likely that there are different moderators for the reactance boomerang and the 
counterarguing boomerang. By establishing boundary conditions for the two boomerang effects, 
we will generate greater understanding regarding the groups of people who are prone to a 
boomerang effect given a certain issue.  
Second, the long-term consequence of a boomerang effect should be another important 
topic. Researchers who examined the nationwide anti-marijuana campaign sponsored by the 
Partnership for Drug-Free Kids (PDFA) found a lagged boomerang effect for anti-marijuana 
public service announcements: Youth with more exposure to the antidrug message in the 
previous year had less intention to avoid drug use and weaker antidrug social norms in the 
subsequent year (Hornik et al., 2008). Thus, the boomerang effect may grow stronger over time. 
However, it is unknown whether the reactance boomerang and the counterarguing boomerang 
have different long-term consequences. It seems that the reactance boomerang, given a freedom 
threatening proattitudinal message, dissipates quickly in a laboratory (Bessarabova et al., 2013). 
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But the decay of a boomerang may be much slower or even become stronger outside the 
laboratory because of other factors, such as information seeking or interpersonal communication 
(Hornik, 2006). If so, there may be both short-term and long-term consequences of a boomerang 
effect in strategic communication campaigns. More research should be conducted to examine the 
time course of a boomerang.  
Third, more research should examine the two types of boomerang effects with regard to 
the structure and dynamics of beliefs and attitudes (Dinauer & Fink, 2005). How an antecedent 
affects a concept related to the focal concept (i.e., the issue in the message) may be different 
based on the two types of boomerang effects. Bessarabova et al. (2013) found that high-threat 
induction resulted in persuasion on a related concept but a boomerang on the focal concept given 
a proattitudinal message. Perhaps the reactance boomerang caused by perceived threat through 
anger does not motivate individuals to change the cognitive configuration in their belief and 
attitude space. However, it seems plausible that a cognitive boomerang caused by 
counterarguments may force individuals to adjust their belief and attitude structure. Thus, people 
experiencing a cognitive boomerang may exhibit the boomerang effect on both a focal concept 
(i.e., the issue in the message) and a related concept.  
A related important question is the relationship between a belief or attitude boomerang 
and a behavioral boomerang: Does a belief or attitude boomerang predict a behavioral 
boomerang in a positive or negative manner? It is possible that a belief boomerang is negatively 
associated with a behavioral boomerang given a reactance boomerang, because the individual 
has restored the attitudinal freedom through the belief boomerang and thus should be less 
motivated to show a behavioral boomerang. On the other hand, for the cognitive boomerang, a 
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belief boomerang may positively predict the behavioral boomerang, based on the theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the integrative model (Fishbein, 2000).  
Fourth, more studies should be conducted to identify different types of negative thoughts 
in the boomerang process and to examine their attitudinal and behavioral consequences. There 
are different kinds of nonrefutational thoughts, such as self-bolstering, message derogation, and 
suggestions of alternative solutions or evidence. Of particular relevance to the boomerang effect 
may be self-bolstering. As described by Cohen (1962), people with a strong attitude on an issue 
may bolster their initial attitude (e.g., reduce dissonance) by adding consonant cognitions. A 
consonant cognition may be self-bolstering, one type of nonrefutational thoughts. And the 
attitudinal and behavioral consequences associated with different types of negative thoughts 
should be investigated. Additionally, developing a typology of negative thoughts and a reliable 
measure of different types of negative thoughts would also advance the research on the 
boomerang effect, reactance, and cognitive response. By comparing models with different types 
of negative thoughts and anger, reactance may be more precisely captured.  
Last, the nonsignificant relationship between perceived threat and a boomerang effect did 
not disconfirm the effect of reactance on a boomerang effect given a proattitudinal message. 
Given that our manipulation of perceived threat was embedded in a short paragraph at the end of 
the stimulus and was separated from the argument quality manipulation by several paragraphs, it 
is possible that argument quality discounts the effect of perceived threat on belief and attitude 
change. Future studies should make the two manipulations of equal length and counterbalance 
the sequence of the two manipulations to further demonstrate that there are two types of 
boomerang effects and to investigate the specific mediators that go beyond anger and general 
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negative thoughts in the process. More evidence is needed before any conclusion can be made 
regarding the existence of a boomerang effect given a proattitudinal message. 
Practical implications. This dissertation also has important practical implications. First, 
the predictability of a boomerang effect in this study speaks to the importance of considering and 
managing potential boomerang effects in communication campaigns. A typical communication 
campaign does not include a measure of a boomerang effect because some scholars considered 
the boomerang effect to be accidental (e.g., Cho & Salomon, 2007; Pechmann & Slater, 2005). 
However, given the potential negative consequence of a boomerang effect (Fishbein et al., 2002; 
Hornik et al., 2008), practitioners should evaluate the possibility and consequence of potential 
boomerang effects in anti-drug, heath promotion, or prosocial campaigns, particularly among 
message recipients who are prone to boomerang (e.g., those with a strong prior belief on an 
issue). Such an evaluation should inform practitioners on content tailoring and selection of a 
distribution channel. In terms of content tailoring, a practitioner who does not desire a 
boomerang effect should not target a strong belief held by a group of individuals, which might 
lead to a boomerang effect. Instead, a gateway belief that is relevant, moveable, and changeable 
should be chosen (see a discussion on gateway belief in Yzer et al., 2003). In terms of channel, 
anticipating a boomerang effect, a practitioner who does not desire a boomerang effect could 
consider the bystander campaign, which emphasizes indirect influence through significant others 
(e.g., family, friends) of the targeted subjects (Nan, 2007). 
Second, more research should be conducted on the persuasive appeals for mitigating the 
cognitive or affective process resulting in the boomerang effect targeting those with certain 
individual traits (e.g., trait reactance). In Schultz et al.’s (2007) study on a campaign promoting 
household energy conservation, it was found that a message with the descriptive norm depicting 
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average neighborhood energy use produced a boomerang effect among those who were already 
saving energy, but conveying an injunctive norm (social approval) eliminated the boomerang 
effect. But it is unclear how social approval mitigated the boomerang effect in this study. More 
research should be conducted to explore how different mechanisms in the two types of 
boomerang can be reduced by different persuasive appeals. For example, previous research 
supports the effectiveness of narrative on reducing the number of counterarguments (e.g., Moyer
Gusé & Nabi, 2010). Assuming that the mechanisms of a boomerang effect are predominantly 
counterarguments, the message producer should focus on eliminating counterarguments by 
employing narratives in a health promotion story. Assuming that the mechanisms of a 
boomerang effect are predominantly anger, the message should integrate arguments that 
explicitly discuss the behavioral autonomy and attitudinal freedom of individuals (e.g., “you 
have a choice”). 
Last but not least, among those who are more prone to boomerang on certain issues, a 
boomerang can be employed as an innovative persuasive appeal in future strategic 
communication campaigns. If a campaign planner aims to target those who hold strong beliefs 
and show disagreement with the message’s advocated position, or those who have high trait 
reactance and are in agreement with the message’s advocated position, a boomerang may be an 
alternative persuasive technique. The message producer may intentionally create a message that 
appears to be trying to move people away from the advocated position. For example, for those 
teenagers who believe that the legal drinking age should be 18, the practitioner can produce a 
message advocating decreasing the legal drinking age to 18. Using explicit and intense language 
in this proattitudinal message, these teenagers are expected to experience a reactance boomerang, 
moving their belief closer to 21, a desirable outcome for the practitioner. Thus, a boomerang 
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appeal may help message producers achieve their persuasive goal. But the boomerang appeal 
should only be employed after a careful assessment of its ethical implications.  
Limitations  
 There are a few limitations of this study. First, following previous research (Fishbein et 
al., 2002; Hovland et al., 1957; Kelley & Volkart, 1952), two policy issues were employed in the 
main experiment for improving the external validity of the results. The use of actual issues about 
which participants may feel strongly could help to achieve psychological realism (i.e., the extent 
to which subjects in the experiment experience psychological processes similar to those in their 
real life) and mundane realism (i.e., the extent to which the tasks in the experiment are similar to 
mundane activities; Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1994). But such a design may compromise the 
internal validity of the experiment: The prior belief on the actual issue was not manipulated, and 
thus subjects were not randomly assigned to a proattitudinal or counterattitudinal message 
condition. The lack of random assignment could bring certain threats to internal validity, such as 
selection. The nonequivalence between the experimental conditions may confound the effect of 
the treatment on the dependent variable. Thus, the observed outcome may be attributed to the 
variation of a third unmeasured variable and the relationship between the cause and effect could 
be spurious. In addition, those who received a counterattitudinal message as compared with those 
who received a proattitudinal message might have more extreme belief scores and may be more 
prone to statistical regression, a potential threat to internal validity. Because of the trade-off 
between external validity and internal validity, future experiments should ensure the internal 
validity of the design by manipulating whether a message is perceived as proattitudinal or 
counterattitudinal. A fictitious issue can be employed and the experimenter can prime 
respondents with pro-issue or counter-issue arguments before the stimulus manipulating their 
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prior belief on the issue.  
  Second, many variables were measured by single items in this study, including belief, 
attitude, belief position, and negative cognitions. The single-item measure does not account for 
measurement errors and prevents us from testing a measurement model in the structural equation 
model. Future research should employ multi-item measurement for these variables to address 
measurement errors and possible bias. In addition, the fit of the model used here was good but 
the variance of the outcome variables explained by the predictors was relatively low. One 
possible reason for the relatively small 𝑅2s is that there may be additional antecedents of a 
boomerang effect (e.g., misperceived norms, Fortier, 2011). Future studies should explore these 
predictors of a boomerang effect.  
 Third, the boomerang effect was measured through an indirect method in this 
dissertation. Namely, a control group’s position was used as the baseline for determining a 
boomerang effect for easier experiment administration and avoidance of potential testing effects 
from using participants’ initial positions as the baseline. Future studies can use subjects’ initial 
positions as the baseline for method triangulation. In addition, future studies should try 
developing a direct scale of a boomerang effect with desirable psychometric properties.  
Last, college students constituted the sample in the experiment. The results should be 
generalized to other groups with caution. For example, college students may have higher trait 
reactance (Bessarabova et al., 2013), an antecedent of reactance boomerang in this dissertation. 
Future studies should replicate the effects in this study with other samples. Moreover, a large 
quantity of independent sample t tests was used as exploratory post hoc tests. Multiple t tests 
may inflate the probability of Type I error, and these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Last, only a boomerang on belief and attitude was measured and explored in this study. There 
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may have been different results if a boomerang is assessed on behavioral intention or behavior. It 
is not known whether anger or counterarguments predict any boomerang on behavior. The 
inclusion of behavioral measures would enable researchers to assess the relationship between 
attitudinal and belief boomerang and behavioral boomerang.  
Conclusion 
This study provides a complementary perspective for the attitude change research 
emphasizing message effectiveness and persuasion. This dissertation establishes a theoretical 
framework for the boomerang effect and redefines the phenomena of a boomerang. Through an 
experiment, two types of boomerang effects with distinct antecedents and mediators were 
successfully differentiated. Under a counterattitudinal message, both argument quality and prior 
belief strength predicted a boomerang effect. Under a proattitudinal message, perceived threat to 
attitudinal freedom unexpectedly did not predict a boomerang effect. The findings were 
consistent regardless of issue (i.e., the drinking age vs. the marriage age) and message advocated 
position (i.e., propolicy vs. antipolicy), suggesting some generalizability. This study also 
contributes to attitude change research by empirically separating cognitive and affective 
mechanisms for boomerang effects in a dual path framework. There was a predominantly 
cognitive process for a boomerang effect given a counterattitudinal message and a predominantly 
affective process for a boomerang effect given a proattitudinal message. Last, this dissertation 
refines the construct of negative cognitions by integrating two long-standing lines of persuasion 
research on the theory of reactance and the cognitive response perspective. Counterarguments 
and nonrefutational thoughts were two types of negative cognitions. The two constructs were 






Studies with the Observation of a Boomerang Effect 
 
Author &Year Title Sample Type Design and Conditions Message Findings 
Abelson & 
Miller, 1967 
Negative persuasion via 
personal insult 
80 New Yorkers 








2 (Remark type: insulting/neutral) 
×  2 (Crowd presence: yes/no) ×  2 
(Opponent status: leave/stay) + 2 
control groups 
The demonstration by 
African American for 
job discrimination 
Personal insults (e.g., “That’s 
ridiculous”) during intended 
persuasion produced a boomerang 
effect.  When a crowd was present, 
there was as much boomerang in the 
neutral as in the insulting condition. 
Berscheid, 1966, 
Experiment 2 







E 2 (Irrelevant/relevant dissimilar 
values between the communicator 
and the communicate) 
International monetary 





dissimilarity on values relevant to 
the communication produced a 
boomerang effect.  
Bessarabova, 
Fink, & Turner, 
2013 
Reactance, restoration, 




E 2 (Freedom Threat: H/L) × 2 
(Postscript: restoration/filler) + 1 
control  
Pro-recycling message  High freedom threat created a 
boomerang effect for the targeted 
attitude (recycling) as the attitude 
and behavioral intention changed in 
the opposite direction to the one 
advocated in the message compared 
to the control group.  
Bolten, Cohen, 
& Bloom, 2006, 
Experiment 1  
Does Marketing 
Products as Remedies 










about the benefits and 
features of the 
Nicotrol inhaler as a 
smoking cessation aid 
Compared to the control message, 
smokers who read the remedy 
message had lower stop-smoking 
intentions as they perceive relatively 
low risks of smoking, when they 
evaluated the other smokers (versus 
self-evaluation).  
Cohen, 1961 A dissonance analysis 
of the boomerang effect 
64 
undergraduates 
who objected to 
the message 
E 2 (Dissonance: H/L) 
For example, in high dissonance 
condition, Ss saw the partner 
move away from her own position 
after the persuasion attempt) 
Admit women 
undergraduate to Yale 
High dissonance leads to self-
bolstering of the initial attitudes.  
The effect is confined and 
exaggerated to the Ss who liked their 
partners more. 
Dean, Austin, & 
Watts, 1971, 
Experiment 1 
Forewarning effects in 
persuasion: Field and 





2 (Ego involvement: H/L) × 2 
(Forewarning: yes/no) × 2 
(Source status: H/L) 
Election of the new 
U.S. Senator from 
California  
Subjects who were highly involved 
showed a boomerang effect, 
compared to those who were lowly 
involved. Subject who were warned 
showed a boomerang effect, 




Fishbein et al., 
2002 
Avoiding the 
Boomerang: Testing the 
Relative Effectiveness 
of Antidrug Public 
Service  Announcemen
ts Before a National 
Campaign 
3608 students in 
grade 5 through 
12 in 10 schools 
E 5 (Type of PSAs: negative 
consequences of using marijuana 
and inhalant/ bolstering self-
efficacy for the 2nd and 3rd 
condition/ negative consequence 
of using heroin for 4th and 5th 
condition/control group) 
Antidrug PSAs Of the 30 PSAs, 6 PSAs (“Just say 
no” efficacy PSA; general talk about 
drug use; negative consequences of 
using marijuana) were seen as 
significantly less effective than the 
control program.  
Gollust, Lantz, 
& Ubel, 2009 
The polarizing effect of 
news media messages 
about the social 
determinants of health 
2490 US adults 
(23.3% reported 
they were strong 
or moderate 
Republicans) 
E 4 (Attribution frames: genetic 
predisposition/behavioral 




diabetes to social 
determinants 
Republicans reported a lower level 
of support for public health polices 
compared o the control condition, 
after they read a counterattitudinal 
message that attributed type-2 
diabetes to social determinants. 






Boomerang effects in 
science communication: 
How motivated 
reasoning and identity 




240 adults in an 
upstate, rural 
New York state 
community 
E 3 (Social distance: H/L) + 1 
control 
Simulated new story 
about climate 
mitigation policies 
For Republicans, message exposure 
significantly decreased support for 
climate mitigation policies compared 
with control (i.e., a boomerang 
effect).  
Heller, Pallak, & 
Picek, 1973 
The interactive effects 





who were asked 
to write attitude-
consistent essay)  
E 3 (Intent: H/L/no) × 2 (Threat: 
H/L/no) 
Establish nuclear 
power plants near 
populated areas 
Both intent alone and threat alone 
led to boomerang effects. On the 
interaction term, a boomerang effect 
occurred only if the inference about 
the motivation and behavior of the 
confederate was correspondent and 











sample (183 dry 
Ss from two 




E 3 (Message type: 
dry/wet/moderately wet) 
The prohibition of 
alcohol 
Among partisan subjects, these who 
held extremely dry position exposed 
to extremely wet communication had 
a boomerang effect compared to the 





Truth or Consequences: 
Overcoming resistance 
to persuasion with 





3 (Involvement level: H/L/Others) 
× 2 (Argument quality: H/L) 
N/A Among the highly involved Ss, weak 
arguments caused the boomerang 






The effects of source on 
response to negative 
information about one’s 
self 
144 male Ss (7 
out of 14 pairs of 
fraternities are 
antagonistic) 
E 2 (Source: same fraternity/other 
fraternity) × 4 (Severity of 
criticism) 
Self-rating from the 
pair 
When low credible source (other-
fraternity) was present, participants 
showed a boomerang effect at large 
discrepancy levels of critics.  
Kelley & 
Volkart, 1952 
The resistance to 
change of group-
anchored attitudes 




2 (Expression of attitude:  
public/private) × 5 (Degree of 
valuation of membership) 
Scout’s attitudes 
toward camping and 
forest activities 
A boomerang of the advocated 
position occurred for those who 
placed highest valuation upon the 
membership of the group. 
Miller, 1965 Involvement and 
Dogmatism as 
Inhibitors of Attitude 
Change 
40 high school 
students who  fall 
above and below 
75th and 25th 




E 2 (Involvement in a 
relevant/irrelevant message) × 2 
(Dogmatism: H/L) × 2 (Initial 
position: pro/con) 
Fluoridation of public 
drinking water (the 
relevant message) 
/amount of Math and 
Science in high school 
curriculum (the 
irrelevant message) 
After receiving a counterattitudial 
speech, people who are highly 
dogmatic and ego-involved in the 
message showed a boomerang 
effect. 
Na, 1999 Is biased processing of 
strong attitudes 
peripheral? An 
extension of the dual 




students in Korea 
E 3 (Attitude strength: 
weak/moderate/strong) × 2 
(Argument quality: H/L) 
Attitude toward the 
president 
Holders of strong attitudes showed 
the boomerang effect by producing 




When corrections fail: 
The persistence of 
political misperceptions 






E 2 (Correction: yes/no) ×  2 
(Mortality salience: yes/no) + 1 
control  
The misperception that 
Iraq had WMD in its 
country  
Conservatives who received a 
correction message telling them Iraq 
did not have WMD were more likely 
to believe that Iraq had WMD than 





The effects of argument 
quality and involvement 
type on attitude 
formation and attitude 
change: A test of dual-





E 2 (Outcome-relevant involvement: 
H/L) × 2 (Argument quality: H/L) 
× 2 (Message: pro/con) × 3 
(Topic) 
Green space on 
campus; banning cell 
phones from class; 
affirmative action 
Recipients of low-quality arguments 
showed a boomerang effect 
regardless of involvement level, and 
topic type (pro and con) 
Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979a 
Effects of Forewarning 






E 2 (Warning of the persuasive 
intent: yes/no) × (Message 
involvement: H/L) 
Senior should be 
required to take a 
comprehensive exam 
Subjects who were forewarned of 
the communicator’s persuasive 
intent had more number of 
counteragruments, fewer favorable 
thoughts, and a boomerang effect, 
compared to unwarned subjects.  








undergraduates (Argument quality: H/L) × 2 
(Source expertise: H/L) 
required to take a 
comprehensive exam 
low quality arguments were 








reconstructive power of 
social norms 
290 households 
in San Macros, 




2 (Energy consumption: above/ 
below average) × 3 (time: base-
line/short-term follow-up/longer-
term follow-up) 
Energy saving  Among households that were already 
increasing energy efficiency, there 
was a boomerang effect after their 
exposure to the message that 




Attitude change from an 




E 3 (Implied threat: H/L) + 1 
control 
Federal aid to church-
run schools should be 
discontinued 
Those that went through the high-
implied threat (the decision of 
writing a pro or counter-attitudinal 
essay was made without considering 
their preferences) showed attitude 




Reactance and the 
dynamics of 
disagreement: Multiple 
paths from threatened 




E 3 (Threat: no threat/threat at 
start/threat at end)  
Adding a major in 
advertising  
Threat caused a boomerang effect. 
The location of the appearance of 
threat does not affect attitude 
change. But in the threat at start 
condition (vs. the threat at end 
condition), counterarguing mediated 
the effect of threat on attitude 
change 
Smith, M. J., 
1977 
The effects of threats to 
attitudinal freedom as a 
function of message 




E 2 (Initial attitude: agree/disagree) 
× 2 (Threat level: H/L) × 2 
(Message quality: H/L) 
Amnesty for Vietnam 
war resisters 
Participants in the high threat/low 
quality/disagreement condition had a 
boomerang effect.   




Discrepancy and the 
importance of 
attitudinal freedom  
143 
undergraduates 
E 2 (Threat level: H/L) × 4 






amnesty for Vietnam 
draft resisters 
Regardless of the threat level, 
participants in the moderate 
agreement and extreme 
disagreement condition had a 
boomerang effect.  
Strack, Schwarz, 
Bless, Kubler, & 
Wanke, 1993 
Awareness of the 




83 students E 2 (Reminding: yes/no) Evaluative judgment 
about a target person 
Reminding of the priming events 
was related to the contrast effect 
(evaluation of the target person 
should go in the opposite direction 
when Ss were reminded of the 




Prior exercise of 
freedom and reactance  
180 
undergraduates 
E 2 (Prior exercise of freedom: 
yes/no) × 2 (Threat: H/L) × 2 
(Message type: 
Opinions about two 
candidates for 
appointment to the 
In the proattitudinal condition, 
participants who did not exercised 
prior freedom and received a high 
 
 94 
 proattitudinal/counterattitudinal)  Texas Marijuana 
Commision 
threat communication had a 




The effectiveness of 
“overheard” persuasive 
communications 
41 wives of 
college students 




E 2 (Issue type: involving/non-
involving) × 2 (Message 
condition: regular/overheard) 
For married women, 
“students husbands 
should spend a great 
deal more time at 
home”, for the 
students, “Junior and 
Senior women should 
be allowed to live off 
campus” 
Among the married women 
regarding the involving issue 
(“students husbands should spend a 
great deal more time at home”), 
there was a boomerang effect in the 
participants’ responses in regular 
persuasive communication 
condition, compared to the 
overheard condition. 
Werle & Cuny, 
2012 
The boomerang effect 
of mandatory sanitary 




E 2 (Type of advertisement for a 
hedonic product: With a sanitary 
message/ Without a sanitary 
message) 
Reactions toward 
advertisement about a 
hedonic food 
advertisement 
In the absence of sanitary 
Message in the advertisement, the 
choice of a healthy snack doubled. 
Whereas the advertisement with a 
sanitary message increased choice of 




Attitude change as a 
function of felt 
competence and threat 
to attitudinal freedom 
141 male and 52 
female college 
students 
E 2 (Threat: H/L) × 2 (Felt 
competence: H/L) 
Evaluations of two 
applicants for the 
dormitory advisor at a 
large university 
Participants in the high 
competence/high threat condition 
had a boomerang effect, compared to 
the other conditions.  
Worchel & 
Brehm, 1970 
Effects of threats to 
attitudinal freedom as a 
function of agreement 
with the communicator 
73 
undergraduates 
(53 male and 20 
female) 




of the communist 
party in US 
Subjects who received freedom-
threatening communication in 
agreement with their own position 
(small discrepancy) showed a 
boomerang effect.   
Wright, 1986 
 
Attitude change as a 
function of threat to 
attitudinal freedom and 
extent of agreement 
with a communicator 
37 male and 19 
female 
undergraduates 
E 2 (Threat: H/L) × 2 (Attitude 
strength: moderate/extreme) 
A message that 
advocated the free 
availability of 
contraceptives through 
the student health 
center  
Participants who had extreme initial 
agreement with the issue and 
received a high threat had a 









E 3 (Threat: H/L/no) Attractiveness of two 
male dating candidates 
Participants who received a high 
threat communication had a 
boomerang effect, compared to the 
control group.  
 
Note. E = experimental study; Field E = Field experimental study; H/L = high/low. The italicized part indicates the manipulated variable in the study. A study is included in this list 
if: After receiving a message, participants show attitude change in a direction that is opposite to the one advocated in a message, either within subjects or in comparison to other 















Drinking age (N = 238) 
 
Marriage age (N = 220) 
1. Belief: The 
extent to which 
the drinking 
age should be 
decreased 
2. Attitude: 
The extent to 







1. Belief: The 
extent to which 
the marriage 
age should be 
increased 
2. Attitude: 
The extent to 










































0.01 (0.16) 0.61 (0.16) 11.84 (0.16) 1.62 (0.17) 0.68 (0.17) 0.56 (0.17) 
 
Kurtosis 
-0.78 (0.31) -0.49 (0.31) 168.51 (0.31) 2.33 (0.33) 0.20 (0.33) 0.71 (0.33) 
 
Note. Winsorizing strategy: The values above 95% value were recoded to be equal to the 95% value. Belief and attitude were 
measured on amount scales where 100 indicates “a moderate amount.” The belief variable measures the extent to which the 
policy should be changed for the legal drinking [marriage] age. For the belief position on the drinking [marriage] age, subjects 









Recoding Strategies in ANOVAs for the Dependent Variables of Subjects’ Belief for Both Issues 




Prior Belief: Antipolicy 
 





























B (1) N (4) N (6) B (3) 
 
 
Note. “B” indicates a predicted boomerang whereas “N” indicates a predicted nonboomerang. The number in the parentheses (1-
3) indicates the recoded boomerang groups for examining the linear or polynomial contrast in the linear models. Those in the 
recoded group 1 are expected to show a boomerang effect by scoring lower than the mean of control participants (Group 2). 
Those in the recoded group 3 are expected to show a boomerang effect by scoring higher than the mean of control participants 
(Group 2). Similarly, group numbers 4, 5, and 6 recode the cells where nonboomerang is expected to occur. Groups 2 and 5 
represent the same control group for the specific issue. The belief variable measures the extent to which the policy should be 
changed for both issues; for the belief position on the marriage age, subjects indicated their answers to the question “What do you 








Recoding Strategies in ANOVAs for the Dependent Variables of Subjects’ Attitude for Both 
Issues and their Belief Position on the Drinking Age 
 
 
Prior Belief: Antipolicy 
 

































B (3) N (6) N (4) B (1) 
 
Note. “B” indicates a predicted boomerang whereas “N” indicates a predicted nonboomerang. The number in the parentheses (1-
3) indicates the recoded boomerang groups for examining the linear or polynomial contrast in the linear models. Those in the 
recoded group 1 are expected to show a boomerang effect by scoring lower than the mean of control participants (Group 2). 
Those in the recoded group 3 are expected to show a boomerang effect by scoring higher than the mean of control participants 
(Group 2). Similarly, group numbers 4, 5, and 6 recode the cells where nonboomerang is expected to occur. Groups 2 and 5 
represent the same control group for the specific issue. The attitude variable measures the extent to which the policy were liked 
for both issues; for the belief position on the drinking age, subjects indicated their answers to the question “What do you think 



















the drinking age 
DV2: Attitude 
regarding the extent 
to which the drinking 
age was liked 
DV3: Belief 
position on the 
drinking age 
 
F value  
F(2, 116) = 
17.58** 
F(2, 116) = 21.22** F(2, 116) = 0.86 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-7.65(1.29)** -18.90(2.93)** .29(1.60) 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-1.10(0.99) 4.51(2.25) 1.61(1.23) 
Mean (SD): Group 
1 
14.12 (5.07) 
n = 32 
38.77 (12.15) 
n = 20 
21.00 (1.49) 
n = 20 
Mean (SD): Group 
2 
10.05 (7.30) 
n = 64 
19.89 (16.99) 
n = 64 
18.83 (2.90) 
n = 64 
Mean (SD): Group 
3 
3.29 (5.02) 
n = 20 
12.05 (9.62) 
n = 32 
18.25 (1.37) 
n = 32 
Topic: Marriage 
DV1: Belief 
toward raising the 
marriage age 
DV2: Attitude 
regarding the extent 
to which the marriage 
age was liked 
DV3: Belief 
position on the age 
 
 
F value  
F(2, 87) = 
11.27** 
F(2, 87) = 16.15** F(2, 85) = 21.02** 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-96.28(20.96)** -55.48(9.96)** -1.62(0.30)** 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-16.38(16.74) 6.08(7.99) .93(0.24)** 
Mean (SD): Group 
1 
156.57 (136.79) 
n = 21 
111.56 (45.72) 
n = 25 
19.67 (1.43) 
n = 21 
Mean (SD): Group 
2 
108.55 (101.29) 
n = 49 
64.88 (52.26) 
n = 49 
17.38 (1.42) 
n = 47 
Mean (SD): Group 
3 
20.42 (35.20) 
n = 24 
33.10 (36.69) 
n = 21 
17.37 (1.41) 
n = 24 
 
Note. N = 196. Respondents’ belief indicates the extent to which the legal drinking [marriage] age should be changed. The belief 
position indicates respondents’ response to the question “What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking [marriage] age should be?” 
F value refers to the F value of the recoded boomerang groups. The ANOVAs tested H1a: Those who receive a proattitudinal 
message that has a high threat to their attitudinal freedom (vs. the control participants) would exhibit a boomerang effect. See 
Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 





Proattitudinal Subgroup ANOVAs with Coded Nonboomerang Groups Based on Low Perceived 
Threat 
Topic: Drinking  
DV1: Belief 
toward lowering 
the drinking age 
DV2: Attitude 
regarding the extent 
to which the drinking 
age was liked 
DV3: Belief 




F(2, 115) = 
21.42** 
F(2, 115) = 18.69** 




8.42(1.29)** 18.03(2.95)** -2.12(0.46)** 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-0.67(0.99) 2.22(2.28) 0.55(0.35) 
Mean (SD): Group 
4 
3.29 (5.08) 
n = 22 
9.87 (8.27) 
n = 29 
18.00 (0.60) 
n = 29 
Mean (SD): Group 
5 
10.05 (7.30) 
n = 64 
19.89 (16.99) 
n = 64 
18.83 (2.90) 
n = 64 
Mean (SD): Group 
6 
15.19 (5.11) 
n = 29 
35.56 (14.39) 
n = 22 
21.00 (1.57) 
n = 22 
Topic: Marriage  
DV1: Belief 
toward raising the 
marriage age 
DV2: Attitude 
regarding the extent 
to which the marriage 
age was liked 
DV3: Belief 




F value F(2, 96) = 9.04** F(2, 96) = 19.53** F(2, 94) = 13.07** 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
87.32(20.77)** 58.07(9.31)** 1.28(0.32)** 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-11.77(16.78) -2.54(7.53) 0.82(0.26)** 
Mean (SD): Group 
4 
32.39 (53.49) 
n = 23 
20.71 (29.33) 
n = 24 
17.48 (1.50) 
n = 23 
Mean (SD): Group 
5 
108.55 (101.29) 
n = 49 
64.88 (52.26) 
n = 49 
17.38 (1.42) 
n = 47 
Mean (SD): Group 
6 
155.88 (129.65) 
n = 24 
102.83 (41.88) 
n = 23 
19.29 (1.83) 
n = 24 
 
Note. N = 196. Respondents’ belief indicates the extent to which the legal drinking [marriage] age should be changed. The belief 
position indicates respondents’ response to the question “What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking [marriage] age should be?” 
F value refers to the F value of the recoded nonboomerang groups. The ANOVAs tested H1b: those who receive a proattitudinal 
message that has a low threat to their attitudinal freedom (vs. the control participants) would exhibit no boomerang effect. See 
Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 





Counterattitudinal Subgroup ANOVAs with Coded Boomerang Groups Based on Low-quality 
Arguments 
 
Topic: Drinking  
DV1: Belief 
toward lowering 
the drinking age 
DV2: Attitude regarding 
the extent to which the 
drinking age was liked 
DV3: Belief position 
on the drinking age 
F value  F(2, 97) = 6.94** F(2, 97) = 6.20** F(2, 97) = 3.71* 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 







Mean (SD): Group 
1 
5.54 (6.04) 
n = 12 
13.23 (11.61) 
n = 21 
18.19 (0.51) 
n = 21 
Mean (SD): Group 
2 
10.05 (7.30) 
n = 64 
19.89 (16.99) 
n = 64 
18.83 (2.90) 
n = 64 
Mean (SD): Group 
3 
14.60 (5.97) 
n = 21 
33.01 (12.97) 
n = 12 
20.58 (1.78) 
n = 12 
Topic: Marriage  
DV1: Attitude 
toward raising the 
marriage age 
DV2: Attitude regarding 
the extent to which the 
marriage age was liked 
DV3: Belief position 
on the marriage age 
 
F value  F(2, 87) = 2.40 F(2, 87) = 3.43* F(2, 85) = 5.03** 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
36.18(21.71) 28.25(10.91)* .45(0.33) 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-25.77(16.66) 5.02(8.37) 0.71(0.26)** 
Mean (SD): Group 
1 
51.41 (50.11) 
n = 17 
51.05 (37.25) 
n = 21 
17.94 (1.35) 
n = 17 
Mean (SD): Group 
2 
108.55 (101.29) 
n = 49 
64.88 (52.26) 
n = 49 
17.38 (1.42) 
n = 47 
Mean (SD): Group 
3 
102.57 (102.72) 
n = 21 
91.00 (42.48) 
n = 17 
18.57 (1.51) 
n = 21 
 
Note. N = 149. Respondents’ belief indicates the extent to which the legal drinking [marriage] age should be changed. The belief 
position indicates respondents’ response to the question “What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking [marriage] age should be?” 
F value refers to the F value of the recoded boomerang groups. The ANOVAs tested H3a: Those who receive a counterattitudinal 
message that has low quality arguments (vs. the control participants) would exhibit a boomerang effect. See Table 2 for how 
these dependent variables were transformed. 






Counterattitudinal Subgroup ANOVAs with Coded Nonboomerang Groups Based on High-
quality Arguments 
 
Topic: Drinking  
DV1: Belief 
toward lowering 
the drinking age 
DV2: Attitude regarding 
the extent to which the 
drinking age was liked 
DV3: Belief position 
on the drinking age 
F value  F(2, 102) = 1.89 F(2, 102) = 4.99** F(2, 102) = 1.04 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-2.93(1.65) -12.36(3.92)** 0.83(0.58) 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
0.37(1.18) 1.82(2.80) 0.10(0.41) 
Mean (SD): Group 4 
12.58 (5.03) 
n = 25 
30.86 (8.27) 
n = 13 
18.36 (0.76) 
n = 25 
Mean (SD): Group 5 
10.05 (7.30) 
n = 64 
19.89 (16.99) 
n = 64 
18.83 (2.90) 
n = 64 
Mean (SD): Group 6 
8.44 (7.38) 
n = 13 
13.38 (12.67) 
n = 25 
19.54 (1.45) 
n = 13 
Topic: Marriage  
DV1: Belief 
toward raising the 
marriage age 
DV2: Attitude regarding 
the extent to which the 
marriage age was liked 
DV3: Belief position 
on the marriage age 
 
F value  F(2, 89) = 0.20 F(2, 89) = 3.93* F(2, 87) = 5.38** 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-11.38(22.26) -31.27(12.31)* -0.58(0.36) 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-5.38(17.23) 8.50(9.53) 0.84(0.28)** 
Mean (SD): Group 4 
110.00 (100.93) 
n = 17 
97.39 (61.79) 
n = 23 
18.82 (1.85) 
n = 17 
Mean (SD): Group 5 
108.55 (101.29) 
n = 49 
64.88 (52.26) 
n = 49 
17.38 (1.42) 
n = 47 
Mean (SD): Group 6 
93.91 (89.78) 
n = 23 
53.18 (49.72) 
n = 17 
19.29 (1.83) 
n = 23 
 
Note. N = 149. Respondents’ belief indicates the extent to which the legal drinking [marriage] age should be changed. The belief 
position indicates respondents’ response to the question “What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking [marriage] age should be?” 
F value refers to the F value of the recoded nonboomerang groups. The ANOVAs tested H3b: those who receive a 
counterattitudinal message that has high quality arguments (vs. the control participants) would not exhibit a boomerang effect. 
See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 







Counterattitudinal Subgroup ANOVAs with Coded Boomerang Groups Based on Strong Prior 
Belief  
Topic: Drinking  
DV1: Belief 
toward lowering 
the drinking age 
DV2: Attitude regarding 
the extent to which the 
drinking age was liked 
DV3: Belief position 
on the drinking age 
 
F value  F(2, 91) = 12.63** F(2, 91) = 15.40** F(2, 91) = 2.58 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
9.39(1.94)** 23.80(4.39)** 1.54(0.69)* 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
0.82(1.33) 6.05(3.01) 0.37(0.47) 
Mean (SD): Group 
1 
4.42 (6.90) 
n = 11 
10.47 (13.47) 
n = 16 
18.19 (0.40) 
n = 16 
Mean (SD): Group 
2 
10.05 (7.30) 
n = 64 
19.89 (16.99) 
n = 64 
18.83 (2.90) 
n = 64 
Mean (SD): Group 
3 
17.69 (5.74) 
n = 16 
44.13 (11.12) 
n = 11 
20.36 (1.21) 
n = 11 
Topic: Marriage  
DV1: Belief 
toward raising the 
marriage age 
DV2: Attitude regarding 
the extent to which the 
marriage age was liked 
DV3: Belief position 
on the marriage age 
F value  F(2, 87) = 0.63 F(2, 87) = 5.38** F(2, 85) = 7.59** 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
24.32(23.39) 40.04(12.29)** 0.91(0.35)* 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-11.02(17.72) 9.64(9.31) 0.62(0.27)* 
Mean (SD): Group 
1 
77.86 (64.11) 
n = 14 
48.38 (38.90) 
n = 24 
17.50 (1.09) 
n = 14 
Mean (SD): Group 
2 
108.55 (101.29) 
n = 49 
64.88 (52.53) 
n = 49 
17.38 (1.42) 
n = 47 
Mean (SD): Group 
3 
112.25 (107.74) 
n = 24 
105.00 (67.11) 
n = 14 
18.79 (1.74) 
n = 24 
 
Note. N = 149. Respondents’ belief indicates the extent to which the legal drinking [marriage] age should be changed. The belief 
position indicates respondents’ response to the question “What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking [marriage] age should be?” 
F value refers to the F value of the recoded nonboomerang groups. The ANOVAs tested H4a: Those who receive a 
counterattitudinal message that has strong prior belief (vs. the control participants) would exhibit a boomerang effect. For 
drinking age, those with belief strength larger than 100 were recoded as high on belief strength; those with belief strength not 
larger than 100 were recoded as low on belief strength. For marriage age, those with belief strength higher or equal to 80 were 
recoded as high on belief strength; those with belief strength lower than 80. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were 
transformed. 





Counterattitudinal Subgroup ANOVAs with Coded Non-boomerang Groups Based on Weak 
Prior Belief  
Topic: Drinking  
DV1: Belief toward 
lowering the 
drinking age 
DV2: Attitude regarding 
the extent to which the 
drinking age was liked 
DV3: Belief 
position on the 
legal drinking 
age 
F value  
 
F(2, 105) = .39 
 
F(2, 105) = 1.51 F(2, 105) = 2.88 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-1.30(1.51) -5.35(3.54) -1.53(0.65)* 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-0.02(1.09) -1.14(2.56) 0.48(0.47) 
Mean (SD): Group 
4 
10.95 (4.00) 
n = 27 
22.28 (11.32) 
n = 14 
20.50 (4.36) 
n = 14 
Mean (SD): Group 
5 
10.05 (7.30) 
n = 64 
19.89 (16.99) 
n = 64 
18.83 (2.90) 
n = 64 
Mean (SD): Group 
6 
9.11 (6.18) 
n = 14 
14.72 (11.86) 
n = 27 
18.33 (0.78) 
n = 27 
Topic: Marriage  DV1: Belief toward 
raising the marriage 
age 
DV2: Attitude regarding 
the extent to which the 
drinking age was liked 
DV3: Belief 
position on the 
age 
F value  F(2, 89) = 1.07 F(2, 89) = 2.53 F(2, 87) = 4.22* 
Linear contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-14.31(22.31) -21.85(11.73) -0.19(0.36) 
Polynomial contrast 
estimate (SE) 
-19.32(17.01) 7.18(8.94) 0.80(0.28)** 
Mean (SD): Group 
4 
95.00 (89.85) 
n = 14 
89.12 (45.79) 
n = 26 
18.50 (1.61) 
n = 14 
Mean (SD): Group 
5 
108.55 (101.29) 
n = 49 
64.88 (52.26) 
n = 49 
17.38 (1.42) 
n = 47 
Mean (SD): Group 
6 
74.77 (85.24) 
n = 26 
58.21 (49.37) 
n = 14 
18.23 (1.68) 
n = 26 
 
Note. N = 149. Respondents’ belief indicates the extent to which the legal drinking [marriage] age should be changed. The belief 
position indicates respondents’ response to the question “What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking [marriage] age should be?” 
F value refers to the F value of the recoded nonboomerang groups. The ANOVAs tested H4b: Those who receive a 
counterattitudinal message that has weak prior belief (vs. the control participants) would not exhibit a boomerang effect. For 
drinking age, those with belief strength larger than 100 were recoded as high on belief strength; those with belief strength not 
larger than 100 were recoded as low on belief strength. For marriage age, those with belief strength higher or equal to 80 were 
recoded as high on belief strength; those with belief strength lower than 80.  See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were 
transformed. 





Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Variables in the Proattitudinal SEM 
 
 Pearson Correlations 
 M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Issue type 1.50 0.50 1.00          
(2) Prior belief 
strength 
103.5 72.43 - .42** 1.00         






- .28** .57** 1.00        
(4) Perceived threat 1.5 0.50 -.01 -.03 .01 1.00       
(5) Trait Reactance 0.09 1.00 -.04 .02 .00 -.04 1.00      
(6) Anger 1.70 0.81 -.02 .02 .07 .01 .34** 1.00     
(7) Negative 
Cognition 
0.74 1.06 - .19** .07 .09 .06 .09 .22** 1.00    
(8) Belief Boomerang -33.71 73.86 - .41** .12 .02 -.02 .11
†
 .10 .15* 1.00   
(9) Attitude 
Boomerang 
-25.65 31.33 - .45** .10 .03 .02 .08 -.04 .08 .33** 1.00  
(10) Belief Position 
Boomerang 
-1.16 1.67 .09 - .21* - .17* .01 0 .09 .02 -.03 -.03 1.00 
       
      Note. N = 196. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) was used for computing missing values. Issue type: 1 = Drinking age; 2 = Marriage age. Prior belief strength and 
competence to exercise attitudinal freedom were transformed scores measured on magnitude scales (100 = moderate amount). For perceived threat:  1 = Low, 2 = High. Trait 
reactance was the standardized principal component score. The three boomerang variables were continuous variables. Belief (e.g., the extent to which the legal drinking age should 
be decreased) is different from belief position (e.g., the legal age for drinking). For definitions of belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude boomerang, see Section 
of “computing individual boomerang scores” on p. 64. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed; see Instrumentation section for how the independent 
variables were transformed.  





Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Variables in the Counterattitudinal SEM 
 
 Pearson Correlations 
 M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Issue type 1.50 0.50 1.00        
(2) Prior belief 
strength 
101.7 88.40 - .48** 1.00       
(3) Argument quality 1.52 0.50 -.02 -.09 1.00      
(4) Counterarguments 0.93 1.18 - .15
†
  .26** -.33** 1.00     
(5) Anger 2.01 0.90 .06 -.02 -.11 .15
†
 1.00    
(6) Belief Boomerang 9.67 65.87 .09 -.01 -.06 .04 .15
†
 1.00   
(7) Attitude 
Boomerang 
15.33 37.25 .18* .04 .02 .09 .16* .12 1.00  
(8) Belief Position 
Bommerang 
0.54 1.57 - .14
†
  .18* -.10 .32** .16
†
 .13 .13 1.00 
 
Note. N = 149. FIML was used for computing missing values. Issue type: 1 = Drinking age; 2 = Marriage age. For both argument quality:  1 = Low, 2 = High. Prior belief strength 
was a transformed score measured on the magnitude scale (100 = moderate amount). The three boomerang variables were continuous variables. Belief (e.g., the extent to which the 
legal drinking age should be decreased) is different from belief position (e.g., the legal age for drinking). For definitions of belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and 
attitude boomerang, see Section of “computing individual boomerang scores” on p. 64. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed; see Instrumentation 
section for how the independent variables were transformed. 





Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for the Variables in the Integrated SEM 
 Pearson Correlations 
 M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Issue type 1.50 0.50 1.00             
(2) Prior belief 
strength 
102.7 79.60 - .44** 1.00            
(3) Subgroup  1.43 0.25 .10 .04 1.00           
(4) Competence to 
exercise attitudinal 
freedom 
120.2 109.8 -.31** .61** -.03 1.00          
(5) Argument quality 1.51 0.50 0 -.09 .03 -.03 1.00         
(6) Perceived threat 1.50 0.50 0 -.05 -.01 -.01 .01 1.00        
(7) Trait Reactance 0.07 0.99 -.02 -.03 -.09 -.03 .07 -.03 1.00       
(8) 
Counterarguments 









 .07 1.00     
(10) Anger 1.83 0.86 .02 .01 0.05 -.02 -.09 .07 .26** .22** .14** 1.00    
(11) Belief 
Boomerang 
-14.92 73.63 .18** .07 -.11** .02 -.05 .07 .02 .19** .10
†
 .16** 1.00   
(12) Attitude 
Boomerang 
-7.95 39.58 -.11* .08 .04 -.02 .03 0 .07 .18** .19** .14** .34** 1.00  
(13) Belief Position 
Boomerang  
-0.42 1.83 .02 .01 .55** -.05 .02 .02 .01 .26** .16** .19** .16** .27** 1.00 
Note.  N = 345. FIML was used for computing missing values. Issue type: 1 = Drinking age; 2 = Marriage age. Subgroup: 1 = Proattitudinal message; 2 = Counterattitudinal 
message. For definitions of belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude boomerang, see Section of “computing individual boomerang scores” on p. 64. See Table 2 
for how these dependent variables were transformed; see Instrumentation section for how the independent variables were transformed.  





Significance of Indirect Effects in the Proattitudinal SEM 
 









z score  
Antecedent: Perceived threat (H2a) 
Mediator: Anger      
Indirect effect from perceived threat on belief 
boomerang through anger (𝑎1 ×  𝑏1) 
0 .38 1.21 0.31  
Indirect effect from perceived threat on belief 
position boomerang through anger (𝑎1 ×  𝑏3) 
0 .01 0.03 - 0.05 
Mediator: Negative Cognition (NC)     
Indirect effect from perceived threat on belief 
boomerang through NC (𝑎2 ×  𝑏2) 
-.01 -1.55 1.48 0.79 
Indirect effect from perceived threat on belief 
position boomerang through NC (𝑎2 ×  𝑏4) 
.01 0.02 0.03 -0.46 
Antecedent: Trait reactance (H2b) 
Mediator: Anger     
Indirect effect from trait reactance on belief 
boomerang through anger (𝑎3 ×  𝑏1) 
.04 3.01 1.88 1.60 † 
Indirect effect from trait reactance on belief 
position boomerang through anger (𝑎3 ×  𝑏3) 
.04 0.06 .05 1.35 
Mediator: Negative Cognition (NC)     
Indirect effect from trait reactance on belief 
boomerang through NC (𝑎4 ×  𝑏2) 
-.01 -0.67 .67 -1.00 
Indirect effect from trait reactance on belief 
position boomerang through NC (𝑎4 ×  𝑏4) 
.01 0.01 .01 0.57 
 
Note. N = 196. 𝑅2 = .195 and .180 for the belief boomerang and belief position boomerang, respectively. 𝑅2 = .175 
and .062 for anger and negative cognitions, respectively. See Figure 8 for the model of the indirect effects in H2.  
†






Significance of Indirect Effects in the Counterattitudinal SEM 
 









Indirect effect from argument quality on belief 
boomerang through counterarguments  
(𝑎1 ×  𝑏1) 
-.01 -1.24 3.49 -0.36 
Indirect effect from argument quality on belief 
position boomerang through counterarguments 
(𝑎1 ×  𝑏3) 
-.09 -0.27 0.10 -2.62** 
Mediator: Anger 
Indirect effect from argument quality on belief 
boomerang through anger 
(𝑎2 ×  𝑏2) 
-.02 -2.10 2.04 -1.03 
Indirect effect from argument quality on belief 
position boomerang through anger 
(𝑎2 ×  𝑏4) 
-.01 -0.04 0.04 -1.00 
 
Note. N = 149. 𝑅2 = .032, .125 for belief boomerang and belief position boomerang, respectively; 𝑅2 = .164 
and .015 for counterarguments and anger. See Figure 9 for the model of the indirect effects in H5. 
†






















Significance of Indirect Effects in the Integrated SEM 
 








Mediator: Nonrefutational thoughts (NT)     
H6a. Indirect effect from perceived threat on 
belief boomerang through NT (𝑎1 ×  𝑏2) 
.01 1.43 1.04 1.38 
H6a. Indirect effect from perceived threat on 
belief position boomerang through NT (𝑎1 ×  𝑏5) 
.01 0.02 0.02 1.10 
H6b. Indirect effect from trait reactance on belief 
boomerang through NT (𝑎2 ×  𝑏2) 




H6b. Indirect effect from trait reactance on belief 
position boomerang through NT (𝑎2 ×  𝑏5) 




H7b. Indirect effect from argument quality on 
belief boomerang through NT (𝑎4 ×  𝑏2) 




H7b. Indirect effect from argument quality on 
belief position boomerang through NT (𝑎4 ×  𝑏5) 
- .01 -0.04 0.03 -1.19 
Mediator: Counterarguments     
H7a. Indirect effect from argument quality on 
belief boomerang through counterarguments 
(𝑎3 ×  𝑏1) 
-.03 -4.50 1.84 -2.44*  
H7a. Indirect effect from argument quality on 
belief position boomerang through 
counterarguments (𝑎3 ×  𝑏4) 
-.02 -0.07 0.03 -2.17* 
Mediator: Anger     
H2b. Indirect effect from trait reactance on belief 
boomerang through anger (𝑎6 ×  𝑏3) 
.04 2.77 1.29 2.15* 
H2b. Indirect effect from trait reactance on belief 
position boomerang through anger (𝑎6 ×  𝑏6) 
.03 0.05 0.03 2.07* 
 
Note. N = 345. 𝑅2 = .113 and .384for belief boomerang and belief position boomerang, respectively; 𝑅2 = .093, .074 
and .158 for counterarguments, nonrefutational thoughts, and anger. 1. See Figure 10 for the model of the indirect 
effects in H6 and H7. 
†






Figure 1. The frequency distributions of the belief and attitude scores on the legal drinking age,  
N = 41. The y-axis stands for frequency. For the legal drinking age, four outcome variables were: 
(1) Attitude toward the drinking age: The extent to which the drinking age was liked; (2) 
evaluative belief: The extent to which the drinking age was good; (3) belief toward increasing 
the legal drinking age; (4) belief toward decreasing the legal drinking age. These four outcome 





Figure 2. The frequency distributions of the belief and attitude scores for tuition (spring 2015),  
N = 41. The y-axis stands for frequency. For the current tuition, four outcome variables were: (1) 
Attitude toward the current tuition: The extent to which the current tuition was liked; (2) 
evaluative belief: The extent to which the current tuition was good; (3) belief toward increasing 
the current tuition; (4) belief toward decreasing the current tuition. These four outcome variables 








Figure 3. The frequency distributions of the belief and attitude scores on the legal marriage age,  
N = 41. The y-axis stands for frequency. For the legal marriage age, four outcome variables were: 
(1) Attitude toward the marriage age: The extent to which the marriage age was liked; (2) 
evaluative belief: The extent to which the marriage age was good; (3) belief toward increasing 
the marriage age; (4) belief toward decreasing the marriage age. These four outcome variables 








Figure 4. The frequency distributions of belief and attitude scores on the hours of sleep per day, 
N = 41. The y-axis stands for frequency. For the amount of sleep each day, four outcome 
variables were: (1) Attitude toward the amount of sleep each day: The extent to which having 7-8 
hours of sleep each day was liked; (2) evaluative belief: The extent to which having 7-8 hours of 
sleep each day was good; (3) belief toward having more than 7-8 hours of sleep each day; (4) 
belief toward having less than 7-8 hours of sleep each day. These four outcome variables were 
measured on 11-point scales.  








Figure 5. The frequency distributions of belief and attitude scores on taking four courses in 
career training during undergraduate studies, N = 41. The y-axis stands for frequency. The four 
outcome variables measured on 11-point scales were: (1) Attitude toward which taking four 
courses in career training: The extent to which taking four courses in career training was liked; 
(2) evaluative belief: The extent to which taking four courses in career training was good; (3) 
belief toward taking more than four courses in career training; (4) belief toward taking less than 







Figure 6. Representation of the two-factor confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  
The error terms of the latent variables were set to covary. The error terms of items were not 





Figure 7. Estimated parameters for the modified CFA model. 
Standardized path coefficients are reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
The model was based on the modification indices in R “lavaan” package. N = 349. The 
unstandardized factor loading of the first indicator of each factor was fixed to be 1. The other 
factor loadings were free to be estimated. The error terms of the latent variables were allowed to 
covary. The model fit indices: 𝜒2(7, N = 349) = 53.86, 𝑝 > .05, SRMR = 0.02, RMSEA = .05, 
and CFI = 0.99. 𝑅2 = .68, .56, .75, and .54 for anger item 1, 2, 3, and 4. 𝑅2 = .14 and .04 for 





Figure 8. Representations for the indirect effects from perceived threat and trait reactance to 
boomerang through reactance in H2, N = 196. Control variables were issue type, prior belief 
strength, and perceived competence to exercise belief freedom. Control variables were used for 
predicting both the mediators and endogenous variables but were not shown in the figure for 
simplicity. All variables (except for anger) were specified as observed variables. Anger was 
assessed by multiple items. For correcting the measurement error, anger was treated as a latent 
variable with one indicator (i.e., the averaged composite) and the error term of the indicator fixed 
at (1- α) times the indicator’s variance. The error terms of the two mediators and the two belief 






Figure 9. Representations for the indirect effects from argument quality to boomerang through 
counterarguing (vs. anger) in H5, N = 149. Control variables were issue type and prior belief 
strength. Control variables were used for predicting both the mediators and endogenous variables 
but were not shown in the figure for simplicity. All variables (except for anger) were specified as 
observed variables. Anger was assessed by multiple items. For correcting the measurement error, 
anger was treated as a latent variable with one indicator (i.e., the averaged composite) and the 
error term of the indicator fixed at (1- α) times the indicator’s variance. The error terms of the 
















Figure 10. Representations of the indirect effects in the integrated SEM (H6 & H7), N = 345. 
Control variables were issue type, proattitudinal versus counterattitudinal message, prior belief 
strength, and perceived competence to exercise belief freedom. Control variables were used for 
predicting both the mediators and endogenous variables but were not shown in the figure for 
simplicity. All variables (except for anger) were specified as observed variables. Anger was 
assessed by multiple items. For correcting the measurement error, anger was treated as a latent 
variable with one indicator (i.e., the averaged composite) and the error term of the indicator fixed 
at (1- α) times the indicator’s variance. The error terms of the two mediators and the two belief 
boomerang variables were set to covary, respectively. The estimation method was maximum 












Figure 11. Estimated Parameters for the Proattitudinal SEM. 
Standardized path coefficients were reported. Standard errors were reported in the parentheses. 
The solid lines indicate significant path coefficients, whereas dashed lines indicate nonsignificant 
path coefficients. The model tested H2 and RQ1 in R “lavaan” package. All variables (except for 
anger) were specified as observed variables. The estimation method was maximum likelihood. 
The error terms of the two mediators and the two belief boomerang variables were set to covary, 
respectively. Control variables were issue type, prior belief strength, and perceived competence 
to exercise belief freedom. Control variables were used for predicting both the mediators and 
endogenous variables but were not shown in the figure for simplicity. The model fit indices: 𝜒2 
(6, N = 196) = 5.13, p > .05, SRMR = 0.017, RMSEA = .00, and CFI = 1.00. 𝑅2 = .196, .060, 
and .243, respectively for the belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude 
boomerang, respectively. 𝑅2 = .132 and .079 for anger and negative cognitions, respectively. For 
definitions of belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude boomerang, see Section 
of “computing individual boomerang scores” on p. 64. See Table 2 for how these dependent 








Figure 12. Estimated Parameters for the Counterattitudinal SEM. 
Standardized path coefficients were reported. Standard errors were reported in the parentheses. 
The solid lines indicate significant path coefficients, whereas dashed lines indicate nonsignificant 
path coefficients. The model tested H5 and RQ2 in R “lavaan” package. All variables (except for 
anger) were specified as observed variables. The estimation method was maximum likelihood. 
The error terms of the two mediators and the two belief boomerang variables were set to covary, 
respectively. Control variables were issue type and prior belief strength. Control variables were 
used for predicting both the mediators and endogenous variables but were not shown in the 
figure for simplicity. They were not shown in the figure for simplicity. The model fit indices: 𝜒2 
(7, N = 149) = 8.47, p > .05, SRMR = 0.03, RMSEA = .04, and CFI = 0.97. 𝑅2 = .032, .125, and 
.074 for the belief boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude boomerang, respectively. 
𝑅2 = .164 and .015 for counterarguments and anger, respectively. For definitions of belief 
boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude boomerang, see Section of “computing 
individual boomerang scores” on p. 64. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were 








Figure 13. Estimated Parameters for the Integrated SEM. 
Standardized path coefficients were reported. Standard errors were reported in the parentheses. 
The solid lines indicate significant path coefficients, whereas dashed lines indicate nonsignificant 
path coefficients. The model tested H6 and H7 in R “lavaan” package. All variables (except for 
anger) were specified as observed variables. The estimation method was maximum likelihood. 
The error terms of the two mediators and the two belief boomerang variables were set to covary, 
respectively. Control variables were issue type, proattitudinal versus counterattitudinal message, 
prior belief strength, and perceived competence to exercise belief freedom. Control variables 
were used for predicting both the mediators and endogenous variables but were not shown in the 
figure for simplicity. The model fit indices: 𝜒2(17, N = 345) = 17.64, p > .05, SRMR = 0.02, 
RMSEA = .01, and CFI = 1.00. 𝑅2 = .113, .384, and .180 for the belief boomerang, belief 
position boomerang, and attitude boomerang, respectively. 𝑅2 = .093, .074, and .158 for 
counterarguments, nonrefutational thoughts, and anger, respectively. For definitions of belief 
boomerang, belief position boomerang, and attitude boomerang, see Section of “computing 
individual boomerang scores” on p. 64. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were 





Appendix A: The Questionnaire for Pilot Study 1  
Researchers at the University of Maryland are studying what issues young people on campus 
perceive to be exposed to. The word “EXPOSED” in this context means that you hear about 
them from parents, media, your friends, or other sources. We would like you to answer the 
questions that follow to help us to learn about those issues. There are no right or wrong answers; 
we are interested in your views. 
  
Remember that you cannot proceed to the next question if you do not provide a 
complete description of the issue. If you provide answers that are not meaningful to researchers 
(e.g., type the same word for every question), you will not receive any credit for participation.  
 
Please list the first issue you hear about from any source. 
__________________________________________________ 
What is your opinion or position on this issue? 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Please list the second issue you hear about from any source.  
__________________________________________________ 
What is your opinion or position on this issue? 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Please list the third issue you hear about from any source.  
__________________________________________________ 
What is your opinion or position on this issue? 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Please list the fourth issue you hear about from any source. 
__________________________________________________ 
What is your opinion or position on this issue? 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Please list the fifth issue you hear about from any source. 
__________________________________________________ 








Finally, please provide the following demographic information. 




2. Please indicate your gender:   
__ Female    __ Male 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 White  
 Black, or African American  
 Latino, or Hispanic American  
 American Indian or Alaska Native  
 Pacific Islander  
 Asian, or Asian American  
 Middle Eastern  
 Other  
 
4. Please indicate what year you are in college: _____ 
 Freshman  
 Sophomore  
 Junior  
 Senior  
 Graduate  
 Other  
 
Please provide your SONA ID code (the code assigned to you by the SONA system when you 













Appendix B: The Questionnaire for Pilot Study 2  
Researchers at the University of Maryland are studying young people's attitudes and beliefs 
towards a variety of social and health issues. We would like you to answer the questions that 
follow to help us to learn about those issues. There are no right or wrong answers; we are 
interested in your views. 
  
Remember that researchers have ways to check whether your answers are meaningful and 
thoughtful. For example, if you select the same answer for all the questions in a very short 
time, you will not receive any credit for participation.  
 
The current legal age for drinking alcoholic beverages in Maryland is 21 years old.  
 
1. What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking age should be? 
     ___________ 
 
2. How much do you like the current legal drinking age? Indicate the extent to which like the 
current legal age on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates “Moderate”, and 
11 indicates “Extremely”.  
 
3. How good is the current legal drinking age? Indicate the extent to which you think the current 
legal age is good on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates “Moderate”, and 
11 indicates “Extremely”. 
 
4. The current legal drinking age should be increased. Indicate the extent to which you agree 
with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates 
“Neither Agree or Disagree”, and 11 indicates “Strongly Agree”. 
 
5. The current legal drinking age should be decreased. Indicate the extent to which you agree 
with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates 
“Neither Agree or Disagree”, and 11 indicates “Strongly Agree”. 
 
 
Due to a tuition increase and one-time surcharge, the tuition of full-time resident undergraduates 
at the University of Maryland is $4865.93 for Spring 2015 semester.  
 
1. How much do you think the tuition should be in Spring 2015? 
___________ 
 
2. How much do you like the current tuition for Spring 2015? Indicate the extent to which like 
the current legal age on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates “Moderate”, 
and 11 indicates “Extremely”. 
3. How good is the current tuition for Spring 2015? Indicate the extent to which you think the 
current legal age is good on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates 




4. The current tuition for Spring 2015 should be increased. Indicate the extent to which you agree 
with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates 
“Neither Agree or Disagree”, and 11 indicates “Strongly Agree”. 
 
5. The current tuition for Spring 2015 should be decreased. Indicate the extent to which you 
agree with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates 
“Neither Agree or Disagree”, and 11 indicates “Strongly Agree”. 
 
 
The age of marriage in the United States varies by state, but is generally 18. However, with 
parental and/or judicial consent, most states allow parties of lower ages to marry. For example, in 
Maryland, parties can marry at age sixteen with parental consent. 
 
1. What do you think Maryland’s legal age of marriage with parental and/or judicial consent 
should be? 
 ____________ 
2. How much do you like the current age of marriage with parental and/or judicial consent in 
Maryland? Indicate the extent to which you think the current legal age is good on a 11-point 
scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates “Moderate”, and 11 indicates “Extremely”. 
 
3. How good is the current age of marriage with parental and/or judicial consent in 
Maryland? Indicate the extent to which you think the current legal age is good on a 11-point 
scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates “Moderate”, and 11 indicates “Extremely”. 
 
4. The current age of marriage with parental and/or judicial consent in Maryland should 
be increased. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement on a 11-point scale where 
1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates “Neither Agree or Disagree”, and 11 indicates 
“Strongly Agree”. 
 
5. The current age of marriage with parental and/or judicial consent in Maryland should be 
decreased. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 




The amount of sleep one needs each day changes over the course of one’s life. The National 
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute recommends that an adult needs 7-8 hours of sleep a day. 
 
1. How many hours of sleep do you think that an undergraduate should have each day? 
   __________________ 
 
2. How much do you like to get 7-8 hours of sleep per day? Indicate the extent to which you 
think the current legal age is good on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates 




3. How good is it to get 7-8 hours of sleep per day? Indicate the extent to which you think the 
current legal age is good on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates 
“Moderate”, and 11 indicates “Extremely”. 
 
4. An undergraduate should sleep more than 7-8 hours per day. Indicate the extent to which you 
agree with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates 
“Neither Agree or Disagree”, and 11 indicates “Strongly Agree”. 
 
5. An undergraduate should sleep less than 7-8 hours per day. Indicate the extent to which you 
agree with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates 
“Neither Agree or Disagree”, and 11 indicates “Strongly Agree”. 
 
 
The Department of Communication at the University of Maryland may impose a new policy that 
undergraduates need to take four courses in career training in their four years of undergraduate 
study. 
 
1. How many courses in career training in four years do you think undergraduates should take? 
____________ 
 
2. How much do you like that that undergraduates need to take four courses in career training in 
their four years of undergraduate study? Indicate the extent to which you think the current legal 
age is good on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates “Moderate”, and 11 
indicates “Extremely”. 
 
3. How good is it that undergraduates need to take four courses in career training in their four 
years of undergraduate study? Indicate the extent to which you think the current legal age is good 
on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Not at all”, 6 indicates “Moderate”, and 11 indicates 
“Extremely”. 
 
4. The new policy should require that undergraduates take more than four courses in 
career training in their four years of undergraduate study. Indicate the extent to which you agree 
with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates 
“Neither Agree or Disagree”, and 11 indicates “Strongly Agree”. 
 
5. The new policy should require that undergraduates take less than four courses in 
career training in their four years of undergraduate study. Indicate the extent to which you agree 
with the statement on a 11-point scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates 





Finally, please provide the following demographic information. 




2. Please indicate your gender:   
__ Female    __ Male 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 White  
 Black, or African American  
 Latino, or Hispanic American  
 American Indian or Alaska Native  
 Pacific Islander  
 Asian, or Asian American  
 Middle Eastern  
 Other  
 
4. Please indicate what year you are in college: _____ 
 Freshman  
 Sophomore  
 Junior  
 Senior  
 Graduate  
 Other  
 
Please provide your SONA ID code (the code assigned to you by the SONA system when you 
























Appendix C: The Questionnaire for Pilot Study 3  
Researchers at the University of Maryland are studying college students' views 
towards about social issues.  Today we would like you to tell us your views about two particular 
issues, Maryland’s legal drinking age and legal marriage age. There are no right or wrong 
answers; we are interested in your views. We will also ask you to provide us with arguments pro 
and con about these issues.  
  
It is important that you provide meaningful and thoughtful answers. To receive credit for your 
participation in this research project, you will need to answer carefully, clearly, and thoughtfully. 
  
1. The current legal age for drinking alcoholic beverages in Maryland is 21 years old.  
 
Please indicate your position toward this issue. 
What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking age should be? 
________________ 
 
Now, think about your position toward this issue, Maryland’s legal drinking age. You will be 







Now, you will be asked to generate arguments opposite to your position toward this issue, 







2. The age of marriage in the United States varies by state, but is generally 18. However, with 
parental and/or judicial consent, most states allow younger people to marry. For example, in 
Maryland, parties can marry at age sixteen with parental consent.  
 
Please indicate your position toward the issue. 




Now think about your position toward this issue, the legal age of marriage. You will be asked to 









Now, you will be asked to generate arguments opposite to your position toward this issue, 







Finally, please provide the following demographic information. 
1. Please indicate your age: _____ 
 
2. Please indicate your gender:   
__ Female    __ Male 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 White  
 Black, or African American  
 Latino, or Hispanic American  
 American Indian or Alaska Native  
 Pacific Islander  
 Asian, or Asian American  
 Middle Eastern  
 Other  
 
4. Please indicate what year you are in college: _____ 
 Freshman  
 Sophomore  
 Junior  
 Senior  
 Graduate  
 Other  
 
Please provide your SONA ID code (the code assigned to you by the SONA system when you 








Appendix D: The Questionnaire for Pilot Study 5 
Before you continue, we want to make sure you are familiar with the scales you will be using 
throughout the study. For every question you will be asked to use a specific number from 0 
(zero) on up. Zero means not at all, 100 means a moderate amount, and you may use any 
number from zero on up. For example, suppose the question asked “How much do you like ice 
cream?” 
• If you don’t like ice cream at all, you would answer 0. 
 • If you like ice cream moderately, you would answer 100.  
• If you like ice cream only a little bit (less than moderately), you could answer 20 or 40 (again, 
the choice of what number to use is yours).  
• If you really liked ice cream, you may answer something like 300 or 400, depending on how 
much you really like it.  
So, let’s practice this scale a little bit: 
 
1. How much do you like the food offered in the Stamp Student Union?  
0 = not at all 100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up: 
________________ 
 
2. How important is it for you to do well on your next COMM exam?    
0 = not at all 100 = moderately important 
Use any number from zero on up: 
________________ 
 
3. What’s the lowest number you can use for answering questions according to this scale? Please 
use a number to answer this question.  
________________ 
 
4. What does 100 indicate when using this scale? (An incorrect answer will not allow you to 
proceed to the next question) 
 The lowest amount that you can use.  
 A moderate amount of a variable.  
 A larger-than-moderate amount of a variable.  
 The highest value you can use.  
 
5. Can you use a number such as 375 to answer a question? (An incorrect answer will not allow 
you to proceed to the next question) 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Now that you have learned how to use the magnitude scales, please click the button below to 
continue. 
 
Researchers at the University of Maryland are studying young people's attitudes towards various 
arguments on social issues. We would like you to answer the questions that follow to help us to 
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learn about your evaluation of arguments on social issues. There are no right or wrong answers; 
we are interested in your views. Remember that researchers have ways to check whether your 
answers are meaningful and thoughtful. For example, if you select the same answer for all the 
questions in a very short time, you will not receive any credit for participation.  
 
I. The current legal age for drinking alcoholic beverages in Maryland is 21 years old. You will 
read 5 arguments on why Maryland's legal drinking age should be lowered. You are going to rate 
the quality of those arguments. Considering, how strong is the argument you just read?    
0 = not at all  100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up      
 
(Participants were randomly assigned to condition 1 or 2) 
 
1a. A 2013 Youth Risk Behavior Survey revealed that over half of high school students drank 
some amount of alcohol during the past month. Further, binge drinking among Greek 
members contributes to the highest rates of car accidents, sexual assaults, and emergency room 
visits on college campuses. Because the majority of teenagers under 21 consume alcoholic 
beverages and the current legal drinking age of 21 is ineffective, Maryland's legal drinking age 
should be lowered.               
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
1b. The current legal drinking age has pushed underage drinking into private and less controlled 
environments, where young adults may be more prone to binge drinking and other unsafe 
behaviors. What we need is a normal environment of parental and community supervision so that 
drinking behavior can occur in a responsible way. Teaching responsible drinking at an earlier age 
can help to control possible binge drinking in the future. So we suggest lowering Maryland's 
legal drinking age.            
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
1c. The government should regulate the consumption of alcohol based on different ages rather 
than set 21 as a legal age for drinking. Most countries in the world have regulations rather than 
laws on alcohol consumption. For example, in Germany, there is a tiered system involving 
alcohol, such that alcohols of different contents (beer, wine and liquor) can be consumed at 
different ages progressively. So we suggest lowering Maryland's legal drinking age.            
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong  
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
1d. There are fewer drunk driving traffic accidents and fatalities in many European countries that 
have a lower legal drinking age. For example, alcohol-related traffic accidents and fatalities 
decreased by 57% between 1975 and 1990in Germany where the drinking age is 16. One reason 
may be that teenagers are familiar with the influence of alcohol on their behavior (e.g., driving) 
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at an earlier age. This may lead to fewer cases of drunk driving. So, we suggest lowering 
Maryland's legal drinking age.              
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong  
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
1e. A legal drinking age of 21 encourages young adults to acquire and use false identification 
documents to procure alcohol. In this era of national security concerns, including terrorism, 
illegal immigration, and other threats, it would be better to have fewer fake IDs in circulation and 
more respect for the law. So, we suggest lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   




2a. According to Neff, a freshman from Germany, he and his best friends have started consuming 
various types of alcoholic beverages since high school. Neff concluded that all the teenagers in 
the United States consumed alcoholic beverages in their high school and college too and the 
current legal drinking age of 21 was ineffective. Thus, we suggest lowering Maryland's legal 
drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
2b. The current legal drinking age has pushed underage drinking into private and less controlled 
environments, where young adults may be more prone to binge drinking and other unsafe 
behaviors. A school official advocating the elimination of all the Greek communities believed 
that binge drinking among Greek members contributes to all the car accidents and sexual assaults 
in the United States. He believed that teaching responsible drinking at an earlier age could solve 
all the problems on campus. So we suggest lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
2c. The government should regulate the consumption of alcohol based on different  ages rather 
than set 21 as a legal age for drinking. Maurice, a freshman in Salisbury University, strongly 
believes that he is much more mature than his peers and should be able to drink all types of 
alcohol because there is no serious health damage on his brain that is brought on by liquor.  So 
we suggest lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
2d. There are fewer drunk driving traffic accidents and fatalities in many European countries that 
have a lower legal drinking age. For example, traffic accidents and fatalities decreased by 57% 
between 1975 and 1990 in Germany where the drinking age is 16. Tom, a high school graduate 
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in the United States, believed that there were fewer cases of traffic accidents in Germany in 1990 
than in 1975 because the legal drinking age in Germany is 16. So we suggest lowering 
Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
2e. A legal drinking age of 21 encourages young adults to acquire and use false identification 
documents to procure alcohol. An old man from New York believed that all the social problems, 
including terrorism, illegal immigration, and severe unemployment, are caused by fake 
identifications used by young people.   Having fewer fake IDs in circulation solves all these 
threats. So, we suggest lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   




II. Now, you will read 6 arguments on why Maryland's legal drinking age should not be 
lowered. You are going to rate the quality of those arguments. Considering, how strong is the 
argument you just read? 
0 = not at all  100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up      
 
(Participants were randomly assigned to condition 3 or 4) 
 
3a. For most 18-year-olds, the frontal lobe of the brain – largely involved in “executive 
functioning” processes such as judgment, reasoning, self-monitoring, and inhibiting and 
regulating behavior – is still quite immature. For example, research shows that adolescents are 
less sensitive to the negative effects of alcohol that normally serve as cues for grown-ups to 
“slow down.” This is the reason that binge drinking is more common among adolescents. So, we 
suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age.   
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
3b. Not only do 18-year-olds usually lack the “mature” brain capacity to make good choices 
regarding alcohol, but their use of alcohol may actually damage the part of the brain that they 
need to make such choices. According to several studies, alcohol abuse in adolescence is 
correlated with reduced volume of the hippocampus, a primary center in the brain for memory. 
Alcohol also damages the frontal lobe, which contains parts of the brain that involve impulse 
control. So we suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   





3c. A lower drinking age may also be tied to lower grades, poor attendance and increases in 
dropout rates. The 2000 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse found that as rates of 
alcohol use by 12- to 17-year-olds increase, grade point averages decrease. Research also has 
shown that middle school students who avoid using alcohol and other drugs score higher on state 
reading and math tests than other students. So, we suggest not lowering Maryland's legal 
drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
3d. Beginning to drink during high school may be relatively more likely to lead to later abuse 
and addiction than delaying drinking until adulthood. Data from a survey of 43,000 U.S. adults 
heighten concerns that early alcohol use, independent of other risk factors, may contribute to the 
risk of developing future alcohol problems. So we suggest not lowering Maryland's legal 
drinking age.  
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
3e. A legal drinking age of 21 reduces traffic accidents and fatalities. A study in 2010 found that 
a higher legal drinking age was associated with lower rates of traffic accidents. The National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimated that a legal drinking age of 21 
decreased the number of fatal traffic accidents for young people aged 18-21 by 13%. So we 
suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
4a. For most 18-year-olds, the frontal lobe of the brain – largely involved in “executive 
functioning” processes such as judgment, reasoning, self-monitoring, and inhibiting and 
regulating behavior – is still quite immature.  Jennifer, a housewife and a Christian, said that her 
16-year-old kid’s brains were not fully developed and thus had a red face after consuming some 
quantity of alcohol. Thus Jennifer believed that all the adolescents should not drink. So, we 
suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age.   
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
4b. Not only do 18-year-olds usually lack the “mature” brain capacity to make good choices 
regarding alcohol, but their use of alcohol may actually damage the part of the brain that they 
need to make such choices. Jill was a senior in a college and recently suffered from a severe 
grade slippage. Her parents were seriously concerned about her grades and suspected that their 
daughter may be involved in alcohol abuse. Her parents believed drinking led to all the brain 
problems among teenagers, such as loss of memory and damage of impulse control. So, we 
suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
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0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
4c. A lower drinking age may also be tied to lower grades, poor attendance and increases in 
dropout rates. Lizzy, a parent of a 17-year-old high school student, said that her son scored lower 
than the average on the state reading and math tests. Lizzy believed that drinking must have 
caused this decrease in grade point averages, because most high school students start consuming 
alcoholic beverages at 17. So we suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
4d. Beginning to drink during high school may be relatively more likely to lead to later abuse 
and addiction than delaying drinking until adulthood. Douglas was a middle-aged salesperson 
and had just divorced his wife. He felt depressed and relapsed into alcohol addiction. The only 
reason that Douglas was addicted to alcohol again was because of his early drinking behavior in 
high school. So we suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
4e. A legal drinking age of 21 reduces traffic accidents and fatalities. Ashley was a commuter on 
I-495 and she witnessed that too many people had died in car accidents on the Interstate. Ashley 
believed that drunk young drivers on the road prevented people from driving safely and caused 
all the crashes on the Capital Beltway. So we suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking 
age.  
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
III. The age of marriage in the United States varies by state, but is generally 18. However, with 
parental and/or judicial consent, most states allow parties of lower ages to marry. For example, in 
Maryland, parties can marry at age sixteen with parental consent.   You will read 4 arguments on 
why Maryland's legal drinking age should be increased. You are going to rate the quality of those 
arguments. Considering, how strong is the argument you just read? 
0 = not at all  100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up      
 
(Participants were randomly assigned to condition 5 or 6) 
 
5a. At 16, an individual is not an independent adult and they are not physically and 
psychologically prepared for the responsibilities regarding their selection of a life-long 
partner. With limited metal capacity and life experience, teenagers’ knowledge and attitudes 
regarding marriage and significant others may be mercurial. As a result, they need more life 
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experience before they decide to settle down. So we suggest increasing Maryland's legal age of 
marriage.  
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
5b. Marrying at an early age could lead to potential early marriage instability.  According to the 
National Survey of Family Growth in 2009, of the marriages entered into before age 18, nearly 
70% end in divorce. It seems that the likelihood of marriages’ success and endurance may be 
improved given that the two people marry at older ages. So we suggest increasing 
Maryland's legal age of marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
5c. At 16, one lacks the relational skills and emotional maturity required to sustain the marriage. 
According to a professor who specializes in family communication, younger people have more 
difficulty controlling their anger and anxiety when they communicate with their partners. As a 
result, people who marry at a younger age are more likely to experience marriage failure. So we 
suggest increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
5d. There are severe life consequences for those who marry and give birth to a child at an early 
age: they are more likely than those who delay their marriage to discontinue their formal 
educations prematurely, earn low wages, and live in poverty. Those who marry and give birth to 
a kid at an early age are obliged to more family responsibilities. This is the most important cause 
of why they are not capable of finishing their college educations and not able to make a living. 
Teen fathers and mothers are worse off economically than those who enter marriage at an older 
age because they are forced to concentrate on their babies rather than their careers. So we 
suggest increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
5e. Besides physical health threats potentially brought by early childbearing (e.g., obstertric 
fistula), women who marry early may develop more mental health problems than those who 
marry later. According to a study by CAMH (the Center for Addiction and Mental Health), 
women who marry as adolescents have higher rates (i.e., a 41% increase) of lifetime mental 
illness, such as depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder, than women who marry in 
adulthood. So we suggest increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage.  
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   






6a. At 16, an individual is not an independent adult and they are not physically and 
psychologically prepared for the responsibilities regarding their selection of a life-long 
partner. As a police officer from New York, Adam saw many cases of juvenile delinquency. As a 
result, he concluded that all teenagers are irresponsible and immature and they need more 
education before they decide to settle down. So we suggest increasing Maryland's legal age of 
marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
6b. Marrying at an early age could lead to potential early marriage instability. Annie, a 29-year-
old housewife of three children, recalled that one of her best friends in high school was married 
before she got her high school diploma. The young couple ended up divorcing at age 25. 
Therefore, Annie believed that all early marriages are instable and will fall apart sooner or 
later. So we suggest increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage.         
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
6c. At 16, one lacks the relational skills and emotional maturity required to sustain the marriage. 
Thomas married his high school sweetheart at 16. However, due to his bipolar emotional 
disorder, he had difficulty controlling his emotion during his communication with his partner. 
Thus, all young people lack emotional management skills and will experience marriage failures. 
So we suggest increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage.             
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
6d. There are severe life consequences for those who marry and give birth to a kid at an early 
age: they are more likely than those who delay their marriage to discontinue their formal 
educations prematurely, earn low wages, and live in poverty. For example, Jill was not interested 
in further education after she finished her high school. She worked as a waitress at a local 
restaurant and got married at the early age of 16 with a guy who worked as a waiter in the same 
restaurant. Jill soon had her first baby at 17. Thus, it can be concluded that teen fathers and 
mothers must be worse off economically than those who enter marriage at an older age because 
they are forced to concentrate on their babies rather than careers. So we suggest increasing 
Maryland's legal age of marriage.    
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
 6e. Besides physical health threats potentially brought by early childbearing (e.g., obstertric 
fistula), women who marry early may develop more mental health problems than those who 
marry later.  Marrying at an early age absolutely causes a higher risk of developing all kinds of 
mental health problems. The mental health problems include coronary disease, breast cancer, and 
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bipolar disorder. Thus, the older one gets married, the less likely the person develops serious 
mental disease. So we suggest increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage.  
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   




IV. Now, you will read 4 arguments on why Maryland's legal age of marriage should not be 
increased. You are going to rate the quality of those arguments. Considering, how strong is 
the argument you just read?      
0 = not at all  100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up      
 
(Participants were randomly assigned to condition 7 or 8) 
 
7a. Marrying at a young age may help teenagers mature. Marriage carries with it a heightened 
sense of responsibility and obligation, which forces teenagers to grow up. When a woman is 
committed to marriage, she needs to be responsible for taking care of the family and for 
nurturing her babies. So, those who get married at an early age have to spend more time planning 
and pursuing their educational and professional goals and less time partying and drinking. So, we 
suggest not increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
7b. Parental consent helps those youth who decide to marry at an early age make a right choice. 
According to Dr. Robert Epstein, a Harvard psychologist, those who had their partner chosen for 
them by parents tended to feel more in love as time passes. One reason is that parents are able to 
determine whether the two teenagers’ family backgrounds, interests, and life goals are 
compatible. Further, parents help teenagers decide whether their relationship should be 
developed into a marriage. So, with parental consent, there is no need to increase 
Maryland's legal age of marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
7c. Marriage is certainly one route to reduce out-of-wedlock births by those teenagers who 
become pregnant. Premarital pregnancy causes harmful consequences for both the parents and 
their children. For instance, in Tennessee, Census Bureau data from 2006-2008 showed that a 
child had a 43.1% chance of being impoverished if he or she was in a single-parent, female-
headed family. So we suggest not increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   





7d. A legal marriage age below 16 is prevalent among many countries. For the period 2000-
2011, about 12% of women in developing regions were married or in union before age 15. In 
2010 this was equivalent to almost 24 million women. As a nation of immigrants, the United 
States should preserve the right of teenagers from other cultures to get married. So we suggest 
not increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage.           
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
8a. Marrying at a young age may help teenagers mature. Marriage carries with it a heightened 
sense of responsibility and obligation, which forces teenagers to grow up. When a man is 
committed to marriage, he becomes responsible for providing for his family, making sure the 
bills are paid, and protecting his wife and future children. Similarly, a woman needs to be 
responsible for nurturing her babies and taking care of the household. Therefore, 100% of young 
people who get married at an early age will spend more time planning and pursuing their 
educational and professional goals and less time partying and drinking. And they will absolutely 
earn more than those who marry in their 20s or 30s. So we suggest not increasing 
Maryland's legal age of marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
8b. Parental consent helps those youth who decide to marry at an early age make a right choice. 
Nadiar got married at the early age of 15 with a guy arranged by her parents in India. She has 
lived and raised two chilren with her partner chosen by her parents. For 12 years, Nadiar 
gradually felt more in love as time passed. Therefore, it should be concluded that all the arranged 
marriages are more romantic and reliable than the free choice marriages. Parents can always 
select the right wife/husband for their ignorant and young child. So, with parent consent, there is 
no need to increase Maryland's legal age of marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
8c. Marriage is certainly one route to reduce out-of-wedlock births by those teenagers who 
become pregnant. Jenny was a high school teenage girl and got pregnant at 15. Afraid to reveal 
the fact to her parents, she suffered from psychological disorders and a severe grade slippage. If 
the legal age of marriage were lowered, Jenny would not suffer from these consequences of pre-
marital pregnancy. So we suggest not increasing Maryland's legal age of marriage.  
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
8d. A legal marriage age below 16 is prevalent among many countries. For example, a Muslim 
girl can marry when she attains puberty or completes 15 years of age. The same fact applies to 
all the developing countries in the world. Therefore, this should be applied to the United States 
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regardless of potential cultural difference. So we suggest not increasing Maryland's legal age of 
marriage. 
0 = not at all   100 = moderately strong   
Use any number from zero on up 
_____________________________ 
 
Finally, please provide the following demographic information. 
1. Please indicate your age: _____ 
 
2. Please indicate your gender:   
__ Female    __ Male 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 White  
 Black, or African American  
 Latino, or Hispanic American  
 American Indian or Alaska Native  
 Pacific Islander  
 Asian, or Asian American  
 Middle Eastern  
 Other  
 
4. Please indicate what year you are in college: _____ 
 Freshman  
 Sophomore  
 Junior  
 Senior  
 Graduate  
 Other  
 
Please provide your SONA ID code (the code assigned to you by the SONA system when you 









Appendix E: The Questionnaire for the Main Study 
After signing the consent form, respondents enter the scale training section:  
Before you continue, we want to make sure you are familiar with the two types of scales you will 
be using throughout the study.  
  
For some questions, you will be asked to indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
statement on a scale, for example, from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 11 (Strong Agree).  
 
For the other question, you will indicate your answer using a specific number from 0 (zero) on 
up. Zero means not at all, 100 means a moderate amount, and you may use any number from 
zero on up. For example, suppose the question asked “How much do you like ice cream?” 
 
• If you don’t like ice cream at all, you would answer 0. 
 • If you like ice cream moderately, you would answer 100.  
• If you like ice cream only a little bit (less than moderately), you could answer 20 or 40 (again, 
the choice of what number to use is yours).  
• If you really liked ice cream, you may answer something like 300 or 400, depending on how 
much you really like it.  
 
So, let’s practice this scale (with which you may be unfamiliar) a little bit: 
 
1. How much do you like the food offered in the Stamp Student Union?  
0 = not at all    
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
2. How important is it for you to do well on your next COMM exam?  
 0=not at all         
100=moderately important 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
3. What’s the lowest number you can use for answering questions according to this scale? Please 
use a number to answer this question. Your Answer:____ 
 
4. What does 100 indicate when using this scale? (An incorrect answer will not allow you to 
proceed to the next question) 
Your Answer: 
 The lowest amount that you can use. 
 A moderate amount of a variable. 
 A larger-than-moderate amount of a variable. 
 The highest value you can use. 
 
5. Can you use a number such as 375 to answer a question? (An incorrect answer will not allow 






There were two versions of questionnaire in the main study, as two issues were employed, legal 
drinking age and legal marriage age. Although stimulus messages were different in content, the 
questionnaires were similar except for some minor change in wordings. Thus, all the messages 




Now that you have learned how to use the scales, please click the button below to continue. 
 
Researchers at the University of Maryland are studying young people's attitudes towards various 
arguments on social issues. We would like you to answer the questions that follow to help us to 
learn about your evaluation of arguments on social issues. There are no right or wrong answers; 
we are interested in your views.     
 
Remember that researchers have ways to check whether your answers are meaningful and 
thoughtful. For example, if you select the same answer for all the questions in a very short 
time, you will not receive any credit for participation.  
The current legal age for drinking alcoholic beverages in Maryland is 21 years old.  
Please indicate your answer to the following question as quickly as possible, but not so quickly 
that they might make errors. Click the button when you are ready.  




Now, pace yourself. Considering the issue of Maryland's legal drinking age, how strongly do you 
believe in your position? 
0 = not at all 
100 = moderately strong 
Use any number from zero on up 
____ 
 
How certain is your belief toward the issue? 
0 = not at all 
100 = moderately certain 




How important is your belief toward the issue to you personally? 
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0 = not at all 
100 = moderately important 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
 
Eighteen Experimental Conditions: 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the sixteen experimental conditions plus two non-
message control conditions 
 
Now you are going to read a message regarding the legal age for drinking/marriage. After 
reading the message, please answer the questions that follow. (Participants will be randomly 
assigned to 1 of 9 message conditions) 
 
Message 1 
We suggest lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. Here are our reasons: 
 
The current legal drinking age has pushed underage drinking into private and less controlled 
environments, where young adults may be more prone to binge drinking and other unsafe 
behaviors. What we need is a normal environment of parental and community supervision so that 
drinking behavior can occur in a responsible way. Lowering the legal drinking age and teaching 
responsible drinking at an earlier age can help to control possible binge drinking behavior in the 
future.  
 
A legal drinking age of 21 also encourages young adults to acquire and use false identification 
documents to procure alcohol. In this era of national security concerns, including terrorism and 
illegal immigration, it would be better to have fewer fake IDs in circulation and more respect for 
the law. If the drinking age is lowered, there will be no need for youth to acquire fake IDs. 
 
What’s more, there are fewer drunk driving traffic accidents and fatalities in many European 
countries that have a lower legal drinking age. For example, alcohol-related traffic accidents and 
fatalities decreased by 57% between 1975 and 1990 in Germany where the drinking age is 
16. One reason may be that teenagers are familiar with the influence of alcohol on their behavior 
(e.g., driving) at an earlier age. This leads to fewer cases of drunk driving. 
 
Rather than set 21 as a legal age for drinking, the government should regulate the consumption 
of alcohol based on different ages rather than set 21 as a legal age for drinking. Most countries in 
the world have regulations rather than laws on alcohol consumption. For example, in Germany, 
there is a tiered system involving alcohol, such that alcohols of different contents (beer, wine and 
liquor) can be consumed at different ages progressively.  
 
So these are the reasons for the position we advocated. They are good reasons, so you have no 
choice but to agree with them. Because when you think about it you are really forced to agree 
because this is a universal student issue. 
 




 Message 2 
 
We suggest lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. Here are our reasons: 
 
The current legal drinking age has pushed underage drinking into private and less controlled 
environments, where young adults may be more prone to binge drinking and other unsafe 
behaviors. What we need is a normal environment of parental and community supervision so that 
drinking behavior can occur in a responsible way. Lowering the legal drinking age and teaching 
responsible drinking at an earlier age can help to control possible binge drinking behavior in the 
future.  
 
A legal drinking age of 21 also encourages young adults to acquire and use false identification 
documents to procure alcohol. In this era of national security concerns, including terrorism and 
illegal immigration, it would be better to have fewer fake IDs in circulation and more respect for 
the law. If the drinking age is lowered, there will be no need for youth to acquire fake IDs. 
 
What’s more, there are fewer drunk driving traffic accidents and fatalities in many European 
countries that have a lower legal drinking age. For example, alcohol-related traffic accidents and 
fatalities decreased by 57% between 1975 and 1990 in Germany where the drinking age is 
16. One reason may be that teenagers are familiar with the influence of alcohol on their behavior 
(e.g., driving) at an earlier age. This leads to fewer cases of drunk driving. 
 
Rather than set 21 as a legal age for drinking, the government should regulate the consumption 
of alcohol based on different ages rather than set 21 as a legal age for drinking. Most countries in 
the world have regulations rather than laws on alcohol consumption. For example, in Germany, 
there is a tiered system involving alcohol, such that alcohols of different contents (beer, wine and 
liquor) can be consumed at different ages progressively.  
 




We suggest lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. Here are our reasons: 
  
The current legal drinking age has pushed underage drinking into private and less controlled 
environments, where young adults may be more prone to binge drinking and other unsafe 
behaviors. A school official advocating the elimination of all the Greek communities believed 
that binge drinking among Greek members contributes to all the car accidents and sexual assaults 
in the United States. He believed that teaching responsible drinking at an earlier age could solve 
all the problems on campus.  
  
What’s more, a legal drinking age of 21 encourages young adults to acquire and use false 
identification documents to procure alcohol. An old man from New York believed that all the 
social problems, including terrorism, illegal immigration, and severe unemployment, are caused 
by fake identifications used by young people.  Having fewer fake IDs in circulation solves all 




There are fewer drunk driving traffic accidents and fatalities in many European countries that 
have a lower legal drinking age. For example, traffic accidents and fatalities decreased by 57% 
between 1975 and 1990 in Germany where the drinking age is 16. Tom, a high school graduate 
in the United States, believed that there were fewer cases of traffic accidents in Germany in 1990 
than in 1975 because the legal drinking age in Germany is 16.  
  
Rather than set 21 as a legal age for drinking, the government should regulate the consumption 
of alcohol based on different ages. Maurice, a freshman in Salisbury University, strongly 
believes that he is much more mature than his peers and should be able to drink all types of 
alcohol because there is no serious health damage on his brain that is brought on by liquor.   
  
So these are the reasons for the position we advocated. They are good reasons, so you have no 
choice but to agree with them. Because when you think about it you are really forced to agree 
because this is a universal student issue. 
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believes that he is much more mature than his peers and should be able to drink all types of 








We suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. Here are our reasons: 
  
For most 18-year-olds, the frontal lobe of the brain – largely involved in “executive functioning” 
processes such as judgment, reasoning, self-monitoring, and inhibiting and regulating behavior – 
is still quite immature. For example, research shows that adolescents are less sensitive to the 
negative effects of alcohol that normally serve as cues for grown-ups to “slow down.” This is the 
reason that binge drinking is more common among adolescents.  
  
Not only do 18-year-olds usually lack the “mature” brain capacity to make good choices 
regarding alcohol, but their use of alcohol may actually damage the part of the brain that they 
need to make such choices. According to several studies, alcohol abuse in adolescence is 
correlated with reduced volume of the hippocampus, a primary center in the brain for memory. 
Alcohol also damages the frontal lobe, which contains parts of the brain that involve impulse 
control.  
  
Furthermore, a lower drinking age may be tied to lower grades, poor attendance and increases in 
dropout rates. The 2000 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse found that as rates of 
alcohol use by 12- to 17-year-olds increase, grade point averages decrease. Research also has 
shown that middle school students who avoid using alcohol and other drugs score higher on state 
reading and math tests than other students.  
  
Last but not least, a legal drinking age of 21 reduces traffic accidents and fatalities. A study in 
2010 found that a higher legal drinking age was associated with lower rates of traffic accidents. 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimated that a legal drinking 
age of 21 decreased the number of fatal traffic accidents for young people aged 18-21 by 13%.  
  
  
So these are the reasons for the position we advocated. They are good reasons, so you have no 
choice but to agree with them. Because when you think about it you are really forced to agree 
because this is a universal student issue. 
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correlated with reduced volume of the hippocampus, a primary center in the brain for memory. 
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We suggest not lowering Maryland's legal drinking age. Here are our reasons: 
  
For most 18-year-olds, the frontal lobe of the brain – largely involved in “executive functioning” 
processes such as judgment, reasoning, self-monitoring, and inhibiting and regulating behavior – 
is still quite immature.  Jennifer, a housewife and a Christian, said that her 16-year-old kid’s 
brains were not fully developed and thus had a red face after consumption some quantity of 
alcohol. Thus Jennifer believed that all the adolescents should not drink. 
  
Not only do 18-year-olds usually lack the “mature” brain capacity to make good choices 
regarding alcohol, but their use of alcohol may actually damage the part of the brain that they 
need to make such choices. Jill was a senior in a college and recently suffered from a severe 
grade slippage. Her parents suspected that their daughter might be involved in alcohol abuse, 
because drinking led to all the brain problems among teenagers, such as loss of memory and 
damage of impulse control. 
  
Furthermore, a lower drinking age may also be tied to lower grades, poor attendance and 
increases in dropout rates. Lizzy, a parent of a 17-year-old high school student, said that her 
son scored lower than the average on the state reading and math tests. Lizzy believed that 
drinking must have caused this decrease in grade point averages, because most high school 
students start consuming alcoholic beverages at 17.  
  
Last but not least, a legal drinking age of 21 reduces traffic accidents and fatalities. Ashley was a 
commuter on I-495 and she witnessed that too many people had died in car accidents on the 
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Interstate. Ashley believed that drunk young drivers on the road prevented people from driving 
safely and caused all the crashes on the Capital Beltway. 
  
So these are the reasons for the position we advocated. They are good reasons, so you have no 
choice but to agree with them. Because when you think about it you are really forced to agree 
because this is a universal student issue. 
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The age of marriage in the United States varies by state, but is generally 18. However, with 
parental and/or judicial consent, most states allow parties of lower ages to marry. For example, in 
Maryland, parties can marry at age sixteen with parental consent. We argue that Maryland's legal 




At 16, an individual is not an independent adult and they are not physically and psychologically 
prepared for the responsibilities regarding their selection of a life-long partner. With limited 
metal capacity and life experience, teenagers’ knowledge and attitudes regarding marriage and 
significant others may be mercurial. As a result, they need more life experience before they 
decide to settle down.  
 
At 16, one lacks the relational skills and emotional maturity required to sustain the marriage. 
According to a professor who specializes in family communication, younger people have more 
difficulty controlling their anger and anxiety when they communicate with their partners. As 
such, people who marry at a younger age are more likely to experience marriage failure. 
 
Marrying at an early age could also lead to potential early marriage instability. According to the 
National Survey of Family Growth in 2009, of the marriages entered into before age 18, nearly 
70% end in divorce. It seems that the likelihood of marriages’ success and endurance may be 
improved given that the two people marry at older ages.  
 
Besides physical health threats potentially brought by early childbearing (e.g., obstertric fistula), 
women who marry early may develop more mental health problems than those who marry later.  
According to a study by CAMH (the Center for Addiction and Mental Health), women who 
marry as adolescents have higher rates (i.e., a 41% increase) of lifetime mental illness, such as 
depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder, than women who marry in adulthood.  
 
So these are the reasons for the position we advocated. They are good reasons, so you have no 
choice but to agree with them. Because when you think about it you are really forced to agree 
because this is a universal student issue. 
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difficulty controlling their anger and anxiety when they communicate with their partners. As 
such, people who marry at a younger age are more likely to experience marriage failure. 
 
Marrying at an early age could also lead to potential early marriage instability. According to the 
National Survey of Family Growth in 2009, of the marriages entered into before age 18, nearly 
70% end in divorce. It seems that the likelihood of marriages’ success and endurance may be 
improved given that the two people marry at older ages.  
 
Besides physical health threats potentially brought by early childbearing (e.g., obstertric fistula), 
women who marry early may develop more mental health problems than those who marry later.  
According to a study by CAMH (the Center for Addiction and Mental Health), women who 
marry as adolescents have higher rates (i.e., a 41% increase) of lifetime mental illness, such as 
depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder, than women who marry in adulthood.  
  




The age of marriage in the United States varies by state, but is generally 18. However, with 
parental and/or judicial consent, most states allow parties of lower ages to marry. For example, in 
Maryland, parties can marry at age sixteen with parental consent. We argue that Maryland's legal 
age of marriage should be raised. 
 
At 16, an individual is not an independent adult and they are not physically and psychologically 
prepared for the responsibilities regarding their selection of a life-long partner. As a police 
officer from New York, Adam saw many cases of juvenile delinquency. As a result, he 
concluded that all teenagers are irresponsible and they need more education before they decide to 
settle down. 
 
At 16, one lacks the relational skills and emotional maturity required to sustain the marriage. 
However, due to his bipolar emotional disorder, he had difficulty controlling his emotion during 
his communication with his partner. Thus, all young people lack emotional management skills 
and will experience marriage failures. 
 
Marrying at an early age could also lead to potential early marriage instability. Annie, a 29-year-
old housewife, recalled that one of her best friends in high school was married before she got her 
high school diploma. The young couple ended up divorcing at age 25. As such, Annie believed 




Besides physical health threats potentially brought by early childbearing (e.g., obstertric fistula), 
women who marry early may develop more mental health problems than those who marry 
later. Marrying at an early age absolutely causes a higher risk of developing all kinds of mental 
health problems. The mental health problems include coronary disease, breast cancer, and 
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bipolar disorder. Thus, the older one gets married, the less likely the person develops serious 
mental disease.  
 
So these are the reasons for the position we advocated. They are good reasons, so you have no 
choice but to agree with them. Because when you think about it you are really forced to agree 
because this is a universal student issue. 
  




The age of marriage in the United States varies by state, but is generally 18. However, with 
parental and/or judicial consent, most states allow parties of lower ages to marry. For example, in 
Maryland, parties can marry at age sixteen with parental consent. We argue that Maryland's legal 
age of marriage should be raised. 
 
At 16, an individual is not an independent adult and they are not physically and psychologically 
prepared for the responsibilities regarding their selection of a life-long partner. As a police 
officer from New York, Adam saw many cases of juvenile delinquency. As a result, he 
concluded that all teenagers are irresponsible and they need more education before they decide to 
settle down. 
 
At 16, one lacks the relational skills and emotional maturity required to sustain the marriage. 
However, due to his bipolar emotional disorder, he had difficulty controlling his emotion during 
his communication with his partner. Thus, all young people lack emotional management skills 
and will experience marriage failures. 
 
Marrying at an early age could also lead to potential early marriage instability. Annie, a 29-year-
old housewife, recalled that one of her best friends in high school was married before she got her 
high school diploma. The young couple ended up divorcing at age 25. As such, Annie believed 
that all early marriages would fall apart sooner or later.  
 
Besides physical health threats potentially brought by early childbearing (e.g., obstertric fistula), 
women who marry early may develop more mental health problems than those who marry 
later. Marrying at an early age absolutely causes a higher risk of developing all kinds of mental 
health problems. The mental health problems include coronary disease, breast cancer, and 
bipolar disorder. Thus, the older one gets married, the less likely the person develops serious 
mental disease.  
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Maryland, parties can marry at age sixteen with parental consent. We argue that Maryland's legal 
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age of marriage should not be raised. 
 
Marriage is certainly one route to reduce out-of-wedlock births by those teenagers who become 
pregnant. Premarital pregnancy causes harmful consequences for both the parents and their 
children. For instance, in Tennessee, Census Bureau data from 2006-2008 showed that a child 
had a 43.1% chance of being impoverished if he or she was in a single-parent, female-headed 
family. In comparison, in a family with married parents, a child had only a 7.5% chance of living 
in poverty. 
 
What’s more, parental consent helps those youth who decide to marry at an early age make a 
right choice. [According to Dr. Robert Epstein, a Harvard psychologist, those who had their 
partner chosen for them by parents tended to feel more in love as time passes. One reason is that 
parents are able to determine whether the two teenagers’ family backgrounds, interests, and life 
goals are compatible. Further, parents help teenagers decide whether their relationship should be 
developed into a marriage. So, with parental consent, there is no need to increase 
Maryland's legal age of marriage.  
 
Last but not least, a legal marriage age below 16 is prevalent among many countries.  
For the period 2000-2011, about 12% of women in developing regions were married or in union 
before age 15. In 2010 this was equivalent to almost 24 million women. As a nation of 
immigrants, the United States should preserve the right of teenagers from other cultures to get 
married.  
 
So these are the reasons for the position we advocated. They are good reasons, so you have no 
choice but to agree with them. Because when you think about it you are really forced to agree 
because this is a universal student issue. 
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parents are able to determine whether the two teenagers’ family backgrounds, interests, and life 
goals are compatible. Further, parents help teenagers decide whether their relationship should be 
developed into a marriage. So, with parental consent, there is no need to increase 
Maryland's legal age of marriage.  
 
Last but not least, a legal marriage age below 16 is prevalent among many countries.  
For the period 2000-2011, about 12% of women in developing regions were married or in union 
before age 15. In 2010 this was equivalent to almost 24 million women. As a nation of 
immigrants, the United States should preserve the right of teenagers from other cultures to get 
married.  
 




The age of marriage in the United States varies by state, but is generally 18. However, with 
parental and/or judicial consent, most states allow parties of lower ages to marry. For example, in 
Maryland, parties can marry at age sixteen with parental consent. We argue that Maryland's legal 
age of marriage should not be raised. 
 
Marriage is certainly one route to reduce out-of-wedlock births by those teenagers who become 
pregnant. Premarital pregnancy causes harmful consequences for both the parents and their 
children. Jenny was a high school teenage girl and got pregnant at 15. Afraid to reveal the fact to 
her parents, she suffered from psychological disorders and a severe grade slippage. If the legal 
age of marriage were lowered, Jenny would not suffer from these consequences of pre-marital 
pregnancy. 
 
What’s more, parental consent helps those youth who decide to marry at an early age make a 
right choice. Nadiar got married at the early age of 15 with a guy arranged by her parents in 
India. She has lived and raised two children with her partner chosen by her parents. For 12 years, 
Nadiar gradually felt more in love as time passed. So it should be concluded that all the arranged 
marriages are more romantic and reliable than the free choice marriages. Parents can always 
select the right wife/husband for their ignorant and young child. So, with parent consent, there is 
no need to increase Maryland's legal age of marriage.  
 
Last but not least, a legal marriage age below 16 is prevalent among many countries. For 
example, a Muslim girl can marry when she attains puberty or completes 15 years of age. The 
same fact applies to all the developing countries in the world. Therefore, this should be applied 
to the United States regardless of potential cultural difference. 
 
So these are the reasons for the position we advocated. They are good reasons, so you have no 
choice but to agree with them. Because when you think about it you are really forced to agree 
because this is a universal student issue. 
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no need to increase Maryland's legal age of marriage.  
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same fact applies to all the developing countries in the world. Therefore, this should be applied 
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No message and received the questionnaire for legal marriage age  
 
Survey Questionnaire Block 1: Outcome Variables 
 
Now you are going to indicate your positions, beliefs, and attitudes toward the issue (i.e., 
Maryland's legal drinking age).  
 
How much do you like the current legal drinking age?  
0 = not at all 
100 = moderate 





How good is that the legal age for drinking alcoholic beverages is 21? 
0 = not at all 
100 = moderately good 
Use any number from zero on up 
_______ 
 
What do you think Maryland’s legal drinking age should be? 
_______ 
 
Indicate your agreement with the following three arguments regarding the current legal drinking 
age: 
0 = not at all   
100 = moderate amount 
You may use any number from zero on up 
 
1. The current legal drinking age should be decreased.   ______ 
2. The current legal drinking age should be increased. ______ 
3. The current legal drinking age should stay the same. ______ 
 
Do you feel that you currently possess sufficient information and knowledge about the issue to 
make an intelligent decision regarding their position? 
0 = not at all   
100 = moderate agreement 




Survey Questionnaire Block 2: Mediators 
 
Each word below describes feelings or mood. Please use the rating scales to describe 
your feelings while reading the message. Work quickly, but not so quickly that they might make 
errors. Your first reaction is best. This should take a minute or two. On the 4-point scale, 1 
means “Definitely Do Not Feel”, 2 means “Cannot Decide”, 3 means “Feel Slightly”, and 4 
means “Definitely Feel”.  
 
1. I felt irritated. 
2. I felt angry. 
3. I felt annoyed. 
4. I felt aggravated. 
 
Please continue to choose the answer you wish to select for the following feelings with the 4-
point scale where 1 means “Definitely Do Not Feel”, 2 means “Cannot Decide”, 3 means “Feel 













10. at-rest   
11. drowsy 
12. fearful  
13. lively  
14. still 
15. wide-awake   
16. clutched-up    
17. quiet 





Now list all the thoughts you had while reading the message. You have three to five minutes.  
After you list a thought, you will be instructed to determine the valence (positive vs. negative 




2.  _________________________________________________ 
 
3.  _________________________________________________ 
 
4.  _________________________________________________ 
 






Survey Questionnaire Block 3: Manipulation Check and other individual trait 
variables 
 
Now you are going to indicate your agreement with eight statements regarding your perceptions 
of the message on 11-point scales where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates “Neither 




1. The message made sense.   
2. The message covered all relevant aspects necessary for evaluating the topic.  
3. The message was easy to understand.  
4. The message was reasonable.     
5. The message was well-written. 
6. The message was convincing.  
7.  I like the message.  
8. The message was interesting.    
 
Below are six questions regarding your perceptions on the source of the message. Indicate your 
agreement with these statements regarding your perceptions of the message on 11-point scales 
where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates “Neither Agree nor Disagree”, and 11 
indicates “Strongly Agree”.  
 
 
1. The communicator was sincere.   
2. The communicator was competent.   
3. The communicator was trustworthy. 
4. The communicator was intelligent.  
5. The communicator was credible.  
6. The communicator was knowledgeable.  
 
 
Please indicate your agreement with following four statements on 11-point scales where 1 
indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates “Neither Agree nor Disagree”, and 11 indicates 
“Strongly Agree”.  
 
1. The message threatened my freedom to choose. 
2. The message tried to manipulate me.  
3. The message tried to pressure me.  
4. The message tried to make a decision for me.  
 
Below are seven questions regarding your evaluations of the message quality. Indicate your 
agreement with these statements regarding your perceptions of the message on 11-point scales 
where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 indicates “Neither Agree nor Disagree”, and 11 
indicates “Strongly Agree”.  
 
1. The message was smart. 
2. The message was well-supported.  
3. The message was compelling. 
4. The message was effective. 
5. The message was informative. 
6. The message was detailed.  





The following questions help us to learn about you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree 
with the following statements on 11-point scales where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree”, 6 
indicates “Neither Agree nor Disagree”, and 11 indicates “Strongly Agree”.  
 
1. I become frustrated when I am unable to make free and independent decisions. 
2. It irritates me when someone points out things which are obvious to me. 
3. I become angry when my freedom of choice is restricted. 
4. Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me. 
5. I find contradicting others stimulating. 
6. When something is prohibited, I usually think, “That’s exactly what I am going to do.” 
7. I resist the attempts of others to influence me. 
8. It makes me angry when another person is held up as a role model for me to follow. 
9. When someone forces me to do something, I feel like doing the opposite. 
10. I consider advice from others to be an intrusion. 





Finally, please provide the following demographic information. 
 
Please indicate your age: __ 
 
Please indicate your gender: __ 
 
Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 White  
 Black, or African American  
 Latino, or Hispanic American  
 American Indian or Alaska Native  
 Pacific Islander  
 Asian, or Asian American  
 Middle Eastern  
 Other  
 
Q18 Please indicate what year you are in college: 
 Freshman  
 Sophomore  
 Junior  
 Senior  
 Graduate  





Debriefing (for Drinking Issue) 
             This has been a study about how people react to particular kinds of arguments.  There 
were 8 message conditions plus 1 control condition in the study, and you were only in one of 
them. These messages were related to the legal age for drinking. Under each issue, these 
messages varied based on (1) argument quality; (2) perceived threat; (3) valence (pro vs. anti). 
For example, regarding argument quality, one group only got what is called “weak” arguments – 
the arguments that were based on personal anecdotes, illogical reasoning, and invalid evidence. 
The people in the other condition got the “strong” arguments, which were characterized by sound 
reasoning, accurate statistics, and justifiable evidence. 
            The groups who received the message that contained (1) weak arguments; (2) perceived 
threat are hypothesized to move their belief position away from the advocated position in the 
message. We will test these hypotheses.  
            These messages were made up for this study.  However, most of the statistics were 
accurate and came from newspapers and magazines. The report on the alcohol-related traffic 
accidents and fatalities decrease by 57% between 1975 and 1990 in Germany cam from U.S. 
Department of transportation 
(http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/AlcoholHighway/4_drinking_drivers.htm).  Other 
arguments were generated by students from previous pilot studies and revised by the researcher 
in this main study.  
            We appreciate your participation in this study.  Much of what we have learned in the 
social sciences in the last century is due to the participation of students like you in various 
studies. 
            Thank you.  Feel free to print off this sheet if you like. 
 
Debriefing (for Marriage Issue) 
             This has been a study about how people react to particular kinds of arguments.  There 
were 9 message conditions in the study, and you were only in one of them. These messages were 
related to the legal age of marriage; Under each issue, these messages varied based on (1) 
argument quality; (2) perceived threat; (3) valence (pro vs. anti). For example, regarding 
argument quality, one group only got what is called “weak” arguments – the arguments that were 
based on personal anecdotes, illogical reasoning, and invalid evidence. The people in the other 
condition got the “strong” arguments, which were characterized by sound reasoning, accurate 
statistics, and justifiable evidence. 
            The groups who received the message that contained (1) weak arguments; (2) perceived 
threat are hypothesized to move their belief position away from the advocated position in the 
message. We will test these hypotheses.  
            These messages were made up for this study.  However, most of the statistics were 
accurate and came from newspapers and magazines. The report that women who marry as 
adolescents have higher rates (i.e., a 41% increase) of lifetime mental illness than women who 
marry in adulthood came from  a study by CAMH (the Center for Addiction and Mental 
Health; http://www.monwho.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/MonWHO-2015-Mental-Health-
Theme-Guide.pdf). Other arguments were generated by students from previous pilot studies and 
revised by the researcher in this main study. For example, parental consent helps those youth 
who decide to marry at an early age make a right choice. However, most anecdotes in the study 
were made up to construct weak arguments. For example, Annie, a 29-year-old housewife, 
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recalled that one of her best friends in high school was married before she got her high school 
diploma. The young couple ended up divorcing at age 25.  
            We appreciate your participation in this study. Much of what we have learned in the 
social sciences in the last century is due to the participation of students like you in various 
studies. 





Appendix F: Sample R Code for Recoding Boomerang  
 
  
Below is the sample R code for recoding a new variable of boomerang for each respondent 
on the attitude toward changing the policy on the issue of legal drinking age. 
 
Step 1: Create an empty vector for coding the belief boomerang variable  
belief_boomerang <- vector(mode="numeric", length = nrow(drink_data)) 
 
Step 2: Compute the mean score of the control group for the drinking age 
control_group <- filter(drink_data, anti.pro == 0) 
summarise(control_group,belief_control_mean = mean(belief_decrease, na.rm = TRUE)) 
 
Step 3: Compute the belief boomerang score for each person conditionally based on the 
message valence (i.e., msg_valence: antipolicy[1] vs. propolicy[2]).  
 
for (i in 1: nrow(drink_data)) { 
if (is.na( drink_data$attitude_decrease[i]) == "TRUE") { 
        belief_boomerang[i] <- NA 
} else { 
        if (drink_data $msg_valence[i] == 1) { 
            belief_boomerang[i] <-  belief_control_mean - drink$attitude_decrease 
        } 
        if (marriage$ msg_valence [i] == 2) { 
            belief_boomerang[i] <- drink$attitude_decrease - belief_control_mean 
        } 
        if ((marriage$ msg_valence [i] == 0) { 
            belief_boomerang[i] <- NA 




Apply similar codes to recode other outcome variables.  
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Results of Post Hoc t Tests on the Belief toward Lowering the Legal Drinking Age 
 
DV1: Belief toward 
increasing the age of 
drinking 
Prior Belief: Oppose the policy Prior Belief: Support the policy 
1. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 
2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 










n = 14 
B 
15.31 (5.38)* 
n = 9 
B 
4.65 (6.52)* 
n = 8 
1.74 (4.09)*** 





n = 15 
 
10.88 (5.25) 
n = 13 
 
8.46 (7.52) 
n = 7 
5.99 (5.77) 












n = 12 
7.33 (5.33) 
n = 4 
2.33 (3.81)** 







n = 16 
U 
14.42 (4.25)* 
n = 12 
8.41 (7.94) 
 n = 6 
4.08 (5.89)* 
n = 11 
 
Note. N = 238. The mean of the control participants = 10.05 (7.30), n = 64. B indicates a predicted boomerang in the cell. U 
indicated that an unexpected boomerang in the cell. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 






Results of Post Hoc t Tests on the Belief toward Increasing the Legal Marriage Age 
 
DV1: Belief toward 
increasing the age of 
marriage 
Prior Belief: Oppose the policy Prior Belief: Support the policy 
1. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 
2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 










n = 14 
72.22 (93.11)  
n = 9 
80.57 (62.15) 
n = 7 
23.33 (34.79)** 





n = 10 
79.09 (44.60) 
n = 11 
104.17 (105.44) 
n = 12 
 
42.27 (68.97)* 







 n = 11 
125.33 (107.53) 
n = 12 
B 
31.00 (27.67)*  
n = 10 
38.89 (48.59)* 





 n = 10 
166.67 (150.55) 
n = 6 
82.73 (72.40) 
n = 11 
9.33 (18.31)***  
n = 15 
 
Note. N = 219. The mean of the control participants = 108.55 (101.29), n = 49. B indicates a predicted boomerang in the cell. U 
indicated that an unexpected boomerang in the cell. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 










Note. N = 238. The mean of the control participants = 19.89 (16.99), n = 64. B indicates a predicted boomerang in the cell. U 
indicated that an unexpected boomerang in the cell. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
  
DV2: The extent to 
which Ss like the 
current drinking age 




2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 












n = 14 
 
13.00 (13.04) 
n = 9 
B 
35.67 (14.62)* 
n = 8 
 
37.00 (14.07)** 






n = 15 
11.90 (12.28) 
n = 13 
26.73 (16.44) 
n = 7 
32.50 (15.45)* 









n = 16 
13.40 (11.01) 
n = 12 
27.69 (7.86) 
n = 4 
45.27 (10.86)*** 







n = 16 
15.00 (13.43) 




n = 6 
33.46 (10.82)* 





Results of Post Hoc t Tests on the Attitude toward Legal Marriage Age 
 
 
Note. N = 220. The mean of the control participants = 64.88 (52.26), n = 49. B indicates a predicted boomerang in the cell. U 
indicated that an unexpected boomerang in the cell. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
  
DV2: The extent to 
which Ss like the 
current marriage age 
Prior Belief: Oppose the policy Prior Belief: Support the policy 
1. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 
2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 
3. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 







    23.57 (29.18)**  
n = 14 
47.67 (40.70) 
n = 9 
82.43 (45.44) 
n = 7 
    95.83 (34.34)
†
 





16.70 (30.62)**  




 n = 11 
U 
102.92 (41.48)* 
n = 12 
110.45 (41.14)** 







n = 11 
53.58 (36.07) 





n = 10 
133.33 (56.79)** 




27.50 (35.22)*  
n = 10 
49.17 (44.77) 
 n = 6 
L 
91.36 (80.19) 
n = 11 
99.31 (34.34)** 




Note. N = 238. The mean of the control participants = 18.83 (2.90), n = 64. B indicates a predicted boomerang in the cell. U 
indicated that an unexpected boomerang in the cell. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 





Results of Post Hoc t Tests on the Belief Position for Drinking Age 
 
DV3: Belief position 
on drinking age 
Prior Belief: Oppose the policy Prior Belief: Support the policy 
1. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 
2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 
3. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 








18.14 (0.36)  
n = 14 
18.33 (0.71) 
n = 9 
20.38 (1.06) 
n = 8 
21.50 (1.51)** 






n = 15 
18.46 (0.97) 
 n = 13 
19.43 (1.51) 
n = 7 
20.13 (1.36) 







n = 16 
B 
18.08 (0.29)* 
n = 12 
23.50 (7.77) 
n = 4 
21.22 (0.83)* 





n = 16 
18.25 (0.45) 
 n = 12 
19.67 (1.51) 
n = 6 
20.82 (1.89)* 





Results of Post Hoc t Tests on the Belief Position for Marriage Age 
 
Note. N = 217. Mean of Control Group = 17.38 (1.42), n = 47. B indicates a predicted boomerang in the cell. U indicated that an 
unexpected boomerang in the cell. See Table 2 for how these dependent variables were transformed. 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
  
DV3: Belief position on 
marriage age 
Prior Belief: Oppose the policy Prior Belief: Support the policy 
1. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 
2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 
3. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 









n = 14 
B 
18.78 (1.48)** 
 n = 9 
18.14 (1.35) 
n = 7 
 
17.58 (1.51) 






n = 10 
U 
     18.36 (1.63)* 
n = 11 
17.92 (1.78) 
n = 12 
17.36 (1.57) 



















n = 10 
  
14.42 (4.25)* 
n = 6 
18.09 (1.64) 
 n = 11 
16.87 (1.13) 
n = 15 
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Appendix H: Number of Subjects who had a Boomerang in Each Experimental Condition 
Table H1 
 




DV1: Boomerang on 
Belief toward changing 
the age policy 
Prior Belief: Oppose the policy Prior Belief: Support the policy 
1. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 
2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 
3. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 








n = 15 of 27 
22.2% 
n = 4 of 18 
40% 
n = 6 of 15 
3.8% 






n = 7 of 25 
 
13% 
 n = 3 of 23 
26.3% 
n = 5 of 19 
21.1% 







n = 11 of 27 
33.3% 
n = 8 of 24 
28.6% 
n = 4 of 14 
0% 





n = 12 of 26 
27.8% 
 n = 5 of 18 
23.5% 
n = 4 of 17 
11.5% 










DV2: Boomerang on 
Attitude toward the 
policy 
Prior Belief: Oppose the policy Prior Belief: Support the policy 
1. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 
2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 
3. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 








n = 3 of 27 
11.1% 
n = 2 of 18 
6.7% 
n = 1 of 15 
15.4% 






n = 2 of 25 
 
13.3% 
 n = 3 of 23 
15.8% 
n = 3 of 19 
15.8% 







n = 5 of 27 
8.3% 
n = 2 of 24 
7.1% 
n = 1 of 14 
5.6% 





n = 5 of 26 
16.7% 
n = 3 of 18 
29.4% 
n = 5 of 17 
3.7% 












DV3: Boomerang on 
Belief Position 
Prior Belief: Oppose the policy Prior Belief: Support the policy 
1. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 
2. Message valence: 
Pro-policy 
3. Message valence: 
Anti-policy 








n = 2 of 27 
11.1% 
n = 2 of 18 
13.5% 
n = 2 of 15 
30.8% 






n = 2 of 25 
 
17.4% 
 n = 4 of 23 
42.1% 
n = 8 of 19 
42.1% 







n = 2 of 27 
20.8% 
n = 5 of 24 
28.6% 
n = 4 of 14 
38.9% 





n = 4 of 26 
38.9% 
  n = 7 of 18 
23.5% 
n = 4 of 17 
30.8% 
n = 8 of 26 
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Appendix I: Results from Auxiliary Interaction Tests 
Table I1 
 
Main and Interactional Effects of Subgroup, Perceived Threat, and Argument Quality  
Topic: Drinking  
DV1: Belief 
toward lowering 
the drinking age 
DV2: Attitude 
regarding the extent 
to which the drinking 
age was liked 
DV3: Belief 






111.25*** 114.00*** 103.53*** 
Perceived threat  .42 .13 .72 
Argument quality  .00 .34 .01 
Subgroup * 
Perceived threat 
.00 .16 .00 
Subgroup * 
Argument quality 
7.60** 1.21 6.17** 
𝑅2 | Adjusted 𝑅2 .41 | .40 .41 | .39 .40 | .38 
Topic: Marriage  
DV1: Belief 
toward raising the 
marriage age 
DV2: Attitude 
regarding the extent 
to which the marriage 
age was liked 
DV3: Belief 







14.58*** 58.75*** 11.28*** 
Perceived threat  4.23* .43 .18 
Argument quality  .80 1.28 .07 
Subgroup * 
Perceived threat 
6.03* .05 .11 
Subgroup * 
Argument quality 
.07 2.16 .29 
𝑅2 (Adjusted 𝑅2) .14 | .11 .28 | .25 .07 | .04 
Note. N = 174 for drinking age and N = 171 for marriage age. F values (sig.) for the main effects and 












Figure I1. The interaction between subgroup and argument quality on the belief boomerang for 
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